COGNITION AND CULTURE

SONJA KLEINKE
ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES
ANDREAS MUSOLFF
VERONIKA SZELID

THE ROLE OF METAPHOR AND METONYMY

NEW SZÉCHENYI PLAN

TÁLENTUM SOROZAT

COGNITION AND CULTURE

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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, the cognitive approach to metaphor and metonymy has made their relation to culture a central topic in its analyses, with a view to grounding conceptual mappings in culture-specific knowledge and folk-theory systems.[1] The strong epistemological hypotheses that cognitive theorists have formulated in favor of deriving "primary" metaphors from universal patterns of embodiment and in neural structures[2] have taken nothing away from this interest in the cultural specificity of metaphor and metonymy; instead, they have enhanced and complemented it[3]. Only when an alternative (i.e., embodiment-based) motivation potentially underlies the empirically observable data regarding the uses of metaphor and metonymy does a specific claim that they are culturally grounded amount to a testable hypothesis in the first place. Furthermore, any such hypotheses become all the more meaningful if they can explain how embodied and, hence, more universal meaning structures are both enriched by culturally specific patterns of conceptual integration and entrenched in socially, historically and contextually situated traditions of usage.[4] As a result, the past twenty-five years have seen exponential growth in empirically underpinned debates about synchronic and diachronic cross-cultural variation of metaphor and metonymy.[5]

Whilst the necessity of taking the culture- (or "nurture")-side of metaphor and metonymy into account is easy to understand and proclaim in broad terms of theoretical and methodological maxims, the implementation and operationalization of culturally oriented metaphor research is far from being fully established. On the one hand, culturalist accounts are characterized by a centrifugal pull in different directions on account of connections with different disciplines interested in culture, ranging as they do from socio- and psycholinguistic perspectives, over

[1] Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 22–24, 139; Kövecses 2005, 2006, 2009.

[2] Grady 1997; Grady – Johnson 2003; Lakoff – Johnson 1999; Lakoff 2008.

[3] Gibbs 1999; Zinken – Musolff 2009.

[4] Fauconnier – Turner 2003; Frank 2009.

[5] Kövecses 1986, 1995; Geeraerts – Grondelaers 1995; Panther – Radden 1995; Yu 2008a,b, 2009; Barcelona 2009; Winters et. al. 2010; Low et al. 2010; Musolff 2010.

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cultural and literary studies, to anthropology, ethnology and social psychology. Furthermore, formulating hypotheses about cross-cultural differences as well as similarities in the uses of metaphor and metonymy demand a significant amount of empirical data gathering that involves constructing special research corpora and checking their validity/reliability against larger, "general" corpora as well as other corpus-based findings.[6]

Insofar as the intensified interest in empirical linguistic data of metaphor and metonymy use has increased, the role of "context" has also become more central – not just in the sense that context-less examples have largely disappeared from current research debates but also in the theoretically significant sense that the character of context as a *culturally mediated* ensemble of genres, registers and discourse traditions, which shape and are in turn shaped by different types of conceptual metaphors, has become thematic[7]. Against this background the concrete discourse event with its specific discourse culture creates the micro-context for the actual use of cognitive metaphor and metonymy in natural interaction.

The vital role of cognitive metaphor and metonymy in shaping the construction of meaning in discourse at the macro- as well as the micro-level has long been acknowledged by cognitive linguistic research.[8] However, with the growth of empirical analyses of cognitive metaphor in natural interaction and the emergence of the discourse-oriented turn in cognitive linguistics as a new research paradigm[9], the frame has been set for more systematic analyses of the complex and multi-facetted discourse-organizing potential of cognitive metaphor and metonymy. The micro-level of the concrete discourse event is increasingly understood as the specific *cultural micro-frame* within which cognitive metaphor and metonymy as communicative practices enfold their *interactional* and *interpersonal* impact[10]. Empirical research has revealed that cognitive metaphor and metonymy are crucially involved in the creation of both coherence and cohesion at the micro-level of the concrete discourse event – not only as an important aspect of addressee-related inferential processes[11], but also in the actual *construction* of coherent discourse by the speaker[12]. Thus, implementing corpus-based, empirical studies of the actual ideational, interactive and interpersonal uses to which interlocuters put conceptual

[6] See Deignan 2008; Low et al. 2010.

[7] See Kövecses 2002: 239–245; Steen 2009; Gibbs – Lonergen 2009; Carston – Wearing 2011.

[8] See numerous empirical case studies on cognitive metaphor and metonymy in different genres and registers and e.g. Barcelona 2007 for a brief discussion.

[9] Cf. e.g. Gibbs 2008, Cameron 2008, Zinken – Musolff 2009, and Low – Todd – Deignan – Cameron 2010.

[10] See Barcelona 2003, 2007 or Coulson – Oakley 2003 on the role of metonymy in conceptual blending in a variety of discourse domains.

[11] See e.g. Barcelona 2003, 2007; Panther – Thornburg 1998, 2003.

[12] See e.g. Brdar-Szabó – Brdar 2011.

metaphor and metonymy adds a new perspective and strengthens our analytical toolkit for the systematic investigation of their discourse-related cultural aspects. At the same time, a bottom-up study of metaphor and metonymy in naturally occurring discourse may foster our understanding of the metaphorical and metonymic pathways speakers and addressees *actually take* in the construction and negotiation of ideational and interpersonal meaning, e.g. by showing the levels of granularity, degrees of creativity, variation in metaphor density and distribution[13], as well as interpersonal and interactional pragmatic short-term goals with which speakers use cognitive metaphors and metonymies in context, thereby shaping these contexts as specific discourse genres and registers.

The complexity and diversity of these context- and discourse-related processes, which are simultaneously rooted in the macro-culture of a speech community and the micro-culture of a concrete discourse event, have made a uniform treatment of cognitive metaphor and metonymy less plausible. This insight is also reflected in the structuring of this volume that encompasses various theoretical levels and empirical manifestations of metaphor and metonymy in culture. Ranging as it does from their role in creative poetry and other innovative text genres, including the development of scientific linguistic terminology, over political and religious registers and conventionalized proverbs to multimodal uses, this collection offers a prismatic array of cognitive and cultural perspectives on metaphor and metonymy in action.

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[13] See Cameron 2008.

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PART 1
CONTEXT

ÉVA ILLÉS*

APPROACHES TO CONTEXT

1. INTRODUCTION

Context is a widely evoked notion which plays a key role in the study of language use. In fact, it has come to the fore not only in language-related disciplines but in other research domains in humanities and hard sciences as well.[1] Its omnipresence and significance, however, has not made context an unproblematic concept. Context has remained notoriously hard to define and "difficult to analyze scientifically and grasp in all its different demeanors."[2] Various research traditions perceive and define context differently, emphasizing aspects of the concept they deem relevant.[3] The aim of the present paper is to provide an overview of how some schools of thought determine and (re)create context for the particular purposes of their analyses. The intention is to highlight how the conception of context varies depending on whose perspective is taken, and to explore how different approaches, including cognitive linguistics, can be grouped and compared in relation to their treatment of context. The inquiry will include a brief discussion of the implications of the cultural level of analysis and will also demonstrate how focusing on particular aspects of context results in partial descriptions of the concept.

2. LANGUAGE USE

In actual instances of language use knowledge of the language is insufficient. In order to understand the sign POPPY FACTORY on a building in south-west London, for example, it is necessary to be familiar with the tradition of Remembrance Day and to know that the emblem of it is the red poppy, a paper-plastic version of which is manufactured in this factory. Without this background information,

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[1] Akman – Bazzanella 2003.

[2] Akman – Bazzanella 2003: 321.

[3] House 2006.

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it is difficult to make sense of the sign, even if one knows the dictionary meaning of "poppy" and "factory."

In acts of communication, however, cultural knowledge often does not suffice and information about the particular situation is necessary to make sense. For example, the sentence "I couldn't do it." can have positive meanings if what could not be done is something negative, but can also obtain a negative sense if it is said by a student who could not do their homework, for instance. How the sentence is perceived is also dependent on who the first person singular pronoun refers to, what "it" entails and many other things. Therefore, without the knowledge of the particular context it is impossible to say what the sentence means when it becomes an utterance in an act of real-life communication. Context, that is shared knowledge of the world in general and a state of affairs of a specific situation in particular, thus complements meanings encoded in the language, and the interaction of the two, linguistic and non-linguistic resources, results in meaning obtained in actual language use.

3. THE NOTION OF CONTEXT

Firth's[4] definition (see Note 1) can serve as a starting point for the present inquiry in that it differentiates context from situation and perceives context as an abstract notion which can be subjected to scientific analysis. Firth also identifies relevance as the key concept which plays a crucial role in making meaning, a notion in reference to which different approaches to context can be distinguished in this paper.

In Firth's scheme, context is presented as an abstract schematic construct which "is not 'out there', so to speak, but in the mind."[5] It differs from situation in that it contains only those features of the situation which come into play when meaning is created. Since it is only features which pertain to meaning that constitute context, "Context, then, is not what is perceived in a particular situation, but what is conceived as relevant, and situational factors may have no relevance at all."[6]

Context as a schematic construct also presupposes assumptions about familiar ways of organizing the world and customary ways of conducting social interaction. This knowledge comes about as a result of our experiences as human beings, as members of a particular culture or cultures as well as individuals whose life trajectories, personal traits and experiences are unique. In Hofstede's model[7] these

[4] Firth 1957.
[5] Widdowson 1996: 63.
[6] Widdowson 2007: 21.
[7] Hofstede 2001: 3.

categories represent the three levels of human mental programming in the form of a pyramid where the universal is placed at the bottom, the collective in the middle and the individual at the top. It should be noted, however, that, as Hofstede[8] has also pointed out, this neat distinction of the layers of human knowledge is an abstraction, an analytical device to facilitate scientific inquiry. In reality these layers are intertwined and comprise a complex network.

In all the approaches discussed below context is viewed as an abstract mental representation. What distinguishes them is the perspective from which the notion is described. In analyst-oriented approaches it is the researcher who assigns relevance and determines context off-line, while in the participant-oriented paradigm the interlocutors decide what counts as relevant and they create context. The various approaches are also different in relation to the levels of mental programming they account for.

4. ANALYST-ORIENTED APPROACHES

The relevant features of the situation are determined by the researcher, who can work from two different directions. In the first case, the movement is from context to language. Through the analyst's observation and introspection context is devised by selecting the relevant extralinguistic features of the situation. Once context has been determined, the most commonly used language realizations are assigned to it, thus creating correspondence between form and function. The other approach moves in the opposite direction, from language to context, and recreates context from the linguistic data available to the researcher.

4.1 Analytic approaches: From context to language

One of the delineations of context has been offered by Hymes[9] who, using ethnographic observation, has attempted to draw up a schema of the universal dimensions and features of context. In the SPEAKING model Hymes[10] has identified eight components, the initials of which make up the acronym: (S)Setting/scene, (P)Participants, (E)Ends, (A)Art characteristics, (K)Key, (I)Instrumentalities, (N) Norms of interaction and interpretation and (G)Genres. Particular configurations of these constituents, the presence or lack as well as the relationship of various features define individual speech acts and speech events, and render them compa-

[8] Hofstede 2001: 2.
[9] Hymes 1972.
[10] Hymes 1967.

rable with other acts and events within the same community or with similar acts in other speech communities.[11] Hymes's schema of context, where the relevant features of the situation are selected by the outsider researcher, is to serve as an analytical device to make a descriptive theory of ways of speaking possible.

In Speech Act Theory, context comes about as a result of the language philosopher's introspection and comprises those features of the situation which present the conditions that must obtain for an utterance to count as a particular type of speech act, that is, to make a speech act felicitous.[12] For a statement to be interpreted as a promise, among others, the following conditions must obtain: the proposition predicates a future act of the speaker, the hearer prefers the speaker's carrying out the act to their not doing it and the future act is not part of the normal course of events. An utterance such as "I'll punch you in the face", even if it contains the performative verb 'promise', does not count as a promise because the act to be performed is not the preferred option of the speaker. The objective of speech act theory is to describe language use in terms of speech acts: once the sets of conditions for all speech acts have been established, a taxonomy of language use can be provided.[13] While the general conditions for the identification of various speech acts are assumed to be universal, there are differences at the cultural level. For example, not all speech acts are present in all cultures and their binding force may vary as well.[14]

4.2 Cognitive linguistics: From language to context

An alternative way of creating context is using linguistic data to examine the relationship between language and cognition in order to establish the cognitive models and principles which contribute to the creation and understanding of meaning. The rationale justifying the use of linguistic evidence can be summarized as follows:

> The world comes largely unstructured; it is (human) observers who do most of its structuring. A large part of this structuring is due to the linguistic system (which is a subsystem of culture). Language can shape and, according to the principle of linguistic relativity, does shape the way we think.[15]

[11] Hymes 1972.
[12] Searle 1991.
[13] Searle 1991.
[14] Huang 2007.
[15] Kövecses 2006: 12.

It follows from this that if language shapes the way people think, different languages influence the thinking of speakers of various languages differently. Therefore, some of the structured mental representations (the preferred term is 'frame' in cognitive linguistics and 'schema' in pragmatics) shared by a group of people will be language and therefore culture-specific. For instance, Hungarians who eat boiled meat with grated horseradish, have this particular frame which might be non-existent in other cultures.[16] Applied in this way, linguistic data can serve as a tool for cultural modelling.

4.3 Discussion

The context created in this paradigm is a generalized abstraction which serves as a tool for the analysis of various aspects of language use. The researchers aim either to identify the constituents of a context, be they situational features or conditions of use, or attempt to establish the categories and frames which govern the cognitive aspects of meaning-making.

Analysts abstract the general features from the particular instances of language use, and in so doing, they rid of the temporary, individual and ad hoc features of contexts. This inevitably results in the reduction of the complexity of real-time online construction of context and the fact that only two of the three levels of Hofstede' model[17], the universal and the cultural are covered.

Since the aim is to identify patterns and regularities in language use, be it through observation or introspection, situations which are ritualistic or highly conventional lend themselves to this kind of analysis more easily. One reason for this is the fact that such situations are relatively fixed and stable, which makes their relevant features more visible. Furthermore, in settings constrained by convention, the correspondence between language and context is closer and the choice of language is often fairly limited, which makes the typical linguistic realizations of a context more readily available to the analyst. As a result of this, much of the research into language use explores conventionalized contexts, which presents a limitation in the practice of this approach.

The concern with the universal and especially the cultural level of schemata or frames has given rise to the cross-cultural analysis of context by all three schools of thought within this paradigm. These analyses include the comparison of typical contexts together with the realization patterns of such contexts. Cross-cultural inquiry is based on the idealization of not only the language and context but of the particular cultures as well. The assumption is that speakers of a language are

[16] Kövecses 2006.
[17] Hofstede 2001.

constrained by the culture in which their language is spoken and therefore share not only the language but culturally-defined schemata as well.

Identifying the speaker of a language with the culture or the country where the language is used may result in the somewhat outdated and simplified 'one nation – one language – one culture' view, where culture is "essentialized into monolithic national cultures on the model of monolithic standard national languages."[18] In terms of context, this can translate into the assumption that all speakers of a language possess a particular set of schemata, and if a speaker does not have a schema within the set, that person is not the representative of the particular culture. It is worth noting that, somewhat paradoxically, considering the spread and use of English in international communication, English language teaching is still heavily influenced by such juxtaposing and comparison of native speaker and learner language use.[19]

As we have seen, the notion of context as a fixed generalization identified by the analyst cannot capture all aspects of context:

> […] this analysis so far is designed only to give us the bare bones of the modes of meaning and not to convey all of the subtle distinctions involved in actual discourse. […] this analysis cannot account for all the richness and variety of actual speech acts in actual natural language. Of course not. It was not designed to address that issue.[20]

5. PARTICIPANT-ORIENTED APPROACH

It is this approach which attempts to address the issues left unanswered by the analyst-oriented paradigm. Instead of taking an outsider stance, it aims to capture how insiders within a particular instance of language use select the relevant features of a situation when making meaning. Since it is the participants who decide which features of the situation pertain and make up context, the schematic construct necessarily includes individual and ad hoc features. Therefore, context in this paradigm is viewed as follows:

> A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that affect the interpretation of an utterance. A context in this

[18] Kramsch 2004: 250.
[19] Kramsch 2004.
[20] Searle in Thomas 1995: 99.

> sense is not limited to information about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding utterances: expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker, may all play a role in interpretation.[21]

In actual situations, especially in less conventionalized ones, any part of the interactants' schematic knowledge can contribute to the creation of meaning. In addition, through various stages of the interaction meanings are negotiated between the interlocutors, which renders context fluid and makes a componential analysis of real-time, online contexts difficult, if not impossible. Since the focus here is on the process of context construction and meaning making, the question is not what makes up context but *how* participants create context online in order to arrive at mutual understanding.

In the Cooperative Principle Grice[22] attempts to capture how participants select the relevant features of context and what kind of logic ordinary people employ when they create meaning in acts of communication. Rather than defining the constituents therefore, Grice identifies the maxims, in reference to which elements of a situation pertaining to context are selected by the insider interactants.

Context in the procedural paradigm is thus a fluid construct which is created online, and which reflects the participants' perspective. Grasping how and what meaning participants arrive at online therefore requires an emic approach which reveals what goes on in the speakers/hearers' mind when they negotiate and establish common meaning. One suggested way of making the invisible visible is close observation of or, preferably, engagement in complete speech events rather than segments of decontextualized interaction.[23] Even then, the particular line of logic followed by the participants on a particular occasion is hard to recover and is often impossible. Lack of closeness, both physically and mentally, and distance in time and space make it impossible, for instance, to answer the question of why and how the Song of Songs found its way into the Bible[24] or what the representative of a lobby group meant by *whisper* in his assessment of a G8 summit.[25] In the latter case, the absence of information about the speaker and the specific circumstances surrounding the utterance results in the suggested interpretation of the analyst, which reflects the analyst's perspective and does not therefore necessarily coincide with the meaning the speaker originally intended.

[21] Sperber – Wilson 1986: 18.
[22] Grice 1975.
[23] Seidlhofer 2009.
[24] See Szelid (in this compilation).
[25] See Kövecses (in this compilation).

6. CONCLUSIONS

The different approaches to context adopt differing perspectives and focus on those features of the notion which make the investigation of a particular aspect of language use possible for the researcher. In the analyst-oriented paradigm the universal and culture-specific features of context are identified by the outsider researcher, allowing for componential and cross-cultural analyses of schemata and frames. This approach, however, can account for neither the individual level of the context schema nor for the emergent and fluid nature context displays in real-life online communication. While a participant- and process-oriented approach can overcome these problems, the difficulty here lies with the recovering of the individual and fortuitous features of context. As a result, this paradigm is better suited to answer the question of how context is established rather than what constitutes it.

As we have seen, the various approaches complement each other as none of them is able to fully grasp the complex notion of context – a trait that characterizes scientific inquiry which can offer "partial views of reality" and partial truths at best.[26]

NOTES

1.

[…] 'context of situation' is best used as a suitable **schematic construct** to apply to language events, and that it is a group of related categories at a different level from grammatical categories but rather of the same abstract nature. A context of situation for linguistic work brings into relation the following categories:

A The **relevant** features of participants: persons, personalities
(i) The verbal action of the participants.
(ii) The non-verbal action of the participants.
B The **relevant** objects.
C The effect of the verbal action.[27]

[26] Widdowson 2009: 243.
[27] Firth 1957: 182, my emphasis.

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Zoltán Kövecses

CREATING METAPHOR IN CONTEXT

1. INTRODUCTION

In my book *Metaphor in Culture*, I show that there is both universality and variation in the conceptual metaphors people produce and use.[1] I argue, furthermore, that both the universality and the variation result from what I call the "pressure of coherence." People tend to be coherent both with their bodies and the surrounding context when, in general, they conceptualize the world or when they conceptualize it metaphorically. Since the body and its processes are universal, many of our conceptual metaphors will be (near-)universal. And, in the same way, since the contexts are variable, many of our conceptual metaphors will also be variable. In other words, the principle of the pressure of coherence takes two forms: the pressure of the body and the pressure of context.

Cognitive linguists have paid more attention to the role of the body in the creation of conceptual metaphors, supporting the view of embodied cognition. In my own work, I attempted to redress the balance by focusing on what I take to be the equally important role of the context. In particular, I suggested that there are a number of questions we have to deal with in order arrive at a reasonable theory of metaphor variation. The questions are as follows:

What are the dimensions of metaphor variation?
What are the aspects of conceptual metaphors that are involved in variation?
What are the causes of metaphor variation?

The first question has to do with "where" metaphor variation can be found. My survey of variation in conceptual metaphors indicated that variation is most likely to occur cross-culturally, within-culture, or individually, as well as historically and developmentally. I called these the "dimensions" of metaphor variation. Conceptual metaphors tend to vary along these dimensions.

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[1] Kövecses 2005.

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The second question assumes that conceptual metaphors have a number of different aspects, including the following: source domain, target domain, experiential basis, relationship between the source and target, metaphorical linguistic expressions, mappings, entailments (inferences), nonlinguistic realizations, blends, and cultural models. These either produce metaphor variation (e.g., blends) or are affected by it (e.g., source domain, metaphorical linguistic expressions, entailments).

The third question is the crucial one for my purposes here. It asks what the factors, or "forces," are that are responsible for variation in conceptual metaphors. I proposed two distinct though interlocking groups of factors: differential experience and differential cognitive styles. I found it convenient to distinguish various subcases of differential experience: awareness of context, differential memory, and differential concerns and interests.

Awareness of context includes awareness of the physical context, social context, cultural context, but also of the immediate communicative situation. Differential memory is the memory of events and objects shared by a community or of a single individual; we can think of it as the history of a group or that of an individual. Differential concerns and interests can also characterize either groups or individuals. It is the general attitude with which groups or individuals act or are predisposed to act in the world. Differential experience, thus, characterizes both groups and individuals, and, as context, it ranges from global to local. The global context is the general knowledge that the whole group shares and that, as a result, affects all group members in using metaphors. The local context is the specific knowledge that pertains to a specific situation involving particular individuals. More generally, it can be suggested that the global context is essentially a shared system of concepts in long-term memory (reflected in conventional linguistic usage), whereas the local context is the situation in which particular individuals conceptualize a specific situation.

By contrast, differential cognitive styles can be defined as the characteristic ways in which members of a group employ the cognitive processes available to them. Such cognitive processes as elaboration, specificity, conventionalization, transparency, (experiential) focus, viewpoint preference, prototype categorization, framing, metaphor vs. metonymy preference, and others, though universally available to all humans, are not employed in the same way by groups or individuals. Since the cognitive processes used can vary, there can be variation in the use of metaphors as well.

In sum, the two large groups of causes, differential experience and differential cognitive styles, account for much of the variation we find in the use of conceptual metaphors.

2. CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCE ON THE CREATION OF METAPHORS

Let us now review some of these causes as contextual factors that influence the creation of metaphors in particular communicative contexts.

Differential experience

Surrounding discourse: Sometimes it is the surrounding linguistic context (i.e., what comes before and after a particular unit of discourse) that influences the choice of metaphors, as in the sentence "The Americanization of Japanese car industry *shifts into higher gear*," analyzed by Kövecses.[2] The expression *shift into higher gear* is used because the immediate linguistic context involves the "car industry."

Previous discourses on the same topic: Given a particular topic, a range of conceptual metaphors can be set up. Such metaphors, that is, metaphorical source domains, often lead to new source domains in continuations of the debate involving the topic by, for example, offering a source domain relative to one of former ones. This commonly occurs in scientific discussion.[3]

Dominant forms of discourse and intertextuality: It is common practice that a particular metaphor in one dominant form of discourse is recycled in other discourses. One example is Biblical discourse. Biblical metaphors are often recycled in later discourses assigning new values to the later versions.

Ideology underlying discourse: Ideology underlying a piece of discourse can determine the metaphors that are used. Goatly's[4] work shows that different ideologies lead to different metaphors.

Knowledge about the main elements of the discourse: The main elements of discourse include the speaker/conceptualizer1, topic/theme of discourse, and hearer/addressee/conceptualizer2. Knowledge about any one of these may lead to the use of particular metaphors.

Physical environment: This is the physical setting in which a communicative exchange takes place. The physical setting includes the physical circumstances, viewing arrangement, salient properties of the environment, and so on. These aspects of the physical environment can influence the choice of metaphors.

Social situation: Social aspects of the setting can involve such distinctions as man vs. woman, power relations in society, conceptions of work, and many others. They

[2] See Kövecses 2005.
[3] See, e.g., Nerlich 2007.
[4] Goatly 2008.

can all play a role in which metaphors are used in the course of metaphorical conceptualization.

Cultural situation: The cultural factors that affect metaphorical conceptualization include the dominant values and characteristics of members of a group, the key ideas or concepts that govern their lives, the various subgroups that make up the group, the various products of culture, and a large number of other things. All of these cultural aspects of the setting can supply members of the group with a variety of metaphorical source domains.

History: By history I mean the memory of events and objects in members of a group. Such memories can be used to create highly conventional metaphors (e.g., *carry coal to Newcastle*) or they can be used to understand situations in novel ways.[5]

Interests and concerns: These are the major interests and concerns of the group or person participating in the discourse. Both groups and individuals may be dedicated to particular activities, rather than others. The commonly and habitually pursued activities become metaphorical source domains more readily than those that are marginal.

Differential cognitive styles

Experiential focus: Given multiple aspects of embodiment for a particular target domain, groups of speakers and even individuals may differ in which aspect of its embodiment they will use for metaphorical conceptualization.[6]

Salience: In a sense, salience is the converse of focusing on something. In focusing, a person highlights (an aspect of) something, whereas in the case of salience (an aspect of) something becomes salient for the person. In different cultures different concepts are salient, that is, psychologically more prominent. Salient concepts are more likely to become both source and target domains than nonsalient ones and their salience may depend on the ideology that underlies discourse.

Prototype categorization: Often, there are differences in the prototypes across groups and individuals. When such prototypical categories become source domains for metaphors, the result is variation in metaphor.

Framing: Groups and individuals may use the "same" source concept in metaphorical conceptualization, but they may frame the "same" concept differentially. The resulting metaphors will show variation (in proportion to differences in framing).

[5] Kövecses 2005.
[6] See Kövecses 2005.

Metaphor vs. metonymy preference: Several cognitive processes may be used to conceptualize a particular target domain. Groups and individuals may differ in which cognitive process they prefer. A common difference across groups and people involves whether they prefer metaphorical or metonymical conceptualization for a target domain.

Elaboration: As noted by Barcelona,[7] a particular conceptual metaphor may give rise to a larger or smaller number of linguistic expressions in different languages. If it gives rise to a larger number, it is more elaborated.

Specificity: Barcelona[8] notes that metaphors may vary according to which level of a conceptual hierarchy they are expressed in two groups. A group of speakers may express a particular meaning at one level, whereas the same meaning may be expressed at another level of the hierarchy by another group.

Conventionalization: Barcelona[9] observes that linguistic instantiations of the same conceptual metaphor in two languages may differ in their degree of conventionalization. A linguistic metaphor in one language may be more or less conventional than the corresponding linguistic metaphor in another language.

These are some of the contextual factors that do seem to play a role in shaping metaphorical conceptualization, more specifically, in creating (often novel) metaphors. Most of the time the factors do not function by themselves; instead, they exert their influence on the conceptualization process jointly. Several of the factors listed above can simultaneously influence the use of metaphors.

I will now examine two examples in some detail to demonstrate these mechanisms: First, I will analyze a case where the physical properties of a situation are (at least in part) responsible for the emergence of a (novel) metaphor. Second, I will turn to the concept of SELF to see how ideology as context may influence its conceptualization. The examination of the second example will lead to a need to refine the view concerning the influence of context on metaphor.

[7] Barcelona 2001.
[8] Barcelona 2001.
[9] Barcelona 2001.

3. PERCEPTUAL QUALITIES OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Let us see how the *perceptual qualities* characteristic of a physical setting can have an effect on the creation and use of unconventional metaphorical expressions. Consider an example taken from Semino.[10] She analyzes the metaphors used by various participants at the 2005 G8 summit in Scotland on the basis of an article about the summit. In conjunction with the summit a major rock concert called Live 8 was held. Some participants assessed what the G8 summit had achieved positively, while some had doubts concerning its results. Semino has this to say about one such negative assessment she found in the article reporting on the summit:

> In contrast, a representative of an anti-poverty group is quoted as negatively assessing the G8 summit in comparison with the Live 8 concert via a metaphor to do with sound:
>
> 1.1 Dr Kumi Naidoo, from the anti-poverty lobby group G-Cap, said after "the roar" produced by Live 8, the G8 had uttered "a whisper".
>
> The reference to 'roar' could be a nonmetaphorical description of the sound made by the crowd at the concert. However, the use of 'whisper' in relation to the summit is clearly a (negative) metaphorical description of the outcome of the discussions in terms of a sound characterized by lack of loudness. Hence, the contrast in loudness between the sounds indicated by 'roar' and 'whisper' is used metaphorically to establish a contrast between the strength of feeling and commitment expressed by the concert audiences and the lack of resolve and effectiveness shown by the G8 leaders.

While in general I agree with this account of the metaphor used, I would also add that the metaphor arises from the physical(-social) context in which it is produced. Dr. Kumi Naidoo creates the metaphor *whisper* against a background in which there is a very loud concert and a comparatively quiet summit meeting. We can think of the loudness and the relative quiet of the occasion as perceptual features of the two events. In other words, I would suggest that the particular metaphor derives from some of the perceptual features that characterize the physical(-social) setting.

As Semino points out, *whisper* is clearly metaphorical. It is informative to look at how it acquires its metaphorical meaning. How can it mean 'the lack of resolve

[10] Semino 2008: 3–4.

and effectiveness,' as proposed by Semino? Or, to put the question differently, why do we have the sense that this is indeed the intended meaning of the metaphor? After all, 'whisper' and 'lack of resolve and effectiveness' appear to be fairly different and distant notions. What is the conceptual pathway that can take us from 'whisper' to 'lack of resolve and effectiveness'? My suggestion is that the pathway is made up of a number of conceptual metaphors and metonymies that function at various levels of schematicity.

First, there is the highly generic metaphor INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT. Second, a metonymy that is involved is the more specific EMOTIONAL RESPONSES FOR THE EMOTIONS. Third, we have the even more specific metonymy ANGRY BEHAVIOR FOR ANGER/ ARGUMENT. And, finally, there is the metonymy that connects emotions with actions: EMOTION FOR DETERMINATION TO ACT. My claim is that we need each of these metaphors and metonymies in order to be able to account for the meaning of the word *whisper* in the example. In all this the INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT metaphor is especially important, in that it provides us with the connection between the degree of the loudness of the verbal behavior and the intensity of the determination, or resolve, to act. Since whisper is low on the degree of verbal intensity, it will indicate a low degree of intensity of resolve; hence the meaning of *whisper*: 'lack of resolve (and effectiveness).' Given these metaphors and metonymies in our conceptual system, we find it natural that *whisper* can have this meaning.

But the main conclusion from this analysis is that features of the physical setting can trigger the use of certain metaphoric and metonymic expressions. No matter how distant the literal and the figurative meanings are from one another, we can construct and reconstruct the appropriate conceptual pathways that provide a sensible link between the two. In the present example, the original conceptualizer, then the journalist who reported on the event, and finally the analysts of the discourse produced by the previous two can all figure out what the intended meanings of the words *whisper* and *roar* probably are, given our shared conceptualization of (some of the perceptual qualities of) the physical context.

4. IDEOLOGY AS CONTEXT: A COMPLICATION IN THE CONTEXT-METAPHOR RELATIONSHIP

In the cognitive linguistic view, a concept is assumed to be represented in the mind by a number of other concepts that form a coherent whole, a functional domain, that is, a mental frame. In other cases, however, a number of concepts can hang together in a coherent fashion without forming a tight frame-like structure. This happens in the case of worldviews or ideologies, where a number of concepts occur together forming a loose network of ideas. Such loose networks of ideas can govern the way we think and talk about several aspects of the world. As an example, consider the concept of the SELF, as it is used in western societies.[11]

> The **self** is an individual person as the object of his or her own reflective consciousness.[12]

We commonly refer to the self with the words *I* and *me* in English. These words represent different aspects of the self – the subjective knower and the object that is known.[13] The concept of the SELF seems to be a universal and it is also lexicalized in probably all languages of the world.

How universal might the *metaphorical conceptualization* of the self be? If we look at some of metaphorical linguistic examples, one can easily be led to believe that what we have here is a unique – an English or a Western – metaphor system of the self, or more generally, inner life. Linguistic examples in English, like *hanging out with oneself, being out to lunch, being on cloud nine, pampering oneself,* etc. might suggest that the conceptual metaphors that underlie these examples are culture-specific conceptual metaphors. But they are not. As it turns out, the same conceptual metaphors that underlie such expressions show up in cultures where one would not expect them. Lakoff and Johnson[14] report that the system can be found in Japanese. Moreover, many of the examples translate readily into Hungarian, which shows that the system is not alien to speakers of Hungarian either.[15] Below I provide linguistic examples for some conceptual metaphors

[11] A perceptive study of the internal structure of the self in western societies is WOLF 1994. The present study investigates the *external* relations of the concept.
[12] Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self)
[13] Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self)
[14] LAKOFF – JOHNSON 1999.
[15] KÖVECSES 2005.

identified by Lakoff and Johnson for English in both Japanese and Hungarian. The Japanese examples come from Lakoff and Johnson.[16]

The PHYSICAL-OBJECT SELF metaphor

JAPANESE:

SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION
Kare-wa dokusyo-ni ware-o wasure-ta.
He-TOP reading-LOC self-ACC lose[forget]-PAST
Lit.: "He lost self reading."
"He lost himself in reading."

HUNGARIAN:

BODY CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT
Alig tudtam elvonszolni magam a kórházig.
Hardly could carry-with-difficulty myself the hospital-to
I could hardly make it to the hospital.

SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION
Teljesen elereszteTte magát.
Completely let-go-PAST herself
She let it all hang out.

The LOCATIONAL SELF metaphor

JAPANESE:

The SCATTERED SELF metaphor
ATTENTIONAL SELF-CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER
Kare-wa ki-o hiki-sime-ta.
He-TOP spirit-ACC pull-tighten-PAST
Lit.: "He pulled-and-tightened his spirits."
"He pulled himself together."

The OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT metaphor
Zibun-no kara-kara de-te, zibun-o yoku mitume-ru koto-ga taisetu da.

[16] Lakoff – Johnson 1999: 284–287.

Self-GEN shell-from get out-CONJ self-ACC well stare-PRES COMP-NOM important COP
Lit.: "To get out of self's shell and stare at self well is important."
"It is important to get out of yourself and look at yourself well."

HUNGARIAN:

THE SELF AS CONTAINER
Magamon kivül voltam.
Myself-on outside was-I
I was beside myself.

The SCATTERED SELF metaphor

ATTENTIONAL SELF-CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER
Szedd össze magad!
Pick-IMP together yourself
Pull yourself together!

SELF CONTROL IS BEING ON THE GROUND
Kicsúszott a talaj a lába alól.
Out-slipped the ground the foot-his from-under
He lost his bearings.

TAKING AN OBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IS LOOKING AT THE SELF FROM OUTSIDE
Nézz egy kicsit magadba és meglátod, hogy hibáztál.
Look a little yourself-into and see that made-mistake-you
Take a look at yourself and you'll see that you've made a mistake.

The SOCIAL SELF metaphor

JAPANESE:

The SELF AS VICTIM metaphor
Zibun-o azamuite-wa ikena-i.
Self-ACC deceive-TOP bad-PRES
Lit.: "To deceive self is bad."
"You must not deceive yourself."

The SELF AS SERVANT metaphor
Kare-wa hito-ni sinsetuni-suru yooni zibun-ni iikikase-ta.
He-TOP people-DAT kind-do COMP self-DAT tell-PAST
"He told himself to be kind to people."

HUNGARIAN:

The SUBJECT AND SELF AS ADVERSARIES metaphor
Meg kellett küzdenie saját magával.
PART had-to struggle-he own self-with
He had to struggle/ fight with himself.

The SELF AS CHILD metaphor
Megjutalmazom magam egy pohár sörrel.
PART-reward-I myself one glass beer-with
I'll reward myself with a glass of beer.

The SELF AS SERVANT metaphor
Rá kell kényszeritenem magam a korai lefekvésre.
Onto must force-I myself the early going-to-bed
I must force myself to go to bed early.

Given this similarity in metaphorical conceptualization, can we assume that the concept of SELF is a uniform notion in languages/cultures of the world? The major issue that I attempt to explore here is whether this notion of the self is uniform or not, and if not, in precisely what ways it varies, and why.

The networks of concepts associated with the self

In societies that emphasize the self, the concept is associated with a number of other concepts, including:

Independence (personal)
Self-centered
Self-expression
Self-indulgence
Personal goals and desires
Happiness (personal)
Achievement (personal)
Self-interest

Selfishness
Suspicion
Pride
Competition
Indifference

We can call a society with such a network of concepts *individualistic*. We can characterize this network as follows:

- In such a society, individual people will regard themselves as being **independent of others**, i.e., as autonomous.
- The self will view the world from his or her own perspective and finds him- or herself in the center. In other words, the self in **self-centered**.
- The self is taken to be expressible and **self-expression** is encouraged.
- The self seeks pleasure; in other words, he/she is **self-indulgent**.
- Individual people will have their own unique **personal goals and desires**.
- The self's main goal and desire is **personal happiness**. This is most explicitly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence ("the pursuit of happiness").
- Individual persons want to **achieve their personal life goals**, and they regard the success of achieving them as the main measure of success and happiness in life.
- The self is driven by **self-interest**. The interest of the self comes before the interest of the others or the group.
- People are "naturally" **selfish**. In a world of limited resources, they know that they accomplish life goals at the expense of others.
- The self views others with **suspicion**. This is because others are potential rivals in the way of accomplishing life goals.
- The self is **proud**. They assume they are better and/or more important than others.
- Individual people engage in **competition** against others in order to achieve life goals. They regard fair competition as the only fair way of accomplishing life goals.
- Such people feel **indifferent** to others. They feel that they have "won" in a fair competition and that the others they have defeated "deserve their fate."

However, there are societies where the SELF concept goes together with a different network. For example, the network of concepts below can be regarded as the opposite of the network above:

Interdependence
Other-centered
Saving the other's face
Self-denial
Social goals and desires
Happiness (social)
Achievement (social)
Interest (social)
Sharing
Trust
Humility
Cooperation
Care, Concern

Where such a network of concepts exists, we can call that society *collectivistic*. It can be described in the following way:

- In such a society, the self will view himself or herself as **interdependent on each other**.
- The self will look at the world from the perspective of the others. In other words, the self is **other-centered**.
- The self will prefer to **save the other's face**. The expression of the self is taken to be secondary.
- The self is characterized by **self-denial**.
- The self's **goals and desires are shared** ones – goals and desires that have to do with the whole group.
- The major life goal of the self is **happiness for the whole group**; personal happiness is secondary.
- The self wants to **achieve the betterment of the entire society**. They consider this as their primary objective.
- The self's actions are motivated by the **interests of the whole group**. Self-interest serves as secondary motivation.
- The self has the attitude of **sharing** in their relations to others. This means that he or she tries to further the well-being of others in the group and he or she will try to further the general well-being of the group.
- The self **trusts** others in the group, as their goals and desires are shared.
- The self's attitude is that of **humility** toward other members of the group and the group as a whole.
- The self **cooperates** with others in the group in order to promote the well-being of members of the group and that of the group.

- The self **cares** for other members of the group and he or she is **concerned** about the interest of the whole group.

The concepts that characterize collectivistic societies can also be found in individualistic ones, and the concepts that characterize individualistic societies can also be found in collectivistic ones. After all, individualistic societies do have the concepts used to characterize collectivistic societies, and probably we have a similar situation with regard to the concepts that characterize collectivistic ones. However, in both cases we have preferential tendencies as regards the co-occurrence of the concepts above.

The two sets of concepts can be brought into correspondence with each other in the following way:

Independence (personal)	–	Interdependence
Self-centered	–	Other-centered
Self-expression	–	Saving the other's face
Self-indulgence	–	Self-denial
Personal goals and desires	–	Social goals and desires
Happiness (personal)	–	Happiness (social)
Achievement (personal)	–	Achievement (social)
Self-interest	–	Interest (social)
Selfishness	–	Sharing
Suspicion	–	Trust
Pride	–	Humility
Competition	–	Cooperation
Indifference	–	Care, Concern

Since the concepts come from the two ends of the same scale, they appear to be each other's opposites. For example, in the intended sense, independence is the opposite of interdependence, personal happiness is that of social happiness, suspicion is that of trust, and pride is that of humility. Thus, the concept of the SELF seems to cooccur with two very different networks of concepts. In the former, the self is highly emphasized and in the latter it is deemphasized.

This conclusion makes it necessary to propose a more refined view of contextual influence on metaphorical conceptualization than I suggested at the beginning of the paper. There my initial assumption was that differences in contextual factors will lead to differences in *metaphorical* conceptualization. But what we actually saw above was that differences in the contextual factor of ideology did not lead to differences in *metaphorical* conceptualization – at least in the three languages/cultures we examined. Instead, the contextual factor of ideology led to a difference

in the *salience* of the concept of SELF. The self appears to be much more salient in individualistic societies (characterized by the first network of concepts) than in collectivistic ones (characterized by the second). In other words, contextual influence may not necessarily affect metaphorical conceptualization but can affect other aspects of concepts (such as salience).

5. CONCLUSIONS

A number of contextual factors have been identified in the paper, but possibly there are more. The workings of these factors suggest that conceptualizers take advantage of the various factors that make up the immediate (local) and nonimmediate (global) context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes place. We can think of this contextual influence on conceptualization as large-scale priming by context that is occurring simultaneously (and competitively) with the influence of entrenched embodiment. As a result of this interaction (this 'in vivo' priming), the abstract concepts in the conceptual system and the system as such are constantly shaped and at the same time they shape the way we conceptualize the world.

However, we also saw that different conceptual factors do not mechanically and automatically lead to differences in the metaphorical conceptualization of a concept. Rather, contextual influence may affect other aspects of a concept used in context (e.g., its salience) and leave *metaphorical* conceptualization unaffected. But at the present stage of research this cannot be a very strong claim. A single concept in just three languages (no matter how radically different they are) simply does not provide enough evidence for it. Clearly, there is a great deal of need for further research in this area.

INTERNET SOURCE

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PART 2
LINGUISTIC CREATIVITY

RÉKA BENCZES*

WHY SNAIL MAIL AND NOT TORTOISE MAIL?

ON THE ROLE OF RHYME IN NOVEL CREATIVE COMPOUNDS

INTRODUCTION

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In a relatively recent article from the British edition of the weekly women's magazine, *Grazia*, I came across the following headline: "J-Lo goes Lo-Co for Bradley".[1] For those who are not that well-versed in celebrity gossip, what the headline wished to communicate to its readers was that the actress Jennifer Lopez (a.k.a. J-Lo) had gone crazy about fellow actor Bradley Cooper. The star expression of the headline is, without doubt, the hapax *Lo-Co*. First of all, it is a play on the expression *to go loco*, meaning 'to go out of one's mind, to be crazy'.[2] Second, it is a clipped (and blended) form of the surnames of the two individuals, i.e., Lopez and Cooper.

It can be hypothesized that one of the principle motivating factors behind the creation of *Lo-Co* was the rhyme of *Lo* with *Co*. Phonological analogy (which is understood here as structural similarity to phonological form) such as rhyme, as an influencing feature in the formation of novel words and expressions in English, is by no means uncommon.[3] Interestingly, it can be found relatively frequently in highly creative – and often funny – compounds which are based upon conceptual metaphors and metonymies and whose humour lies in the unconventional application of these cognitive mechanisms (termed as "creative compounds").[4] Rhyme in creative compounds can surface in two main forms:

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[1] Source: *Grazia*, 26 September 2011.

[2] Source: *Webster's*.

[3] For a detailed discussion on the role of alliteration and rhyme in novel compound formation, see BENCZES (n.d.).

[4] See BENCZES (2006) for a detailed discussion of creative compounds.

1. Rhyme between the constituents of the compound, as in *snail mail* ('the physical delivery of mail, as by the postal service, considered as slow in comparison to electronic mail; a letter, etc., sent by post').[5]
2. Rhyme with an already existing expression, as in the case of *knee-mail* ('a prayer, especially one said while kneeling',[6] which has been most probably coined on the basis of the rhyme to the compound *e-mail*.[7]

Such examples clearly attest to the influence that phonological analogy – more specifically rhyme – has in the creation of such expressions. Accordingly, the paper will analyze these two types of phonological analogy in the creation of creative compounds and will attempt to outline the possible functions that rhyme might have in both the creation *and* comprehension of novel expressions.

2. RHYME BETWEEN CONSTITUENT$_1$ AND CONSTITUENT$_2$ ("RHYMING COMPOUNDS")

Often, the head element of a compound expression rhymes with the modifier, as in *backpack*, *bigwig* or *hotshot*, to name just a few of the lexicalized units. Such compounds are often dubbed as "rhyming compounds" in linguistic literature.[8] A prime example for this phenomenon is *snail mail*, which emerged after the appearance of e-mail. The compound emphasizes the fact that regular mail is much slower than e-mail, and manages to achieve this in a quite humorous manner. This jocular effect can be traced back to the metaphor and metonymy on which the compound itself is based on. First of all, the modifier, *snail*, stands for slowness, via the DEFINING PROPERTY FOR CATEGORY metonymy (as the salient property of a snail is its slowness). Moreover, there is a metaphorical relationship between the head and its modifier, where the former is metaphorically construed as the latter. In this case, we have a man-made, complex object (mail) conceptualized as an animal (snail). Such a conceptualization is by no means irregular: we quite routinely use one level of The Great Chain of Being metaphor system,[9] such as animals, to understand another level, such as complex objects. Needless to say, the selection of the modifier element, *snail*, was most probably influenced by its

[5] Source: *Oxford English Dictionary*, henceforth *OED*.
[6] Source: http://www.wordspy.com; henceforth Wordspy.
[7] As the "e" element of the compound is an abbreviated form of the adjective *electronic*, I will consider *e-mail* a compound word.
[8] See, for e.g., KATAMBA 2005: 73.
[9] LAKOFF – TURNER 1989.

rhyme to *mail* – after all, there are other animals as well which are notoriously slow, such as the tortoise (fabled by Aesop as well). The inherent humour of the expression lies in the clash between the phonological similarity of the component nouns and their very apparent conceptual dissimilarity.

A further humorous, rhyming compound is *hobby bobby* ('a volunteer or part-time police constable, particularly in Britain'.[10] Here the head element, *bobby*, is metonymic, as it comes after Sir Robert ("Bobby") Peel, who, as British Home Secretary, founded the London Metropolitan Police in 1828.[11] Therefore, the metonymical relationship is based on the head of an institution (Robert "Bobby" Peel) standing for the members of that institution (the policemen). It is a rather interesting fact that *bobby*, according to the *Longman Dictionary Of Contemporary English* (*LDOCE*), is an old-fashioned, informal term; more modern expressions include *police officer* or *constable*. Nevertheless, the fact that *bobby* won out over the other, more conventional terms can be accounted for by a number of possible reasons. First and foremost, *bobby* rhymes with *hobby*. The rhyming quality of the expression lends a slightly informal, colloquial, even playful element to the compound, which is further emphasized by the informality of the term *bobby*. Second, *bobby* is an old-fashioned term, which means that its appearance in a novel compound will undoubtedly highlight the unconventionality of the police officer to which the expression refers. Coupled with the modifying element *hobby*, which draws attention to the fact that such people do this sort of work in their pastime, as a form of enjoyment, the result is a slightly jocular, informal compound that is in perfect agreement with the intended meaning: *hobby bobbies* are not "real" police officers in the sense that they do not have the same powers as regular members of the police, but nevertheless, do this sort of work because they enjoy doing it.[12]

The foregrounding of sounds that is achieved through rhyme is a very efficient tool in foregrounding an expression to achieve emphasis, and it can also considerably ease comprehension and recall.[13] Translating this onto the word-level, rhyming compounds are therefore more adept at capturing our attention, and are much easier to remember later on (thereby increasing their chances of becoming

[10] Source: Wordspy.

[11] Source: http://www.word-origins.com/definition/bobby.html. Note that the officers of the Metropolitan Police were first actually known as *Peelers*, also after Sir Robert Peel, but a couple of decades later the name became obsolete as the expression *bobby* became increasingly popular (ibid.).

[12] Note also the meaning of *hobby bobby* as provided by the Urban Dictionary (http://www.urbandictionary.com): 'community police officer that doesn't have the power of a real police officer'.

Nevertheless, while the first citation of the compound (in 1981) referred to people who were involved primarily in police–community relations and did not enforce the law as such, two citations from 2010 use *hobby bobby* to refer to volunteers who have exactly the same powers as regular members of the police (source: Wordspy).

[13] Lea et al. 2008: 18.

lexicalized units of the lexicon). Furthermore, what the analyzed examples clearly show is that rhyme also plays a significant role in intensifying the meaning of the individual compounds. The rhyming feature of the coinages lends them a more playful quality that is in perfect line with the individual meanings. All in all, it can be concluded that rhyme, perhaps the most playful feature of linguistic form, can stand for informality and playfulness in linguistic meaning.[14]

3. RHYME WITH AN ALREADY EXISTING COMPOUND

Often, creative compounds rhyme with an already existing (creative) compound. It is hypothesized here that this analogy is deliberate, and it serves two functions: 1) help the hearer/reader to uncover the meaning of the novel expression by foregrounding the source compound; and 2) bring forth conceptual similarities between the referents of the source compound and the novel expression, hence accentuating the inherent humour of the novel coinage. An example for the first case is *grass ceiling* ('a set of social, cultural, and discriminatory barriers that prevent or discourage women from using golf to conduct business'):[15] when coming across the expression, it is inevitable that the more lexicalized compound *glass ceiling* ('an unofficial or unacknowledged barrier to personal advancement, esp. of a woman or a member of an ethnic minority in employment'[16] also comes to mind, thanks to the close phonological resemblance between the two. *Glass ceiling* is an instantiation of the CAREER IS AN UPWARD JOURNEY metaphor: reaching a socially higher position is understood as upward physical movement in the course of a journey.[17] The compound brings forth the idea that the journey has an end point for women, the "ceiling", while no such end point exists for men – therefore, their career path is unlimited. The fact that the ceiling is made of glass implies that women are able to "see" the possible path that their careers might follow (but, due to the limiting "ceiling", they are, nevertheless, unable to go ahead and do so). The novel coinage of *grass ceiling* ties into the meaning of the source compound, as it also refers to the limited opportunities in business for women as opposed to men, but it places this

[14] As elaborated upon by KÖVECSES 2010 [2002]: 177, metonymic relationships also occur in the semiotic triangle (i.e., between form – concept – thing/event), a.k.a. the linguistic sign. Form, therefore, can stand for concept; this form–concept unity is the basis of the form–meaning relationship of any sign.

[15] Source: Wordspy.

[16] Source: *OED*.

[17] See KÖVECSES 2010 [2002]: 252.

limiting factor unto the golf course. This specification of meaning is accomplished by the modifying element, *grass*, which metonymically stands for the golf course (via the MATERIAL CONSTITUTING AN OBJECT FOR THE OBJECT metonymy).

The role of the source compound in uncovering the meaning of the novel expression can be modelled as a series of three steps, as depicted in *Figure 1.* The square boxes represent the semantic and phonological poles of the source and the novel compound (with subscript 1 standing for the source compound, *glass ceiling*, and subscript 2 standing for the novel coinage, *grass ceiling*). When coming across the compound *grass ceiling*, the phonological analogy brings to mind the lexicalized expression *glass ceiling*. This is represented as "Route 1" on the diagram, where the arrow points from the phonological pole of *grass ceiling* to that of *glass ceiling*. On the basis of the form–meaning unity of words, the phonological pole of *glass ceiling* is linked to its semantic pole, that is, its meaning (this is shown on the diagram by dashed lines). This step is indicated by "Route 2" on the diagram, where the arrow points from the phonological to the symbolic pole of *glass ceiling*. As a third step, the meaning of *glass ceiling* helps to unravel the meaning of *grass ceiling*. This is shown as "Route 3" in the figure, where the arrow points from the semantic pole of *glass ceiling* to that of *grass ceiling.*



FIGURE 1. *Uncovering the meaning of a novel compound that is based on phonological analogy to an already existing compound.*

Phonological analogy to an already existing compound is also able to bring forth conceptual similarities between the source compound and the novel coinage, thereby enhancing the humorous effect of the novel expression. One such example is the already mentioned *knee-mail* (for a definition, see section 1).[18] The compound is formed on the phonological analogy of *e-mail*, where the first constituent (*e*) represents the type of mail that is denoted by the construction as a whole (i.e.,

[18] The analysis of *knee-mail* is based on BENCZES 2006: 148–149.

'electronic mail'). The first constituent of *knee-mail* is metonymical: via the INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION metonymy, the knee (i.e., the instrument) stands for praying while kneeling (i.e., the action). The real creativity of this compound lies in the metaphorical nature of *mail*, which is probably based upon the CONDUIT metaphor, according to which IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS and COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.[19] In the case of *knee-mail*, the prayer is what we send ("mail") to God (the "addressee"), who "reads" our message. The humorous effect of the expression rests on the (conceptual) similarities between *knee-mail* and *e-mail*. E-mails are much faster than surface mail, and they are less prone to get undelivered. Thus the compound *knee-mail* suggests that the prayer definitely reaches God, and does so swiftly. Thanks to the phonological analogy to *e-mail*, all of these implications surface in the case of *knee-mail* (as opposed to the word *prayer*, which is the more conventional term that is used for sending God a "message").

All in all, rhyme with an already existing compound can greatly enhance the comprehension of a creative compound; at the same time, it can also help to expose its inherent ingenuity. The idea that the meaning of a novel compound is reached via accessing a more lexicalized expression is in full agreement with the commonplace claim within cognitive linguistics that word meanings are encyclopaedic.[20] As Langacker points out, "concepts presuppose other concepts and cannot be adequately defined except by reference to them"[21] – therefore, we routinely and automatically search for connections between words, and make use of these in the comprehension of novel ones.

4. CONCLUSIONS

If phonological analogy, in the form of rhyme, does motivate the formation of novel creative compounds, then the question necessarily arises *why* we rely on this method of compound formation. On closer inspection, a number of reasons come to mind. First of all, as emphasized earlier, rhyme is very effective in foregrounding an expression to achieve emphasis. Coupled with the rich metaphorical and metonymical imagery that creative compounds possess, which in itself is also a potent attention-grabbing device, rhyme acts like an exclamation mark in the sense that it helps to direct our attention via the form to the content. Second, rhyme plays a significant role in helping the hearer/reader decipher the meaning

[19] LAKOFF – JOHNSON 1980: 10–13.
[20] For a discussion, see LANGACKER 1987: 155–158.
[21] LANGACKER 1987: 147.

of the novel expression by phonologically linking it to the source lexeme. This reasoning is in line with the results of Gries, who, in his study of alliteration (also termed as "initial rhyme")[22] in multi-word units, came to the conclusion that "the perception of phonological similarity may aid the identification of semantic/conceptual constituents/poles".[23] Third, phonological similarity to lexicalized units aids the acceptability ratings of a novel expression,[24] thereby enhancing its chances of entering the lexicon at large. Fourth, rhyme lends a more playful, informal quality to the compounds, which – as in the case of *hobby bobby* or *snail mail* for example – is in agreement with the informality of the compound's meaning. Fifth, the deliberate use of rhyme in novel compound formation is not only enjoyable to produce for the speaker, but also requires the "active participation" of the hearer/reader in appreciating them.[25] Consequently, rhyming creative compounds can assist in the creation of a "social bond" between the participants in a speech situation.[26] Creative compounds are in themselves witty and innovative, as the imagery or conceptualization that they are based on is often original, humorous and unconventional. Coupled with rhyme, the effect is powerful, yet playful. This playful – ludic – function of language is severely underestimated by linguists, claims Crystal,[27] even though language play serves an important social function by helping to break the ice and creating a sense of inclusion.

Turning back to the question in the title (why *snail mail* and not *tortoise mail*), the answer is obvious. Rhyme is such a natural part of language that we clearly rely on it whenever it is possible to do so. Linguistic innovativeness and creativity is omnipresent, and is a feature of language that needs to be adequately described by linguists if the goal is to uncover the true nature of language and cognition.

[22] Wales 1989: 18.
[23] Gries 2011: 507.
[24] Bybee 2010: 60–61.
[25] Chovanec 2008: 222–223.
[26] Malinowski 1923: 314. According to Malinowski, langauge can be used for "phatic" purposes, where words are used to "fulfil a social functionand that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. … language appears to us in this function … as a mode of action." (p. 315)
[27] Crystal 1998.

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Bernadette Balázs*

CREATIVE ASPECTS OF PREFIXATION IN ENGLISH

1. INTRODUCTION

The systematic study of the cognitive notions behind creative noun-noun compounds in English[1] might draw our attention to a closely related phenomenon: certain cases of prefixation in English presuppose almost the same amount of cognitive interpretation as the noun-noun compounds termed 'creative'. Therefore, as opposed to transparent cases such as *unlikely*, understanding *bi-curious*, *semi-charmed*, *de-clutching* or *anti-foot* require elaborate cognitive processes.[2] Acknowledging the importance of the differing degrees of derivational transparency and compositionality inherent in the notion of a 'creative' compound, Benczes focuses on metaphor and metonymy: "Noun-noun compounds that utilise metaphor and metonymy make use of the creative associations that exist between concepts; associations based on similarity, analogy or contiguity."[3] The present paper outlines a framework of study concerning prefix derivatives, using cognitive linguistic methods to investigate certain neologisms involving the creative use of prefixes. The hypothesis to be proven is that the meaning construction of prefix derivatives involves much more elaborate cognitive processes than the attachment of conventional meaning to a base. The conventional meaning, the base and the cultural context all play a role in the meaning-making processes.[4]

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[1] Benczes 2006, 2010, 2011.

[2] Just in the case of the examples of Benczes 2006, ortography does not seem to have a relevant role here. As with noun-noun compounds, some prefix compounds are spelled with a hyphen, some are spelled without one, in case of the majority of them hyphenating is arbitrary. I do not therefore attach importance to the ortographic variants from a cognitive semantic point of view.

[3] Benczes 2006: 7.

[4] The examples used in the paper are taken from www.wordspy.com, as well as from several dictionaries of English: *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), *Longman Exams Dictionary* (LED).

2. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

In traditional linguistic approaches[5] the question of prefixation belongs to the framework of affixation. Matthews deals with the question of prefixation solely in terms of structure, remarking that English has a tendency to use suffixation, mentioning prefixation with the example of happy → un + happy following the schematic structure X→ un + X.[6]

As Katamba remarks: "A prefix is an affix attached *before* a root or stem or base (like *re-* in *re-make*, *re-read*)".[7] He classifies prefixes as derivational morphemes which form new words by changing the meaning of the base to which they are attached, e. g. *obey* vs. *dis-obey*. In a wider context, aside from the structural descriptions, he makes a few remarks on possible semantic ambiguities concerning prefixes. Though all his examples illustrate cases where the word-class of the output word is identical with the word-class of the input base, Katamba concludes that the prefix '*en-*' might be used in two semantically distinct cases: it might have a causative meaning (*enable*, *enlarge*) while in other cases '*en-*' could be paraphrased as 'put in or into' (*encage*, *endanger*).[8] Jensen in his '*Morphology*' mentions as an example that the prefix '*counter-*' in English has no category features of its own.[9] Therefore, when it is attached to a verb, the result is a verb (*counterattack*); when it is attached to a noun, the result is a noun (*counterexample*); when it is attached to an adjective, the result is an adjective (*counterproductive*).While this might be true for the prefix '*counter-*'(though *counterattack* is also a noun) the case is definitely different with the prefix '*de-*': if it is attached to a noun, the resulting compound might still be a verb: *de-friend*. Though such category-changing prefixes are rare, still, '*a-*', '*be-*', or '*un-*' might be mentioned here as further examples.[10] According to Bauer, prefixation in English is typically class-maintaining, (though class maintaining in itself might be a problematic notion), stating that only where recursive prefixation is permissible (e.g. *meta-meta-theory*) is there genuine class maintaining derivation in English.[11],[12] Interestingly, Bauer already makes note of

[5] cf. Katamba 1993; Matthews 1974; Bauer 1983; Adams 1973.

[6] Matthews 1974: 131.

[7] Katamba 1993: 44.

[8] Katamba 1993: 47.

[9] Jensen 1990: 103.

[10] Katamba 1993: 51.

[11] Bauer 1983: 31–32.

[12] Bauer 1983: 279–285. examining the prefix '*non-*' states its immense productivity, the basic meaning of 'non-'being negation or 'lack of'. "The prefixation of *non-* divides the world up into two classes: those things denoted by the non-prefixed lexeme, and those denoted by the prefixed lexeme. In this way, prefixation with *non-* often provides a contrast with other kinds of negative prefixation […]." Quoting Algeo 1971: 90, Bauer mentions the difference between *non-Christian* and *un-Christian*. On

'playful formations'[13] by which he means humorous nonce formations: "*like-minded or non-minded men*", "*a non-book…*, *non-written by Andy Warhol*". These examples refer to the aspect of prefixation to be discussed later, namely the creative aspect, which can be coherently analysed by a cognitive linguistic approach.

In her extensive work on English word-formation, Valerie Adams also refers to semantically distinct cases in the application of certain prefixes: '*un-*'is negative as in *unhappy*, reversative or privative as in *undo/unclothe*.[14] Still, she claims that the largest group of prefixes are the 'negative, privative and reversative' group, which categories are "fairly well-defined ones, and have shown less tendency to acquire extra nuances of meaning than some of those which are the province of suffixation."[15] She therefore contrasts prefixes and suffixes from the point of view of semantic transparency. It is exactly the problem of semantic transparency/opacity which makes a similar comparison between class-maintaining and class-changing prefixes relevant.

Adams also makes a distinction concerning the origin of the prefixes, which often have a Latin or Greek origin and are much used in forming scientific words, and suffixes, which –compared to the number of native prefixes –"are more often of native origin, or have come into the language via French."[16] The sort of classification of prefixes into native prefixes, like '*out-*', or '*mis-*'; and non-native prefixes (also called neo-classical) like '*para-*', or '*ultra-*', mainly restricted to academic/scientific language is widely advocated by dictionaries of English as well (OED, LED). In the analysis of the examples below we shall adhere to this classification for reasons of simplicity, also to prove that regardless of their origin, prefix derivatives from both traditional classes might pose semantic challenges, which – as previously has been outlined – are either not or only superficially dealt with within traditional approaches concerning meaning-making.

the basis of this, he postulates that separate prefixes are involved in the examined cases, rather than one polysemous prefix.

[13] Bauer 1983: 280, 284.

[14] Adams 1973: 22.

[15] Adams 1973: 161.

[16] Adams 1973: 161.

3. SOME COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC ARGUMENTS

A metonymic concept of grammar might fill in the semantic spaces within the above-mentioned categories and linguistic approaches.[17] Not only does Langacker emphasize vagueness or indeterminacy as "structuring elements" in meaning making: "[…] there is vagueness or indeterminacy in regard to either the elements participating in grammatical relationships or the specific nature of their connection"[18] but he also emphasizes the "encyclopedic" nature of lexical meanings. This brings the very idea of compositionality into question, compositionality being a main descriptivist argument concerning prefix derivatives: "[…] the meaning of the whole cannot be predicted from the meanings of the parts unless the parts themselves have definite, limited meanings."[19] Although a simplified, structure-based view of prefixes (see above) would emphasize exactly this definite, limited meaning, there are quite a number of creative cases in prefixation where compositionality just does not pave the way for creating meaning.

Another important aspect, emphasized by Hohenhaus[20] and also referred to by Benczes,[21] is the dividing line between creativity and productivity, used in the established sense of contemporary linguistics ("as opposed to (earlier) generative grammar").[22] While productivity is strictly rule-governed, creativity is not, or not completely rule-governed. Any instance of syntactic recategorization leans heavily towards productivity, but in case of the prefix-derivatives under consideration, productivity and creativity are inextricably intertwined. It is true that some of them might be termed nonce-formations and it is questionable how many of them will be a constant part of the lexicon. The examples show that prefix derivatives should not only be dealt with from the point of view of productivity, but creativity as well.

[17] Langacker 2009.
[18] Langacker 2009: 46.
[19] Langacker 2009: 47.
[20] Hohenhaus 2007.
[21] Benczes 2006.
[22] Hohenhaus 2001: 16.

4. CREATIVE PREFIX DERIVATIVES WITH NATIVE PREFIXES

Analysing some cases of semantic ambiguities/polysemousness using cognitive linguistic methods illustrates the fact that transparency is not a definitive property of prefix derivatives. The first example is the formation: *overachieve*. The dictionary definition is "to perform better or achieve more success than expected."[23] The noun derived from *overachieve*, *overachiever,* means "someone who works very hard to be successful, and is very unhappy if they do not achieve everything."[24] This traditional interpretation (stemming from treating the parts separately and combining them to get the whole meaning) is already far from obvious or transparent, but there exists a metonymic extension to the original phrase: it is also used for people who seem to be striving for perfection in every possible field of life, and seem to accomplish it with ease, as well.[25] The original phrase attains a metonymical reading, and there is also a dominant metaphorical interpretation: the word achieve is interpreted within the LIFE IS A JOURNEY or PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS metaphors.

The examination of further derivatives with the prefix '*de-*', paves the way for more detailed analysis. The expressions to be scrutinized are *de-emphasize*, *de-proliferate*, *de-policing* and *de-friend*.[26] These compounds seem analyzable enough, but there are subtle cognitive processes involved. *De-emphasize* means "to decrease the emphasis on; minimize the importance of". There is though an inherent contradiction within the phrase: something can only be de-emphasized if it had previously been (possibly over-) emphasized. What creates tension in the interpretation of the phrase from a cognitive point of view is that during the process of creating its meaning, our process of conceptualisation has to deal with contradictory notions. We are, therefore, forced to make an alternative conceptualisation of our original expectations of *emphasize*.

De-proliferate is somewhat similar to *de-emphasize*, meaning: "to reduce in number rapidly". What makes the case of *de-proliferate* (usually referring to the nuclear arsenal of some countries) even more poignant than *de-emphasize* is that the verb proliferate already contains a prefix in itself, albeit an unanalyzable and therefore not bimorphemic one, like *conceive*. The cognitive process is halted in

[23] *Longman Exams Dictionary* 2006.

[24] *Longman Exams Dictionary* 2006.

[25] The phrase was often used in connection with former British Prime minister's wife, Cherie Blair, who, aside from building an internationally acclaimed law practice, had four children and played a substantial, if not decisive part in her husband's political career.
(http://www.amazon.com/First-Lady-Private-Public-Cherie/dp/1856851400; retrieved 29.01.2011)

[26] Sources and definitions see www.wordspy.com.

the same way, "turned around" as in the previous case, and the interpretation of the compound presupposes a shift in perspective, as if in a "micro-blend". Our expectations stemming from the prefix '*de-*' (meaning: reverse action, get rid of) and the contradictory lexeme *proliferate* need to be reconciled in the integrated space of the prefix-derivative itself. There seems to be a metonymic shift in the very creation of a prefix-formation. The work of Carita Paradis'[27] suggests that part of the problem lies in the umbrella term "metonymy". She distinguishes between facetization –the activation of one meaning facet of a concept- and metonymization, which: "involves an expressed lexical item that evokes the idea of a nonconventional, although contextually motivated, reading."[28] Metonymization in Paradis's sense is much rarer than facetization; in the case of prefixes we might suppose as well that some prefix derivatives involve metonymization proper, other cases are exemplifying facetization: we activate one meaning facet of a concept by the use of the prefix.

De-policing is another example of not entirely transparent prefix-derivation. As the wordspy definition goes: ***n.*** "A law enforcement strategy in which police avoid accusations of racial profiling by ignoring traffic violations and other petty crimes committed by members of visible minorities. Also: *depolicing*."[29] Compared with the abovementioned two examples, there is a very marked difference here: as the quotation shows, the sociocultural context cannot possibly be neglected here. In fact, it is precisely this sociocultural context that played a part in the creation of the derivative. The expression *policing*, referring to the general course of police activities, including patrolling and all other proactive police activities without taking into consideration the possible offender's racial identity is put into "reverse action", that is not doing the same number of police activities, or possibly not policing at all, when it comes to the possibility of being accused of racial prejudice. The prefix before the gerund as the second constituent of the derivative has somewhat the function of an adjective, as it determines the type of action involved in the nominalised gerundial form. As the gerund inherently retains somewhat of the original verbal element, this is precisely the reason why a tension is created between the prefix- and the modified second compositional element. *Policing* brings in

[27] Paradis 2004.

[28] Paradis 2004: 255.

[29] But as new leaders were promising action, rank-and-file officers were reacting bitterly, saying if they were faulted for doing their job, they'd stop all proactive policing. It's a practice known as *de-policing*. During a February, 2001 riot in Seattle, when police were accused of taking a hands-off approach, one officer was quoted as saying: „Parking under a shady tree to work on a crossword puzzle is a great alternative to being labelled a racist and being dragged through an inquest, a review board, an FBI and U.S. attorney investigation and lawsuit." – Michelle Shephard, „Seattle offers insights into police profiling," *Toronto Star*, February 9, 2003 (www.wordspy.com)

a very active, authoritative sort of ICM. The prefix '*de-*' in this case stands in sharp opposition to it, so much so that extra interpretative effort, as well as objective, hands-on knowledge is needed to make sense of the derivative. The metonymical relations are as follows: between policemen and their actions, their actions and the idea of police as authority, an entity above the sum of the persons making up that entity. The possible mappings between police action/proactive police action/deactivated police action; racial prejudice/hypothesized racial prejudice/consequences of racial prejudice also create a blend, the police ICM providing the generic space, the blended space uniting a de-activated police "policy".

De-friend might have the analogous base of *befriend* in its formation. However, *de-friend* has a narrower sense and more restricted use: *de-friend* means to remove a person from one's list of friends on a social networking site. Just as the word *teacher* evokes an idealised cognitive model, that of teaching, social networking sites also evoke a conceptual framework. Within this framework, the illocutional force of *de-friend* is based on metonymy: of the nominal part *friend*, only the notion of friendship/being friends is used (part-whole ICM) The friend in his/her physical entity is, of course, not deleted, though by a touch of absurd humour, the phrase symbolically might make such an allusion, at least in terms of this social networking universe. In case of prefix-derivatives, concept metonymies where one concept stands for another concept, both of which may be part of a larger concept, play a crucial role.

In the case of noun-noun compounds, constituent families play an important part in meaning construal processes. In the case of prefix-derivatives, we are supposed to identify constituent families via the respective prefixes themselves. Still, the interpretation of the phrases is not straightforward and the different cases might represent differing levels of elaborateness. As the examples listed above have shown, intertwined cognitive processes are involved, proving our original hypothesis concerning the different levels in the meaning-making processes in 'creative' prefix derivatives.

5. NON-NATIVE PREFIX-DERIVATIVES

The examples shortly analysed are not used in scientific context (according to the distinctions of Adams: see above. The first expression is the expression *triovenable*. It means: "Of or relating to a product or material that can withstand the heat generated by conventional, microwave, or toaster ovens."[30] It refers in its original context to a type of aluminium food-packaging made to withstand all

[30] Source: www.wordspy.com

three means of heating. The adjective *ovenable* is in itself interesting since the suffix *-able* is attached to a noun instead of the more conventional verb. Through our meaning-making cognitive processes we have to make sense first of *ovenable*, creating an adjective from the noun. An oven is not a typical entity to be connected with ability, though, and another shift is required from oven to the entity which is going to go through the "process of ovening". With the addition of *tri-* to *ovenable-*, the semantic opacity remains: are we faced with an entity which can be put into an oven three times, or into three ovens, or three different types of oven? Only the context of packaging gives us the additional information we need: to select the proper meaning from the possibilities.

We can find evidence of creative prefix-derivation in poetic language use as well: the example *semi-charmed* comes from a song by a group called Third Eye Blind. It is an entirely new, creative formation, used in a context with highly poetic inspirations, which would allow for differing interpretations, ranging from infatuation to recurring drug use, creating a constant blurring of the boundary to one's perceptions. *Semi-charmed* can of course be interpreted in other ways as well, which then beautifully exemplifies the statement of Kövecses and Benczes: "Meaning is not "prepackaged" in words, as we assume an active part in every communicative situation to construct meaning. The linguistic expressions' meaning depends on what kind of mental spaces we create, as well as the relations among them."[31]

The examination of the examples proves that prefixes, prefix derivatives do not simply work on the basis of "prepackaged" meaning. Taking a similar approach to them as to creative noun-noun compounds reveals that in many cases, prefixes play a much more formative role than serving as simple attachments. Taking into consideration the cognitive processes behind the creation of prefix-derivatives might reveal several semantic and cultural layers, the same way as cognitive linguistics might open up new ways in the analysis of word-formation.

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LORI GILBERT*

UNDERSTANDING OBAMA'S 'SPUTNIK MOMENT' METAPHOR: A REFERENCE TO WAR?

1. INTRODUCTION

In October of 1957, Americans tuned in to their radios as the first man-made satellite – the USSR's Sputnik I – orbited the earth and emitted a signal from space. The significance and shock of the event led to a broad range of emotions, including wonder, ambition, technological appreciation, jealousy and fear.[1]

Now, 54 years later, these initial emotional responses have evolved into reflection, the Space Race and Cold War are over, and the Sputnik itself has long since disintegrated in the atmosphere. What remains is a contextual meaning that involves not just the satellite, but also its significance to national policy, national security, and national pride.

The Sputnik's modern-day significance has recently been demonstrated by American president Barack Obama in his 2011 State of the Union address. He referred to America's global position in technology development and said: "This is our Sputnik moment." The metaphor attracted a great deal of media attention, including criticism and debate on its meaning and relevance.

In this paper, I will focus on the Sputnik within its historical context, and investigate which underlying assumptions are highlighted and whether they indicate the American public's perception of the Sputnik and its subsequent value in media and political rhetoric. The methodology I will use in my metaphor analysis is based on the cognitive linguistics model developed by Lakoff and Johnson[2] and Kövecses.[3]

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[1] Launius 2007: 141.

[2] Lakoff – Johnson 1980.

[3] Kövecses 2010.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The circumstances surrounding the Sputnik gave the word itself an interesting introduction into the English language. In Russian, sputnik (спутник) is the word for any satellite.[4] It literally means "travelling companion".[5]

The suffix '-nik' has existed in the English language since at least 1723.[6] The suffix was mostly used by speakers of Russian and English, or Yiddish and English. Some of the Yiddish uses of the suffix include 'stuck-upnick' and 'nogoodnik'.[7]

The definition of '-nik' is: "denoting a person (esp. an enthusiast) or thing involved in or associated with a specified thing or quality, often with humorous or pejorative connotations".[8]

After the launch of the Sputnik, American media began to use the suffix creatively. The dog the Soviets sent into space was nicknamed 'muttnik'. Two Minnesota schoolboys made a rocket that carried a mouse, which was called 'mousenik'. In 1957, when the United States failed to launch their own satellite, newspapers referred to it as 'sputternik'.[9]

The definition of the word 'moment' is also significant because it involves the abstract concept of time. In the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor, it means: "A particular stage or period in a course of events or in the development of something; a turning point; a historical juncture".[10]

The 'Sputnik moment' metaphor refers to Sputnik I, which was launched by the USSR on 4 October 1957 and was the first man-made satellite to orbit the earth.[11] This event marked the USSR's lead in the Space Race, which America would ultimately win in 1969 by landing man on the moon.[12]

The circumstances and political environment surrounding the Sputnik indicate a deeper level of meaning. By 1957, America and the USSR had already spent more than ten years in an ideological rivalry that grew into the Cold War.[13] Cadbury wrote: "Above all, the space race became an open contest between capitalism and communism. Victory was not just a matter of pride. National security and global stability were at stake".[14]

[4] Source: *Oxford Language Dictionary*.
[5] Source: *Oxford English Dictionary* (henceforth *OED*).
[6] Source: *OED*
[7] Kabakchi 1990: 275, 277.
[8] Source: *OED*
[9] Ackerman 1958.
[10] Source: *OED*
[11] Launius 2007: 141.
[12] Cadbury 2006: xi, 338.
[13] McMahon 2003: 5.
[14] Cadbury 2006: ix.

Because the meaning attached to Sputnik has different levels of complexity, there are also multiple conceptual source domains for this metaphor. The first source domain is RACE, which includes the assumption that in technology development, one country is 'ahead' of another. Launius believes that the Sputnik and the Space Race most obviously represent the American quest for pride, prestige, and security.[15]

The second source domain relates to the historical context that within the Cold War, putting the first satellite into an Earth orbit was considered a BATTLE. The assumption is that for America, the Sputnik was a lost battle, which resulted in increased effort and funding for further battles.

There is also an assumption that in military strategy, one must necessarily be first in order to occupy a strategic position without engaging in physical battle. Therefore, there is a relationship between the RACE source domain and the BATTLE source domain.

The third source domain also relates to the historical overview of the Cold War. The source domain is WAR. As the Cold War is a metaphor in itself, it is debatable who 'won'. However, for the purpose of this paper, the analyses will work from the typical American assumptions that the 'Sputnik moment' was a Soviet victory, landing man on the moon meant America won the Space Race, and ultimately, America won the Cold War.

In the case of races, battles and wars, it is not technically possible for a country to carry out these actions; rather, it is *people* who engage in races, battles, and wars. Therefore, the conceptual metaphor NATION-STATES ARE PEOPLE applies.

The conceptual source domain associated with 'moment' adds a further level of complexity, because it is used to comment on the past, present, and future implications of a particular issue. The Sputnik moment metaphor would have had a completely different meaning if it were used before the end of the Cold War. The conceptual metaphor that applies to this concept is A MOMENT IS A POINT ON A TIMELINE.

I believe this discursive metaphor applies use of conceptual metaphors to create what Lakoff and Johnson describe as "self-fulfilling prophecies".[16] As such, the target domains used with this metaphor would tend to be ones where a particular outcome is sought, and the metaphor is used rhetorically to promote a positive outcome.

One of the most frequent target domains with the Sputnik moment metaphor is TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, perhaps because this was also an important factor of the Sputnik and the Space Race. Other target domains, which all benefit from the national prestige mapping from the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor, are AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE IN SPORTS and MILITARY POWER.

[15] Launius 2008.
[16] Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 156.

3. THE 'SPUTNIK MOMENT' METAPHOR

The earliest use of the Sputnik moment metaphor that my search produced was 28 May 2002 in the *Christian Science Monitor* editorial "Harvest Moon", regarding America's reaction to China's announcement of their timeline to put man on the moon and mine lunar minerals. The journalist wrote "It was not a Sputnik moment. At least not yet. But China's quiet announcement this month that it plans to put a man on the moon by 2010 and then mine the rich lunar minerals by 2015 could eventually provoke a new space race…"[17]

This metaphor does not stray far from the context of the Space Race. The conceptual target domain is INTERNATIONAL SPACE TECHNOLOGY PRESTIGE. The source domains for this metaphor are RACE, BATTLE, and WAR.

The purpose of this use of the metaphor is to persuade Americans to compete with the Chinese space programme by appealing to the public's underlying assumptions of space exploration.[18] The writer of the editorial cites national pride as a primary reason to compete with China's space exploration plans, as well as the government's statement implying that space is important in military strategy and national security.

In an example from later in 2002, the metaphor was used again, but this time it was taken further from its source domain. In the article "Foreign draftees a wake-up call to U.S.", the journalist writes about the National Basketball Association draft picks, and the fact that there were more top players from countries outside the U.S.: "FOR AMERICAN players and the college system that grinds them out, Wednesday's NBA draft might have been their Sputnik moment. The rocket is in space, while we're standing around holding our Hula-Hoops and saying, 'What happened?'"[19]

The explanation accompanying the use of the metaphor evokes a visual image and a useful explanation of what a 'Sputnik moment' is – the shock and surprise that you've become complacent and someone else has become better than you.

Although the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor does refer to a specific incident, the context in which it can be used can vary greatly. In the following example, the context clearly highlights the WAR source domain of the metaphor. In 2004, an article titled "National Language Conference Results Announced", published in the *US Fed News* read: "Immediately after Sept. 11 2001, Americans found themselves again facing a Sputnik moment. They realized that they were caught flat-footed, unprepared to confront Al Qaeda terrorists."[20]

[17] Source: *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 May 2002.
[18] Launius 2008.
[19] Source: *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 June 2002.
[20] Source: *US Fed News*, 29 June 2004.

This is a mixed metaphor, where the journalist explains the meaning of 'Sputnik moment' by using a fighting metaphor; if you're flat-footed and someone throws a punch at you, you are unprepared and will either get hit or fall over backwards.

Another example of the metaphor used in a similar context was published in the article "Ground-war dominance" in *The Washington Times*: "Battles for the Iraqi cities should have sparked a 'Sputnik moment' within the Department of Defense. That didn't happen. We need to create a national effort to give our soldiers better tools to fight the dismounted battle."[21] Again, the purpose of the metaphor is to persuade readers; the author wrote that the battles "*should have* sparked a 'Sputnik moment'" (italics mine).

The target domain for this metaphor is THE IRAQ WAR, and the source domain is THE COLD WAR. The metaphor is used to highlight the result of the Cold War, which is known, and map it to the result of the Iraq war, which is not. The metaphor is intended to show how, given the right circumstances (funding), the result of the Iraq war *could be* similar to the Cold War.

Especially important in this case is the conceptual metaphor relating to a 'moment' on the timeline of the Cold War. The conceptual metaphor is LOST BATTLES IN IRAQ ARE POINTS ON A TIMELINE. An assumption is that if the funding of the Iraq war resembles the funding of the Space Race, the Iraq war could result in an American victory.

An article in *Newsweek* titled "American Beat: Japanese Sputnik" describes a situation in which two years in a row, Japanese competitors have won the 4th of July Coney Island eating competition. The author writes, "…Kobayashi ate 50 hot dogs and buns in 12 minutes at the annual July 4 hot dog-eating contest at Coney Island. …Kobayashi's 50 doubled the existing record set just a year before by his countryman Kazatoyo Arai. It was a stunning athletic achievement…we're not seeing a Sputnik moment. We're not responding at all."[22]

This article has a rhetorical intent, as the writer makes the case that if the American eating competitions offered substantial prize money, as is the norm in Japan, they would attract America's best talent and America would re-gain the highest international prestige.

The target domain for this metaphor is INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE IN COMPETITIVE EATING. The metaphor's primary mappings are from the source domain BATTLE, with the assumption that this is a lost battle. Because there is also an assumption that there will be opportunities for further battles, there is an additional source domain, which is WAR.

[21] Source: *The Washington Times,* 10 May 2005.
[22] Source: *Newsweek,* 5 July 2002.

The final metaphor analysis is President Barack Obama's State of the Union Address from 25 January 2011, when he said:

> Half a century ago, when the Soviets beat us into space with the launch of a satellite called Sputnik, we had no idea how we would beat them to the moon. The science wasn't even there yet. NASA didn't exist. But after investing in better research and education, we didn't just surpass the Soviets; we unleashed a wave of innovation that created new industries and millions of new jobs. This is our generation's Sputnik moment. Two years ago, I said that we needed to reach a level of research and development we haven't seen since the height of the Space Race. And in a few weeks, I will be sending a budget to Congress that helps us meet that goal.[23]

President Obama used the metaphor to explain that China and India have surpassed America's technological dominance and prestige, and America will therefore invest more money into technology development.

The target domain for this metaphor is AMERICA'S TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PRESTIGE. Because the discourse specifically includes the Space Race metaphor, the first source domain is RACE. However, the historical understanding of the Space Race is that it took place within the Cold War, which means that BATTLE and WAR are also source domains of this metaphor.

This metaphor also includes the conceptual metaphor A MOMENT IS A POINT ON A TIMELINE, and President Obama's metaphor implies the mappings:

America's non-dominant position in the Space Race at the 'Sputnik moment'
↓
America's non-dominant position in technology development at present

America's increased funding for the Space Race
↓
America's increased funding for technology development in 2011
↑
America's victory in the Space Race and Cold War
↓
America's victory for technology development prestige

[23] Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.

The rhetorical intent of Obama's use of this metaphor is not to convince the American public and government to increase funding for technological development. His intent, rather, is to first of all inform the American public that their assumed prestige is under threat, and secondly, to reassure Americans that the result of this funding will lead to America regaining its previous level of prestige.

As a liberal politician, it is noteworthy that Obama would use a war metaphor, particularly in such a high-profile speech. It appears that he used this metaphor with the intent to highlight the positive aspects of the Space Race, which is that if America can achieve victory if it applies its available resources to a problem. It is possible that Obama and his speechwriters had no intention of implying that America is metaphorically 'at war' with India and China. However, my analysis is focussed on how this metaphor's historical relevance applies to underlying assumptions, and I believe that ultimately, even if the WAR source domain of this metaphor is not emphasised, it is still a perceived source domain for the metaphor.

Due to the nature of political rhetoric, it is unsurprising that some of Obama's political opponents were critical of his use of this metaphor. One such criticism was that it has been more than fifty years since the Sputnik's launch and many Americans will not understand the historical background. An example of this misunderstanding of the metaphor is from Sarah Palin on an appearance on Fox News on 26 January 2011: "[Obama] needs to remember what happened with the former communist USSR and their victory in that race to space. Yes, they won, but they also incurred so much debt that it resulted in the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union."[24]

This is a particularly conspicuous example of misunderstanding due to the mainstream media channel and Sarah Palin's political status, but it is possible that many Americans do lack the historical background to quickly understand why the Sputnik was important in America's history.

Another political response to Obama's use of the metaphor was that some of his opponents focussed on emphasising alternative metaphorical highlighting, presumably to conceal Obama's intended metaphorical mappings. For example, on the CNN news channel, also on 26 January 2011, John Boehner, the Speaker of the House, said: "Well, if you really want to talk about what the Sputnik moment is, it's the fact that we're broke…The American people know we're broke and they want us to do something about spending. And there wasn't much talk last night about cutting spending and getting our debt under control."[25]

Alternative highlighting is frequently used in political discourse, and the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor has enough complexities in the source and target

[24] Source: *US News,* 28 January 2011.

[25] Source: www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/27/john-boehner-to-kathleen-_n_814662.html.

domains to provide opposing politicians with opportunities to suggest alternative interpretations of what the Sputnik means to America today.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In these discourse samples, the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor is used primarily with a rhetorical intent; the goal is to convince the target audience that if the conceptual target domain follows a set of actions mapped from the source domain, the result can be American victory. Generally, the ultimate victory implied is one of national pride and prestige. To use the Sputnik moment metaphor is to speculate that in the future we will perceive the current situation in a certain way, which is similar to the way we perceive the Sputnik.

The majority of these discourse samples have used the metaphor to highlight the assumption that the Space Race was won by America because of the increased level of funding that resulted from the Sputnik and America's subsequent lost pride and prestige.

Other discourse samples used the metaphor to make a general patriotic rhetorical comment on America's (foundering) international reputation, and to assert that this situation is temporary and that America will ultimately emerge as the world's reigning super-power.

Therefore, the primary assumptions associated with this metaphor do indicate the public's perception of the Sputnik and its metaphorical application. The assumptions are that a war can be won with a high level of funding, and that America's international pride and prestige may falter but will eventually prevail.

Possible problems with the use of the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor include the potential for misunderstanding if the audience does not have adequate historical knowledge. Furthermore, like many metaphors used within political discourse, political opponents can use the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor with alternative highlighting in order to use it to their advantage, and the original speaker's disadvantage.

Ultimately, Obama's use of the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor has led to a spike of discourse relating to the topic of technology advancement and education, and it may be beneficial to Obama in the long run to be associated with the 'Sputnik moment' metaphor due to its rhetorical power and ability to attract debate.

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Ágnes Kuna*

METAPHORS AND METONYMIES IN CLIMBING ROUTE NAMES

1. INTRODUCTION

As the results of socioonomastics reveal, sports and hobbies increase the demand for new designations and tend to give rise to new sociolects. This has been the case with rock climbing, with route names in particular offering a rich corpus for onomastic research. The extreme sport in question has a history dating back several centuries. However, in the beginning, it was virtually inseparable from mountain climbing, and it was not until the 1960's and '70's that rock climbing truly developed into a sport in its own right. In this period rock climbing routes and their designations multiplied. Ever since that time, the names have been collected and catalogued in so-called climbing guides by the climbers themselves. Today there are several million climbing routes all over the world, and new ones are constantly being created. The climbers' community is eager to keep track of all the new routes and their names.

In creating new names, the accepted tradition is that the first climber to conquer a new route is entitled to name it. The naming process is solely dependent on him or her, and therefore, not surprisingly, an extremely colourful world of names has emerged. There is a wide spectrum of variation in the structure of names, which range from single words to elaborate clauses (short monologues). This is matched by a similar degree of semantic variation, with the topology of the terrain and the climbers' emotional, intellectual, and socio-cultural world contributing the most to conceptualization.

In this paper, I will examine the rich and steadily growing body of climbing route names. My research is based on a corpus of more than 30,000 names, of which 1,200 are Hungarian. The rest includes especially English, German route names collected from 4 climbing areas and from whole Hungary (see Sources). The focus of my investigation is on characterizing the act of name-giving, and discerning semantic groups or tendencies in the names themselves. The theoretical framework for the semantic analysis is provided by cognitive linguistics. Therefore, after some general remarks on climbing and climbing routes (**2.**), I will begin with

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

FIGURE 1: *Climbing routes in climbing guide*

an overview of proper names as seen from a cognitive perspective, then move on to a general description of climbing route names (**3.**) and finally give a detailed account of specific names and their motivation by conceptual metaphor (and metonymy) (**3.1., 3.2., 3.3.**). The last section is reserved for concluding remarks (**4.**).

2. ABOUT CLIMBING AND CLIMBING ROUTES IN GENERAL

Climbing as a sport has its European roots in the Elbe Sandstone Mountains. According to written records, the conquest of Saxon Switzerland began with the first ascent of a peak called *Falkenstein* in 1864. In the 20th century, but especially from the 50's, climbing entered a new phase with the rapid development of climbing gear and technique. Now there are several hundred thousand official climbing areas and routes in the world, popularized (along with their names and rankings) in climbing guides, on the internet and in specialized magazines *(see Fig. 1 and Sources)*.

3. PROPER NAMES FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE – CLIMBING ROUTE NAMES

Cognitive linguists assume that language is an integral part of general cognition (rather than an encapsulated module), and that linguistic meaning and conceptualization are strongly intertwined. Cognitive semantics puts a premium on grounding meaning in human experience. Since language is an integral part of general cognition, meaning is to a large extent motivated by how we perceive, structure, and process the world around us.

Name-giving itself is a cognitive act heavily influenced by the customs and social-interactive practices of the speech community which uses the name. There is of course great variation in proper names depending on what types of entity they refer to, for example, people, institutions, or places. Grammatically speaking, proper names are typically composite structures made up of common nouns, adjectives, and their combinations. This can also be observed in climbing route names.

e.g.

Leicht Alpin (Easy Alpin)
Diagonalwand (Diagonal Wall)

Big Blue
Sárga fal (Yellow Wall)
Középső út (Middle Route)

In the act of name-giving, a variety of factors related to the thing to be named can be profiled (put in the forefront of attention and symbolized linguistically). This gives the process a fundamentally metonymic character. With respect to climbing routes, note that – in addition to properties of the entity itself – the name-giver, and aspects of the supporting event or situation may also serve as prompts for the name. The background for the name-giving act is the frame of rock climbing which includes the climber, climbing as an activity (or sport), and the route with the various features of the terrain *(see Fig. 2)*. Furthermore, name-giving is also framed by pragmatic knowledge of how the route names are used in interactions within the climbing community.



FIGURE 2: *The frame of rock climbing*

Climbing in general and route names in particular are closely linked to a hobby/sport practiced by a special social group, which leaves a huge mark on linguistic representations. On the one hand, the function of a route name is to make the route easy to identify and locate. On the other, and this is just as important, conquering a route is almost like a work of art (born when the first ascent is made) and the "author" is often eager to see this encoded in the name. This is why so many names tell stories about the first ascent rather than reflecting properties of the route itself. Another consequence of route names being bound up with a social group is that the names do not have a conventionalized flavour, but rather prioritize the creation of new meaning, making heavy use of originality, puns, and features of the oral register. This is sometimes reflected in the fact that the names describe

whole events or situations; that is to say, they express clausal rather than nominal meanings.

e.g.

Warum nicht? (Why not?)
Ich will Dich (I want you)
Porno ist mein Leben (Porno is my life)
Kleine Menschen brauchen mehr Schlaf (Small people need more sleep)
If I don't do it, somebody else will
No Smoke, no Hope
Hitch-hike the Plane
Shake it Baby
Only you complete me
No more Babysitting for neurotic girls today
Hol vagy Pista? (Where are you, Pista?)

A further interesting point is that the names may evoke the general social and cultural climate of an era. For example, in the early phase of the sport's history, the names of climbing routes were more similar to other, more standard geographical names (such as those of roads leading to a mountain) than in later decades. Older names tend to profile the form or other characteristic feature of the rock wall, or the direction of the route. Furthermore, they typically assign routes into categories.

e.g.

Südwestwand (South-West Wall)
Südkante (South Edge)
Diagonalwand (Diagonal-Wall)
Nagy áthajlás (Big Overhang)
Balrepedés (Left Crack)

Since the 1950's, the name-giver's personality and imagination have had an ever increasing role in shaping the name-giving process. As a result, new names are less likely to specify categories, and out of context, some of them could hardly be recognized as names in the first place.

e.g.

www.scheisse.de (www.shit.de)
Internet
Virus
Computerspiele (Computer Games)
Offline
Paragraph
New Dimensions
Laserkante (Laser Edge)
Evolution
Null Rhesus Positiv
$E = m \times c^2$

3. THE CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS ASSOCIATED WITH ROUTE NAMES

From a cognitive linguistic point of view, metaphors and metonymies play a crucial role in human thinking and communication. Mappings between the source and target domains are shaped by both embodied experience and culture, leading to a rich variety of conceptualizations and linguistic representations.

Climbing is a complex activity in which a critical role is played by the rock wall, the characteristics of the route, the plants and animals of the area, and the overall environment of the sport, not to mention the emotions and experiences of the climber. These factors all bear on the name-giving process *(see Fig. 2),* and explain why it relies so much on metonymy and metaphor. In this part of the paper, I will show an illustrative sample of route names, classified according to types of conceptual metonymy or metaphor in the frame of climbing.

3.1. Route

Especially easier routes are often named after the time of the first ascent or the weather in which the "line" was conquered. These expressions are predominantly metonymic, but in many cases simple metonymies give rise to several more complex ones and even metaphors.

time/weather for route

Dezemberweg (December Route)
Erster Sonnenstrahl (The First Sunshine)
Regenweg (Rainy Route)
Leichte Brise (Light Breeze)
Immer nass (Always Wet)
Märzschnee (March Route)
Osterhase (Easter Bunny)

Also chiefly metonymical are the names highlighting characteristics of the rock wall or the twists and turns of the route. Another type is based on the metonymic relationship between the route and the plants and animals living alongside it.

plant for route

Wand der toten Bäume (Wall of Dead Trees)
Moosweg (Moss Route)
Akazienweg (Wattle Route)
Kieferweg (Pine Route)
Moha és páfrány (Moss and Fern)

animal for route / the route is an animal;

animal for rock wall / the rock wall is an animal

Zerge (Chamois)
Rotfuchs (Fox)
Karl der Käfer (Karl the Beetle)
Gekko
Salamander
Little Mause
Elephant's Head
Dromedar
Pig's Nose
Pig's Ear
Delphin

Talking about animals, popular conceptual metaphors include the rock wall is an animal and the climber is an animal. In the former case, the rock's shape; in the latter, the climber's movement and stature motivate the mappings. A subcase of the previous metaphor (as well as a metonymic basis for naming the route) is that the climber is a monkey (see **3.3.**).

In a number of cases, route names evoke connections between the experience of climbing (including its environment) and the climber's personality or lifestyle *(see Fig. 2)*. Based on overlaps between the domains of route and climber, routes can be conceptualized as a meal, drink, idea, work of art, a fairy tale or some kind of psychological state or emotion.

the route is a meal/drink

Belegtes Brötchen (Sandwich)
Nutella
Ritter Sport
Kraftbonbon (Power Bonbon)
Nie Diät (Never Diet)
Sektfrühstück (Champagne for Brekfast)
Hot Chilie
Kakao mit Sahne (Hot Chocolate with Whipped Cream)
Espresso
Capuccino
Pasta Tricolore
Big Mac
Happy Meal

the route is an idea/puzzle

Gleiche Idee (The Same Idea)
Opas Idee (Grandfather's Idea)
Blitzidee (Quick Idea)
Zeit zum Lernen (Time to Learn)
Rätsel ohne Lösung (Puzzle without Solution)
Solution

climbing is a fairy tale

Hexe (Witch)	*Abrakadabra*
Drachenwand (Dragon's Wall)	*Hokus Pokus*
Märchenland (Land of Fairy Tales)	*Tales from the Twilight World*
Teufelchen (Little Devil)	*Diabolo*
Hölle (Hell)	

the route is a work of art (music/film/literature)

Herbstsinfonie (Autumn Symphony)	*Inspiration*
Herbstsonate (Autumn Sonata)	*Jazz, jazz, jazz*
Meisterwerk (Artwork)	*Pulp fiction*
Glasperlenspiel (The Glass Bead Game)	

These metaphors are strongly linked to the domain of climber as a socio-culturally determined human being.

3.2. Climber

Since the act of name-giving is directed at the route, not the climber, metaphorical conceptualizations of the climber generally remain in the background, motivating route names through the climber for route metonymy. However, it is still worth reiterating that the climber's characteristics (his/her personality, way of movement, or cultural knowledge and experience) feature in several metaphors, the climber is a monkey being one such example.

the climber is a monkey

Äffchen (Little Monkey)	*Planet der Affen* (Monkey's Planet)
König der Affen (King of Monkeys)	*Gorilla*
Affentheater (Monkey Theatre)	*Monkey Business*

Other mappings indirectly involving the climber as a person are discussed in this paper under route (**3.1.**) or climbing metaphors/metonymies (**3.3.**).

3.3. Climbing

Climbing as a complex activity is the basis of many conceptual metaphors (motivating route names through the climbing for route metonymy). The mapping may focus on climbing as rhythmic movement and its joy (climbing is dancing/having fun), or, on the contrary, may profile its painful and psychologically straining aspects. The latter is especially frequent with more difficult routes (climbing is torture, climbing is an illness, climbing is endurance/the use of power).

climbing is dancing/having fun

Technischer Tanz (Technical Dance)	*The Dance alone*
Der letzte Tanz (The last Dance)	*Dance to heaven*
Tanz der Vampire (Vampire's Dance)	*Tango Korrupti*
Schwesterlein, komm tanz mit mir	*Tabledance*
(Little Sister, come and dance with me)	*Samba Party*
Tango mit dem Tod	*Dancefloor*
(Tango with the Death)	*Ballerina*
Dances with Wolfes	*Private Dancer*

climbing is endurance/the use of power

Kraftmeister (Power Master)	Null Power
Power Göttin (Power Godess)	*Free Fight*
Power-action	*Fight for your Right*

climbing is torture, climbing is an illness

Sebstmord (Suicide)	*21 times the pain*
Fingertöter (Finger Killer)	*Pain makes me stronger, every day!*
Psychoterapie	*Terror*
Malaria	*Daily Terror*
Deasaster	*Anarchia*
Broken Nose	*Diktatur* (Dictatorship)

Both literally and metaphorically, climbing means going all the way to the end, so it is not surprising that climbing is a journey is a widely attested metaphor, along with its more specific version, climbing is flying, with both physical and emotional connotations.

climbing is a journey

Reise nach Indien (Journey to India)
Armins letzte Reise
(Armin's last Journey)
Reise nach Jerusalem
(Journey to Jerusalem)
Peterchens Mondfahrt
(Little Peter's Moon Journey)
Hochzeitsreise (Honey Moon)
Höllenfahrt (Journey to the Hell)
Himmelfahrt (Journey to the Sky)
Road to Tibet
Long Road to Ruin
Final Destination

climbing is flying/falling

Nur Fliegen ist schöner
(Only Flying is nicer)
Feuervogel (Fire Bird)
Flying Horse
Antigravitation
High Gravity Day
Ikarus
Catch me, if I'm falling
Fight Gravity
Velcro Fly
Vertigo

A sense of height, emotional elevation, and flying may further translate into spiritual experience, which accounts for the high number of metaphors of transcendence. These are typically variations on two themes, climbing is salvation/heaven and climbing is sinfulness/hell. In conclusion, climbing is strongly attached to two extremes: it can be conceptualized as joy, satisfaction, and a welcome challenge (a sense of elevation – up) but also as torture, fear and terror (a sense of falling – down). These emotions tend to be represented in the names as well.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I hope to have shown how the frame of climbing with its three domains (route, climbing, climber) inspires and constrains the act of name-giving. As the examples demonstrate, emotions, creativity and puns play a significant role in the process, motivated by the freedom of name-givers in inventing new names and the "work of art" character of the first ascent. As a result, the names do not have a conventional flavour but rather make a vivid impression, highlighting their status as part of the jargon of a social group. The specification of a route's category in the name is increasingly uncommon, with this and many other factors also depending on the social and cultural climate of the era. In future research, it will be interesting to examine how the names are used between climbers in discourse.

Another promising avenue to explore would be to analyse up – down metaphors and their correlation with route difficulty; or to compare climbing route names to the names of mountains, weighing up similarities and differences in their meaning and use.

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PART 3
DISCOURSE ORGANIZATION

Sonja Kleinke*

METONYMIC INFERENCING AND METONYMIC ELABORATION IN QUOTATIONS

CREATING COHERENCE IN A PUBLIC INTERNET DISCUSSION FORUM

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In: *Cognition and culture.*
Eds: Sonja Kleinke – Zoltán Kövecses – Andreas Musolff – Veronika Szelid
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This study of metonymic aspects in the use of quotations in a public Internet forum discussion sheds light on a rather specific discourse function of metonymy, *metonymic elaboration*, which is related to the "productive side" of inferential metonymies, and to which the literature on cognitive metonymy has not paid much attention so far.

It is based on a previous study of quotation practices in public Internet discussions[1] focusing on two sample threads from a corpus of 40,000 postings from discussion fora accompanying non-tabloid broadcast media. The English data were drawn from BBC *Have Your Say* (HYS), the German from *Spiegel Online.* Both threads are comparable with regard to the topic and length of the discussion (HYS: '*Should the US give the Pope such a presidential welcome?*' with 881 postings and SPIEGEL ONLINE: '*Der Papst in den USA – Retter in der Not?*' (transl.: *The Pope, our Savior?)* containing 754 postings). An in-depth, qualitative study of quotation practices in both threads revealed substantial differences in the German- and the English-speaking groups concerning both interpersonal and intergroup functions as well as coherence-related uses. The present paper focuses on the first 300 English postings. Thus we delve deeper into coherence-related functions of quotations typical of this group, which are probably best explained on a metonymic basis. More precisely, the study aims to show how cognitive metonymy is crucially involved in specific patterns of quotations participants use to construct coherent discourse. After a brief introduction into the concept of inferential metonymy and related phenomena such as indirect anaphora, the paper goes on to discuss the related, but

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[1] Bös – Kleinke 2011.

so far largely under-investigated productive aspects of coherence and the notion of *metonymic elaboration*. In part three, it examines specific techniques of metonymic elaboration in quotations in HYS and presents a selection of cognitive metonymies underlying the way participants link their intergroup criticism with a quote from a previous posting. The paper closes with a brief discussion of some unusual sources and targets illustrating the context dependence of metonymic variation.

2. METONYMY AND COHERENCE: FROM INFERENTIAL METONYMY TO METONYMIC ELABORATION

From a cognitive linguistic point of view, metonymy is not only a 'referential' phenomenon, but is also seen as systematically operating at different levels of language, including discourse.[2] Throughout the past decades, researchers from different linguistic strands have discussed the crucial role that metonymically based inferential processes play for the *reception* and *interpretation* of discourse as *coherent*. Panther – Thornburg[3] state that these metonymies establish inference schemas which "participants use in actual communication to arrive at utterance meanings" and that these inference schemas "are, to a large extent, based on metonymic contiguities." Barcelona sees conceptual metonymies as "ready-made pointers towards plausible inferential pathways in the interpretation of a joke or an anecdote, and in fact in the interpretation of any other discourse"[4] and, more recently, as "connecting one proposition to another."[5] Brdar-Szabó – Brdar observe the inferential flexibility of metonymic sources on the discourse level and see the metonymic networks created in texts as an essential aspect of their cohesion and coherence.[6]

The linguistic expressions representing the source in an act of metonymic inferencing do not have to include the target.[7] They usually serve as mere triggers for an instance of *metonymic inferencing*. Stirling[8] describes one special type of metonymic inferencing relevant for quotation practices as *indirect anaphora*, i.e.

[2] Cf. Radden – Kövecses 1999: 21; Panther – Thornburg 2003; Barcelona 2007.
[3] Panther – Thornburg 2007: 248f.
[4] Barcelona 2003a: 97.
[5] Barcelona 2011: 25.
[6] Brdar-Szabó – Brdar 2011.
[7] See also Barcelona 2011.
[8] Cf. Stirling 1996: 69 and see also Barcelona 2003a and 2011 on more complex cases of propositional implicatures.

"instances of reference where there is no explicit, identical antecedent for the referring nominal expression, yet nevertheless it is felt that its interpretation depends in some systematic way upon the linguistic context" as in Stirling's example (1).

(1) We checked the **picnic supplies**. ***The beer*** was warm.

Stirling[9] characterizes the majority of the relevant cases as cognitive metonymies relating the anaphora to some expression in the preceding discourse. Outside the cognitive-linguistic paradigm, processes of metonymic inferencing as illustrated in (1) have mostly been referred to as indirect anaphora, conceptual/bridging inference, or (inferential) bridging.[10]

Despite the prevalence of constructions such as (1) in natural interaction, there are hardly any empirical and corpus-based systematic analyses of metonymic inferencing in indirect anaphora from a cognitive linguistic perspective. Furthermore, regardless of the theoretical background, most studies so far have focused on the perspective of the hearer/reader and their *reception* and *interpretation* of utterances, thereby allocating the burden of establishing coherence in discourse to the recipient.[11]

Other than most cases discussed in the literature on indirect anaphora, the metonymic links in the HYS thread this paper deals with are established between two utterances, a quote from a previous posting by a participant A and a comment by another participant B directly attached to it. Thus, the major task of participant B, who actually instantiates the metonymic connection, does not consist in resolving an anaphora or respectively a metonymic implicature, arriving at participant A's intended interpretation via inferential mechanisms. Instead, users B are elaborating on an entity mentioned in the quote they have picked from the discourse themselves, as in (2), with a quoted passage from a previous posting by a participant A marked in bold print and a comment of a participant B directly attached to it *(I thought…):*

[9] My special thanks go to Mario Brdar for drawing my attention to Stirling's paper.

[10] Cf. for example Erkü – Gundel 1987; Cornish 1999; Schwarz-Friesel 2007; Schwarz-Friesel et al. 2007; Schwarz-Friesel – Consten 2011.

[11] But see Stirling 1996; Barcelona 2007 on metonymically based text-level implicatures, and Brdar-Szabó – Brdar 2011, who put special emphasis on the discursive use of metonymy and study metonymic source and target variation as a result of speakers' shifting between subdomains.

(2) **Bush is a man who killed thousands of people in iraq in the name of terrorism, what the hell is the pope doing with a murderer. Regards {{BBC_314}}**
I thought God loves everyone, including sinners.[12] (HYS#547)

Thus, speaker B uses a trigger expression in the quote that was not originally intended to serve as a metonymic source by participant A (neither consciously nor unconsciously) and he attaches a metonymically based elaboration to it. Thereby B enters an intended subdomain of a complex cognitive entity (the target) from the perspective of a trigger expression in the quote (acting as a source) that provides mental access to it. This adds an additional interactional and supra-individual level to Brdar-Szabó – Brdar's idea of metonymic elaboration,[13] extending its productive aspect beyond the range of source and target variations in a text.

From a cognitive linguistic point of view, the double nature of indirect anaphora, including their productive aspects linked to metonymical elaboration, can be accounted for by two essential properties of cognitive metonymies: firstly the idea of one conceptual entity providing mental access to another conceptual entity[14] and secondly, by Barcelona's observation that their target is "construed from the perspective of the source."[15] But, although the mental access function is seen as basic in the work of many researchers within the cognitive linguistic framework, its double nature, involving a *productive* and *elaborating* element next to a receptive inferential component, is often only mentioned implicitly.[16] Adopting a psycholinguistic perspective, Schwarz-Friesel[17] and Schwarz-Friesel – Consten[18] include the productive perspective in their work on indirect anaphora and coherence and elaborate on the double nature of both phenomena, distinguishing the speaker's perspective systematically from the perspective of the hearer. They see "[b]uilding up coherence and resolving anaphoric expressions in text comprehension … [as] … two processes which go hand in hand",[19] linking up interpretational continuity and thematic progression as

[12] All postings have been completely anonymized and reduced to the linguistically relevant information. No linguistic corrections have been made.
[13] Brdar-Szabó – Brdar 2011.
[14] Radden – Kövecses 1999: 21 – see also Kövecses 2010.
[15] Cf. Barcelona 2011: 12–13 drawing on Langacker's 1999: 207ff. notions of *reference point* and *construal*.
[16] Cf. for example Coulson – Oakley 2003: 51, who see the reference point as setting up "a context within which the conceptualiser can enter into contact with other less prominent entities in the discourse", Panther – Thornburg's 2007: 248f. idea of metonymies used for *reasoning*, or Barcelona's 2011: 11 concept of mental activation.
[17] Schwarz-Friesel 2007.
[18] Schwarz-Friesel – Consten 2011, see also the speaker-related aspects of reference from a pragmatic perspective in Schwarz-Friesel – Consten 2011: 348f.
[19] Schwarz-Friesel – Consten 2011: 353.

two sides of the same coin, without, however, going into the details of the productive side and discussing the role of cognitive metonymy in this process.

In focusing on the perspective of participant B in quotations in HYS, which are seen as *metonymic elaborations* rather than metonymic inferences, this paper attempts to stress the interactional and supra-individual productive aspect of these metonymic links.

3. QUOTATIONS AND PATTERNS OF METONYMIC ELABORATION IN HYS

A standard quotation in HYS consists of two adjacent parts: a quote from a previous posting produced by a participant A in the same discussion thread usually indicated by inverted commas or otherwise marked as a quote from a previous posting and a comment or elaboration by the current poster B given in italics in (3).

(3) "Was President Bush right to give him such a special welcome?" – *Was the Pope right to accept such a special welcome from President Bush?* (HYS#192)

The CMC literature discusses two layers of coherence created by quotations. The first is a text-deictic function, which simply points at some previous portion of discourse functioning as a reminder for the reader and a context-preserving mechanism.[20] The second layer refers to adjacency achieved by concatenating conceptually adjacent postings often spread over long passages in the polylogal discussion, "juxtaposing portions of two turns – an initiation and a response – within one message."[21] This also gives the interaction a highly dialogical flavor. In addition, participants in HYS use quotations as a 'trigger' for severe intergroup criticism of thread-external targets, e.g. politicians and other personae of public interest. In this use, the quote provides 'mental access' not only to a preceding portion of the discourse as discussed by Brendel – Meibauer – Steinbach[22] from a non-cognitive perspective, but also to a *forthcoming* portion of the discourse event realized by a comment of the poster B to the quote from A. Such 'trigger' quotes and their adjacent comments are what the present study focuses on.[23]

[20] Eklundh – Macdonald 1994; Barcellini et al. 2005.
[21] Herring 1999: 8; Barcellini et al. 2005: 2.
[22] Cf. Brendel – Meibauer – Steinbach 2011: 21.
[23] In addition, the material shows numerous examples of the 'normal' referential type of metonymies similar to Stirling's 1996 'type 1 and 2'- realizations in which a linguistic expression as the source provides access to an implied target such as in *Bush* for the *US-Administration.*

In the HYS-thread studied, the trigger-function of the quote from A and its adjacent metonymic elaborations by B are realized in two different formats: Type I is similar to the construction Stirling[24] discusses as 'Type 3' with reference to Fauconnier,[25] but realized by two different participants acting as two different speakers. This is illustrated in example (4) in Table 1, where the quote contains the linguistic expression 'the Pope' serving as the trigger (printed in *italics*) which acts as the *source* of a metonymic *target* 'The Vatican' in B's comment. Thus the comment produced by participant B contains an expression that materializes *one specific option* out of a range of possible targets that the trigger 'the Pope' may theoretically provide access to.

Quote with trigger produced by participant A		**Comment produced by participant B**
Metonymic source expression	**Conceptual metonymy**	**Metonymic target expression**
(4) #294 …. In this light the US Govt's official welcome of **the Pope** is misplaced. {{BBC_21}} …	SALIENT MEMBER OF INSTITUTION FOR **INSTITUTION**	… ***The Vatican*** is a "state" in name only and even that terminology dates back to the era of city-states. One might easily name a dozen small European cities with larger populations …. (HYS#294)

Table 1: *Trigger and metonymic elaboration in HYS – Type 1*

Type 2 is more complex and includes inferential chains[26] *(see example (5), Table 2)* and occurred more frequently in the 300 postings studied. Here we see a multi-level operation of metonymy. It involves a structure also found in rhetorical questions with an explicit reply produced by either the speaker or an addressee, elaborating on the intended, but unexpressed answer to the rhetorical question. In (5), the metonymic elaboration proceeds in two or more steps, yielding two or more partly unexpressed source-target combinations. In step 1, the trigger expressions 'Pope' and 'Bush' are given in the quote. They serve as a source 1 providing access to a possible but unexpressed target PERSONAE OF PUBLIC INTEREST in a SALIENT MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR CATEGORY metonymy.

In step 2, this category may serve as an unexpressed source 2 and provide mental access to another member of the same category ('Putin') in a CATEGORY FOR SALIENT MEMBER metonymy. The coherence created by the combination of

[24] Stirling 1996.
[25] Fauconnier 1985.
[26] See, e.g. Barcelona 2011: 25 for chained implicatures.

Quote with trigger produced by participant A		**Comment produced by participant B**
Metonymic source expression = SOURCE 1	**Chain of conceptual metonymies**	**Metonymic elaboration of Source2=TARGET2**
(5) #311Author: {{BBC_295}} one evil meets another, certainly they are glad to see eachother...**Pope+Bush**=New Crusade {{BBC_94}}	Potential but unexpressed **TARGET1**	I agree. It was the same feeling I had when Bush welcomed ***Putin***.
	Step 1: Salient member of a category for Category Step 2: Category for Salient member of a category	
	TARGET1 = SOURCE2 OF **TARGET2**	

Table 2: *Trigger and metonymic elaboration in HYS – Type 2*

a quote (including a 'trigger' – the 'source') and a comment (elaborating on the target not explicitly mentioned in the quote) rests on a process of metonymic elaboration on the part of participant B and a process of 'metonymic inferencing' on the part of the reader of the discussion on the computer screen.

Stirling[27] observes similar cases without treating them in great detail, but apart from one exception, the occurrences she discusses are produced by *one and the same* speaker in a doctor-patient interaction, developing their own argument more or less coherently. In the online discussion analyzed here, the trigger expression in the quote is chosen by participant B as a cognitive access point, opening up a range of perspectives on a cognitive sub-domain from which B chooses. B's choices are materialized as the specific perspective taken in the discourse by the target represented in their comments. This confirms the idea that metonymic elaboration customizes an underspecified source to the specific discourse needs of the speaker.[28] Other than in findings on potential text-level implicatures,[29] the choice of one possible metonymic route is materialized in the discourse event. Thus quotations serve to construct coherent interaction jointly between two or more participants following more (and also less) conventionalized metonymic paths, which are observable at the level of the concrete discourse event.

[27] See Stirling 1996: 74. In addition, there is some overlap with Barcelona's 2007: 68 types of cognitive metonymies guiding text-level implicatures, but the sets are not identical.
[28] See Brdar-Szabó – Brdar's 2011: 245.
[29] See Barcelona 2007.

In the analysis, the conceptual metonymies were checked with the list provided by Panther – Radden and Panther – Thornburg[30] to confirm their conventionalized character. The most frequent metonymic links reported by Stirling,[31] linking institutions or organizations to people associated to them, were also found in the quotation practices of the Internet discussion studied here. SALIENT MEMBER FOR INSTITUTION and INSTITUTION FOR MEMBER metonymies were realized by explicit or implicit sources$_{1/2/n}$ such as *the Pope, the Church* and explicit or implicit targets$_{1/2/n}$ such as *the Catholic Church* or *Catholics* respectively. In addition, a broader range of other frequent metonymic elaborations linking the trigger expressions in quotes to their comments were found. These include metonymies such as SALIENT QUALITY FOR PERSON (e.g. sources$_{1/2/n}$ = *Catholic beliefs* and targets$_{1/2/n}$ = *Catholics*), GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC (e.g. source$_{1/2/n}$ = *Wider society* and target$_{1/2/n}$ = *Catholic people and Communities*), PART OF A FRAME FOR PART OF A FRAME (e.g. involving the PERCEPTION FRAME: source$_{1/2/n}$ = *hear* and target$_{1/2/n}$ = *read*), CATEGORY FOR SALIENT PROPERTY (E.G. source$_{1/2/n}$ = *Gangster* and target$_{1/2/n}$ = *blood on his hands*). Some of the less frequent metonymies include CATEGORY FOR MEMBER OF A CATEGORY, COMMUNICATION FOR HUMAN BEINGS, PERIPHERAL PART OF AN EVENT FOR WHOLE EVENT, SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC, CAUSE FOR EFFECT, and PLACE FOR INHABITANTS.

The in-depth analysis of the first 300 postings of the thread showed that uses of the source and target tokens *the Pope* and *the church*, for example, are evenly distributed in the material, indicating that metonymical elaboration is systematically performed as a joint activity interrelating and pursuing each other's discourse.

Despite the lean character of metonymic mappings and their firmly established conventional access routes,[32] the postings also show an interesting variability in the metonymic mappings. Next to fully conventionalized access routes we find quite a few instances of non-conventionalized metonymies[33] concerning their source as the actual 'entry point' into the Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM) as well as the targets.[34] Examples of such non-conventionalized sources and targets are expressions such as *One elderly German in a badly fitting white frock, the offenders, A Man who is not responsible for a single terrorist or suicide attack,* which are metonymically linked by posters B to the target *The (Catholic) Church* as in example (7). Example (8) shows a case where the trigger expression *The Catholic Church* as an implicit source$_2$ is derived as a target$_1$ from source$_1$ given in the trigger expression "*He wears…*" and is linked to the conceptual target *atheist.*

[30] See PANTHER – RADDEN 1999 and PANTHER – THORNBURG 2003.
[31] STIRLING 1996.
[32] Cf. for example UNGERER – SCHMID 2006: 130; RUIZ DE MENDOZA IBÁÑEZ 1997: 175.
[33] See also UNGERER – SCHMID 2006: 130 and BARCELONA 2003b: 244.
[34] RADDEN – KÖVECSES 1999: 22.

(7) … So ***one elderly German in a badly fitting white frock*** says sorry in English and that makes everything OK does it? {{BBC_13}} – No: ***the offenders*** will be judged, Judged that is, when time comes. {{BBC_66}} – It also helps that ***the church*** is compensating many of the victims with money. (HYS#156)

(8) "***He wears funny clothes and recites a lot of mumbo jumbo*** in rituals that are favoured by those simple folk" {{BBC_37}} Though I'm an athesist myself some of the people I know are Christians, … (HYS#230)

The targets 'offenders' and 'atheists' in (7) and (8) are chosen in a process of metonymic elaboration by B, but they only seem to work in the specific micro- and macro-context of the discussion. The use of *the offenders* [HYS #156] as an entry into the target domain The Catholic Church makes perfect sense against the background of the 'abuse debate', which was in full swing in the media in 2008, the time when the discussion on HYS took place, and which was immediately activated in the discussion as retrievable background knowledge linked to the ICM The Catholic Church by referring to 'the Scandal' in an earlier posting. It is supported by *says sorry* as a trigger for an 'Offence' ICM the addressee can arrive at using a peripheral part of an event for whole event metonymy. The macro-context licensing *atheist* as a possible target has to do with the construction of in- and outgroups related to religious beliefs inside the forum throughout the discussion.[35] Cases such as these can show that highly conventionalized stereotypical cognitive mappings are only the tip of the iceberg in metonymical elaborations. Creative deviations from the easy-access routes show that, in the discussion studied here, additional factors play an important role for the actual perspective Bs take in their metonymical elaborations. Next to rhetorical motivations[36] these include first and foremost the immediate context of the discourse event, creating something similar to Kövecses'[37] notion of the 'pressure of coherence' discussed for metaphor.

Future research on metonymic elaboration will have to include empirical corpus-based studies more systematically. Along with standard access, they reveal non-conventional routes to conceptual targets in ordinary discourse and tell us more about what paths speakers follow when they pick a relevant aspect of a target domain. This will also give us a better insight into levels of granularity of the

[35] Kleinke – Bös (under review).

[36] Cf. Radden – Kövecses 1999.

[37] Cf. Kövecses 2009. See also Brdar-Szabó – Brdar's 2011 idea of the vagueness of conceptual sources as possible default options for more specific targets resolved by the discourse context, and Barcelona 2011 on the importance of the context for the construction and interpretation of metonymic links as well as Schwarz-Friesel's 2007 and Schwarz-Friesel – Consten's 2011 discussion from a psycholinguistic perspective, which, however, neglects the role of cognitive metonymy.

metonymies involved, their grounding in the actual discourse context, and their specific role in the compression of mental spaces – in short, about the productive construction of meaning and coherent discourse.

SOURCE

"Should the US give the Pope such a presidential welcome?" In: BBC NEWS-Have Your Say. Retrieved April 20, 2008 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/have_your_say/.

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Conceptual Structures and Communicative Functions of Metaphor in Message Board Discourse

A Project Outline

1. Introduction

Over the last three decades of metaphor research, strong emphasis has been placed on metaphor in thought. This is a result of the 'cognitive turn', initiated mainly by the work of Lakoff and Johnson, whose seminal book *Metaphors we live by*[1] caused no less than a revolution in metaphor research. Studies of metaphor in discourse have largely focused on how metaphorical conceptualizations reflect and influence our perception of the world. The role of metaphor in communication has been paid less attention. In my research project, I intend to give a comprehensive account of metaphor in communication, addressing structures in both language and thought. Therefore, I will complement metaphor analysis with discourse analysis, considering a series of discourse features and activities that can be linked to metaphor use. For this part of my study, I will base my analysis on Herring's faceted classification scheme for computer-mediated discourse.[2] My focus will thus be on both the cognitive and the interactional aspects of metaphor in discourse, and on the way they are intertwined. In this paper, I present an exemplary analysis of metaphor in a message board discussion. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to discursive aspects of metaphor use in naturally occurring discourse. It also sketches the specific framing conditions of message board discourse and discusses their relevance for the analysis of metaphor in interaction. Section 3 gives an overview of how metaphors in language and thought are identified and related to specific interactional functions. Section 4 presents the exemplary discussion of how metaphorical mappings are used by participants in a BBC message board thread to negotiate interpersonal and intergroup relations. The paper closes with some conclusions and a brief look at further research questions.

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[1] Lakoff – Johnson 1980.

[2] Cf. Herring 2007, particularly pages 17 ff.

In: *Cognition and culture.*
Eds: Sonja Kleinke – Zoltán Kövecses – Andreas Musolff – Veronika Szelid
Budapest, 2012, Eötvös University Press /Tálentum 6./ 99–109.

2. METAPHOR IN MESSAGE BOARD INTERACTION

Metaphor has been related to various communicative purposes in natural discourse, e.g. its explanatory power and evaluative function.[3] Research from a social-behavioral perspective shows that metaphor may also have a mitigating effect, e.g. in educational contexts/feedback giving, and that it creates intimacy between discourse participants ("affective function").[4] All these functions are particularly relevant for message board discourse, turning it into an interesting source for a linguistic analysis of "metaphor in the wild."[5] As it shows features of both spoken and written communication, message board discourse has been described as a hybrid genre.[6] In public message boards, communication is asynchronous, anonymous and restricted to one channel, i.e. written communication. Depending on the message board, participants seek advice or exchange information about a broad range of topics and concerns. Even 'everyday' issues and problems may turn out to be highly controversial, and thus lead to lively, sometimes highly emotional discussions. At the same time, participants seek to attract attention with witty, rhetorically sophisticated remarks.[7] The argumentative and often emotional character of message board interactions give this type of discourse a personal, conversation-like feel, rather unexpected of asynchronous, written communication. All these features, together with the participants' striving for rhetorical effect, make message board discourse a multi-faceted, fascinating source for the study of metaphor in discourse.

In order to come to an adequate account of metaphor in interaction, it is sometimes necessary to consider corresponding potential mappings at the conceptual level. For instance, there are cases in which a metaphor introduced by one discourse participant is subsequently taken up, modified or commented on, as we will see in the example in Section 4. If this means that a specific mapping between two conceptual domains remains in the focus of attention over a stretch of discourse, then such repeated reference to a mapping also contributes to coherence. At the same time, at the discourse level, taking up a metaphor introduced by another participant can have interpersonal functions, as a statement of consent, or a way of emphasising one's point of view. It is the aim of my research project to shed light on this interplay between the discourse level, i.e. metaphor in interaction,

[3] Cf. Gerrig – Gibbs 1988, particularly pages 7 ff.
[4] Cameron 2003: 23-24.
[5] Pragglejaz 2007: 1.
[6] Belmond – Collot 1996: 14.
[7] Cf. Kleinke – Bös (forthcoming).

and the conceptual level. This multi-level nature of metaphor is captured in Steen's three-dimensional model for metaphor, which encompasses metaphor in language, thought and communication.[8] Adapting the idea that the three dimensions are equally relevant, the analysis of manifestations of metaphor in language and cognitive structures runs parallel to the analysis of discourse structure. *Figure 1* illustrates the link between the conceptual and the discourse level, i.e. with both metaphor-related words and communicative, i.e. interpersonal and interactive, functions. This allows for a more comprehensive account of metaphor use in the stretch of discourse studied.



Figure 1: *Combination of metaphor and discourse analysis at two levels*

However, it has to be said that the approach taken is a purely linguistic one, and can therefore neither account for metaphor production nor for the processing of metaphor by the addressee(s). This means that when I speak of metaphor in interaction, I am not referring to social-behavioural processes, but to linguistic structures that reflect – for instance – the negotiation of ideas or interpersonal relations among discourse participants.

[8] Steen 2011, particularly pages 86 ff.

3. ANALYSING METAPHOR IN DISCOURSE

In my project, the qualitative analysis is carried out in three steps, as exemplified in Section 4. The first step consists of identifying linguistic structures in discourse that are potentially related to a cross-domain mapping. In the second step, the potential mappings are identified, as they may be necessary in order to account for the role of metaphor in communication. The third step is to consider the linguistic and discursive features of the stretch of discourse in which the metaphor occurs, and thereby to identify communicative goals and effects that can be linked to metaphor use. This last step brings in the discourse-analytical perspective, which complements the metaphor perspective and adds the communicative dimension to the picture (cf. Fig 1 above).

Recently, with the increasing interest in metaphor in naturally occurring discourse, there has been a call for more rigorous identification procedures than those provided in the conceptual metaphor framework.[9] In order to handle metaphor in discourse systematically, it is necessary to have an effective tool which helps to annotate metaphors in a reliable way. Therefore, in the thread under consideration in Section 4, metaphor was analysed with reference to *MIPVU*, a procedure proposed by Steen et al,[10] which provides a set of instructions for the identification of metaphor in language. In order to render my analysis of conceptual structures as reliable as possible, I have followed the *Five-step Procedure* according to Steen[11] to move from linguistic structures to potential mappings and inferences. This is similar to the listing of entailments for mappings in conceptual structure as outlined by Kövecses,[12] in which inferences by potential addressees are captured.

For the discourse analytical part, three of Herring's situation factors for the classification of CMD – *activity*, *tone* and *purpose*[13] – proved to be a good starting point when considering the discursive features of the stretch of discourse in which a linguistic metaphor occurs. In order to identify communicative goals and effects that can be linked to metaphor use, I have systematically analysed my data with reference to these factors. I therefore assume that the role of metaphor in communication can be described in relation to these three features, without claiming that metaphors are used intentionally or consciously by the producer or processed as such by the addressee. This approach will allow me to have a closer

[9] Pragglejaz 2007: 2.

[10] Cf. Steen et al. 2010. *MIPVU* is an elaboration of the *MIP*, the metaphor identification procedure proposed by the Pragglejaz Group 2007; the individual steps of MIPVU are discussed in detail in Section 4.

[11] Steen 2011.

[12] Kövecses 2002: 247.

[13] Herring 2007.

look at those metaphors that can be related to discourse activities, or have an effect on the tone of the discourse, or can be assigned an identifiable purpose or function.[14] They are special uses, which cannot be adequately described within the cognitive-linguistic framework. To come to a clearer understanding of exactly these metaphors, to explore their linguistic manifestations and potential underlying mappings, is the aim of my research project. The following section provides an exemplary analysis of one metaphor in a stretch of computer-mediated discourse, taking into account its linguistic structure, the potential underlying mapping and the communicative functions it can be linked to.

4. DISCUSSION

The quotes discussed here are from a thread called "writing lines", found at the "Being a parent" board in the "Parenting" section of the BBC News message board area *(see Fig. 2)*.[15] The thread consists of a discussion between 30 participants, that went on over a period of six days in June 2011. It contains a total of 88 posts – a relatively large number compared to other threads on the same board, which



FIGURE 2: *Screenshot of the BBC News Parenting Messageboard*

[14] Some of them might be what Steen has termed *deliberate* metaphors, i.e. metaphors used in communication for the purpose of "changing the addressees' perspective" on some entity or state of affairs, cf. STEEN 2011: 84.

[15] Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbparents/NF2741290?thread=8234108 (last access: October 05, 2011).

reflects the fact that the exchange turned rather controversial, despite the apparently 'everyday' character of the problem brought up for discussion. What follows is a brief summary of what the thread is about. The original poster's 7-year-old son was punished at school for not bringing his PE kit. As he could not take part in the PE class, his teacher made him write lines instead. The mother doubts the appropriateness of the punishment and seeks the advice of other participants about whether she should talk to the teacher. The opinions given in the first eleven responses could hardly be more divergent, and thus set the stage for a controversial discussion. On the one side, there are those who think that the punishment was outrageous. They share a general concern that too much pressure is put on young children nowadays. On the opposing side, there are those who blame the parents, who in their view fail to teach their children responsibility, resulting in forgotten PE kits. While the first group talks about having to defend their children against teachers on power trips, the second warns against helicopter parents who overprotect them.

The quotes discussed are from the beginning of the thread (posts 3–11). They show how the use of a rather conventional metaphor by one user triggers five related references to that metaphor in ensuing posts. In post 3, the user states her opinion that the OP (original poster) is overreacting. She then points to the positive effects that giving lines may have, i.e. that it may improve handwriting. The post exhibits a challenging, provocative tone and concludes with the following statement:

> a) […] Insatead[16] of thinking positively and backing the school, this mother is going to be one of the whining / complaining brigade. […] (BBCwl, 3)

In a), the user criticizes the OP for her attitude by saying that she is "one of the whining/ complaining brigade". Using this expression, she gives a negative evaluation of the general attitude of some parents who frequently talk to teachers about problems related to the school education of their children. At the level of language, the lexical unit *brigade* can be identified as a metaphor-related word ($MRW_{indirect}$). This is done according to the following steps: First, the contextual meaning is established. In 1), a tentative paraphrase of *brigade* is 'a group of people who share the same (questionable) attitude towards some issue'. This contextual meaning contrasts with the more basic sense listed in the Macmillan corpus-based dictionary (see table below). Macmillan[17] actually lists both the basic and the contrasting

[16] Typo is in the original.
[17] Source: Macmillan Corpus Based Dictionary Online < http://www.macmillandictionary.com/>.

contextual meaning in two separate entries, which points to the fact that the metaphor in question is rather conventionalized.

Contextual meaning	"a group of people who have the same opinions or way of life" (Macmillan, 2)
Basic meaning	"a large group of soldiers, larger than a battalion" (Macmillan, 1)
Sufficiently distinct?	Yes, two separate entries are listed in the dictionary.
Comparison	Yes, the abstract group of people who share strong convictions and defend them can be understood in terms of the more specific military sense.
Decision	*Brigade* is used indirectly and related to a potential cross-domain mapping

TABLE 1: *Steps of identification according to MIPVU*[18]

With respect to language processing, it seems unlikely that the discourse participants have to construct a mapping in order to comprehend what the producer means by using the word *brigade* in this context. This has been referred to as the paradox of metaphor.[19] However, without making any claims about metaphor processing, we can assume that there is a similarity between the state of affairs as expressed by the contextual meaning, i.e. being part of a group of people with a characteristic behaviour, and being part of a brigade. A potential mapping can be easily constructed by filling in the empty slots in the analogy *(see Fig. 3)*.



FIGURE 3: *Potential underlying mapping for* ***brigade***

[18] STEEN et al. 2010.
[19] STEEN 2011: 85.

What can be inferred from this mapping is that the behaviour of the mother is in some respect indirectly similar to the behaviour of members of a brigade, i.e. soldiers. For instance, she defends her convictions, and she might be in a confrontational relationship with those who do not share her convictions. The use of *brigade* in a) is pejorative (cf. Macmillan), as it is the negative entailments that are highlighted. Now interestingly, the metaphorical "whining/complaining brigade" (BBCwl, 3) is taken up in subsequent posts by different users:[20]

b) […] if that makes me part of a brigade then great, where is my badge […] (BBCwl, 5)

c)  Save me a spot in the badge queue! […] (BBCwl, 6)

d) […] I best join the queue then  […] (BBCwl, 7)

e) […] can I have a badge for the complaining club please […] (BBCwl, 8)

f) Wearing my whingers badge with pride  […] (BBCwl, 11)

I would like to argue that in b) – f) the potential mapping that underlies *brigade* remains in some way present in the discourse, because an element of the potential source domain, i.e. *badge*, is playfully used to highlight the positive aspects of the potential mapping. In b), the user emphasises her point of view by indirectly asserting that she sees herself as belonging to the group criticized in a). She picks out a potential element of the source domain. This does not imply, of course, that she is aware of the metaphorical status of the linguistic unit *brigade*. However, she seems to be aware that being member of a brigade may involve wearing a badge, and that consequently there must be a corresponding sign of membership for the group of whiners. In the source domain, the meaning of *badge* is "a special piece of metal, cloth, or plastic, often with words or symbols on it; that you wear or carry with you to show your rank or official position", a rather specialized sense given in Macmillan. In the target domain, there must be a corresponding element.

I have not yet come to a conclusion about whether *badge* is to be considered as a metaphor-related word. The first part of the meaning given in the Macmillan dictionary seems to capture only a part of the contextual sense in b) – f). In the examples, the most important part of the contextual meaning seems to be "sign of group membership", which is not included in either of the two dictionary senses given in Macmillan. However, the question is whether or not this contextual sense

[20] The respective number of the post in the thread is given in brackets; BBCwl = BBC, writing lines.

is sufficiently distinct from the basic sense "a small round object that fastens onto your clothes with a pin and usually has a picture or writing on it" (Macmillan), and whether we are dealing with a metonymical use of *badge* that originates in the source domain of the initial mapping. I will not go into more detail here, but the example certainly leaves room for further discussion.

Turning to the analysis of discourse activities, we can say that the user in 2) turns the negative evaluation given in a) into a positive one. She does so by highlighting positively connoted entailments of the potential mapping *(Fig. 3 above),* such as unity and group identity. She presents herself as a member of the group criticized in a), thus emphasising her point of view and playfully rejecting the criticism. This use of *badge* in b) triggers four subsequent references by different users who all take the same point of view on the issue discussed, as can be seen from their entire contributions to the thread. They refer to it either at the beginning of the post, i.e. as an introductory statement, which is followed by a more detailed explanation of their views (in post 6, 7, 11), or as a kind of résumé at the end of the post, to emphasise their opinion (in posts 5, 8). In c) and d), another entailment of the potential mapping is exploited. If badges are given out as signs of group membership, and if there are enough people who want to be part of the group of whiners, then there must be a badge queue! Thus, referring to *queue*, they emphasise their point of view, i.e. that they are in solidarity with the original poster. Assuming that this playful language use is, via *badge*, still related to the potential mapping that underlies *brigade*, it can be said to contribute to the coherence of the stretch of discourse under analysis.

In summary, post 3 functions as a trigger for a humorous, playful response in post 5, which again triggers a chain of four further responses from users who take a similar stance on the issue, and express this by referring to the entailments. Thus, at the level of thought, the same initial mapping remains in focus for a longer stretch of discourse, and thus at the same time contributes to coherence. As the example has shown, conceptual structures sometimes cannot be analysed in a straight-forward way when taken from naturally occurring discourse. For instance, metonymy may play a role when discourse participants exploit the entailments of a cross-domain mapping. In other cases, metaphors may be embedded in others, so that there are different layers of metaphorical structure, which have to be disentangled and analysed separately.

5. CONCLUSIONS

As the discussion in Section 4 shows, public message boards provide a rich source for the analysis of metaphor in naturally occurring discourse. This is due both to the argumentative character of message board interactions and to the fact that language play and creativity are highly valued. A comprehensive account of metaphor in this particular kind of discourse will have to look at metaphor in all three dimensions, in language, thought and communication. In order to come to a better understanding of how metaphor works in message board discussions, i.e. what pragmatic function it serves, a larger analysis will have to start by looking at the linguistic structures and their potential metaphorical mappings in the relevant discourse passages. These conceptual structures are necessary in order to account for how metaphor is used by participants for specific purposes over stretches of discourse, e.g. how they criticise or evaluate something, or how they take a stance on a particular subject. As points of view, ideas and interpersonal relations may be negotiated through metaphorical conceptualization, it is worth looking at how certain aspects of a potential mapping are highlighted or hidden in that process.

This may also throw light on patterns that show how the discourse context leads participants to use a particular metaphor, an issue related to one aspect of the *pressure of coherence principle*.[21] Some further questions I intend to address in my research are how metaphor may be used for its instructive and persuasive power in argumentative interaction. Moreover, given that it plays a role in the negotiation of ideas, it will be revealing to look at how metaphor influences the tone of the discourse. It may, due to its indirectness, make interaction more friendly/less contentious.[22] Furthermore, as metaphor is valued for its entertaining effect – it will be interesting to assess its role in a type of discourse where participants seek attention. Another peculiar aspect of the example discussed in Section 4 is that a sense of group solidarity seems to be at work when users express or emphasise their point of view via reference to entailments of the initial mapping (cf. the metonymical *badge*). Whether this is just true for the specific example discussed in this paper, or whether similar structures occur for other mappings also remains to be seen. Hopefully, my research will help to answer these questions and test the validity of the procedure chosen for analysis.

[21] Kövecses 2009.

[22] Brown – Levinson 1987: 222: metaphor as an "off-record face-saving strategy".

INTERNET SOURCES

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbparents/NF2741290?thread=8234108 (10/05/2011)
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PART 4
THEORIES OF LANGUAGE

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Some notes on the role of metaphors in scientific theorising and discourse

examples from the language science

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1. Introduction

In the present paper, I will point to some aspects of metaphor use in scientific discourse, taking the language science as my immediate example. My discussion is inspired by Kövecses' recent notion of 'context' and by current work within cognitive linguistics on the discursive development of metaphors. I will start with some general considerations on the role of metaphor in scientific theory building and on different attitudes that have been taken towards metaphor in science (section 2). Then, I will focus on the specific case of the language science (section 3) and sketch, in an exemplary way, some familiar, influential metaphorisations of language proposed by 20th century key authors. In section 4, I will point to some recurrent patterns in the use and development of metaphors in scientific discourse, with a focus on the impact of *zeitgeist* on metaphor use. The immediate example chosen for illustration will be the LANGUAGES AS ORGANISMS/SPECIES metaphor in 19th century linguistics. The revival of this metaphor and, more globally, the biological model of language in the field of sociolinguistics towards the end of the 20th century will be the subject of section 5. There, I will point to some prominent examples of the recourse to the biological model by critics of global English, with a focus on the underlying ideologies of their accounts. In my conclusion, I will take a more global perspective and relate my discussion to a well-known notion in the philosophy of science, namely Kuhn's concept of "paradigms in science", and some perhaps lesser known notions with a similar or related scope.

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2. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC THEORY BUILDING

It is an old observation that metaphor is omnipresent in scientific theorising and discourse, and the role of metaphor in science has been a debated issue for centuries. The various stances that have been taken range between two opposing poles: At the one end, there is the view that metaphors in science are at best redundant, at worst deceptive and an indicator of "unclear thinking". The historical standard reference for this negative view is Locke, based on often-cited statements as the following one:

> "If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passion, and thereby mislead the judgement, and so indeed are perfect cheat […] they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them."[1]

A recent example of a highly sceptical stance towards metaphor in science comes from one of the key figures in sociolinguistics, namely Fishman:

> "To some extent, our tendency to mystify and metaphorise our endeavours derives from our embarrassment that 'language' is not yet a fully understood variable, not even in the so-called 'Language sciences'. […] It is doubly difficult to precisely investigate and conceptualise the relationship between language and culture, for example when both variables are substantially metaphorised and thereby simplified, if not even more basically misunderstood."[2]

At the other end, there are authors that take a positive perspective on metaphor in science, acknowledge its capacity to illuminate the target of scientific investigation and emphasise its heuristic and stylistic value. Here, one may cite Black

[1] Locke 1996 [1689]: 214–215.
[2] Fishman 2002: 5.

> "No doubt metaphors are dangerous – and perhaps especially so in philosophy. But a prohibition against their use would be a wilful and harmful restriction upon our powers of inquiry."[3]

and Weinrich

> It is not justified to blame language for its figurativeness and to merely regard this figurativeness […] as an indicator of 'unclear thinking'. […] The writings of those who try to do without metaphor are just more boring, not more accurate. Dry sentences do not always mean correct sentences. Poor style is not a precondition of truth. (my transl.)[4]

From a cognitive-linguistic perspective, it is of course a completely odd question whether metaphor should be "avoided" in scientific theorising and discourse or not: Metaphor is one of the fundamental conceptual devices of the human mind and thought, and scientific theorising, as any other product of the human mind, is hence metaphoric to a significant extent. What is needed, instead, is awareness of the limits of metaphoric models in science and their highlighting-and-hiding effects. Here, the crucial point is that one must clearly distinguish between the heuristic function of metaphors and the non-metaphoric entailments that can be drawn from them.

Metaphor, after all, is a perspective-setting device in that it views and accesses its target from the angle of its source domain. Metaphors permeate all levels and aspects of scientific theory building and one cannot fail to notice that authors deliberately choose, propose and elaborate on a set of key metaphors in order to convey and delineate the specific perspective they take on their target field. In the following section, I will illustrate this point with well-known examples from major theories of language exposed in the 20th century.

[3] Black 1981: 79.

[4] "Es ist […] unberechtigt, der Sprache ihre Bildlichkeit vorzuwerfen und in dieser nur […] ein Indiz eines ‚unklaren Denkens' zu sehen. […] Wer um jeden Preis ohne Metaphern auszukommen sucht, schreibt nur langweiliger, nicht richtiger. Die Richtigkeit ist nicht immer mit den trockenen Sätzen. Schlechter Stil ist kein Wahrheitskriterium." Weinrich 1976: 324.

3. METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC THEORIES: ILLUSTRATIONS FROM 20TH CENTURY LINGUISTICS

For reasons of limited space, the account given here is a listing rather than a discussion of key metaphors proposed in 20th century linguistics. It is a natural choice to start this record with Saussure's CHESS metaphor:[5]

> "But of all the comparisons that might be imagined, the most fruitful is the one that might be drawn between the functioning of language and a game of chess. In both instances we are confronted with a system of values and their observable modifications. A game of chess is like an artificial realization of what language offers in a natural form."[6]

Indeed, the CHESS metaphor is highly beneficial to capture Saussure's focus on the system character of language, i.e. his approach to language as a set of distinctive elements plus rules. Saussure's CHESS metaphor has been picked up and discussed by many authors, and the more global GAME metaphor has, of course, further prominent pronunciations quite different from the one proposed by Saussure, e.g., Wittgenstein's notion of 'language game'.

The next illustration comes from an eminent Prague-School linguist, namely Bühler. With his organon model, he frames the functionalist interpretation of structuralism in terms of the TOOL metaphor:

> The fact that the human language may thus be seen as belonging to the "implements", or, in Platonic terms, that it is an organon, means nothing other than that it is regarded in relation to those who handle it and are its agents. Hence, in the axiom of the sign nature of language, linguistics gets to the paradigm of the *homo faber*, a maker and user of implements. (my transl.)[7]

[5] Due caution is in order with ascribing specific statements to Saussure based on the *Cours*, since it is a posthumous compilation by two of his students rather than necessarily his own writings.

[6] Saussure 1959 [1916]: 88–89.

[7] "Daß die menschliche Sprache von daher gesehen zu den „Geräten" gehört oder platonisch gesprochen, daß sie ein organon sei, heißt nichts anderes, als sie in Relation zu denen zu betrachten, die mit ihr umgehen und die ihre Täter sind. Die Sprachforschung stößt also im Axiom von der Zeichennatur der Sprache auf das Denkmodell des homo faber, eines Machers und Benützers von Geräten." Bühler 1999 [1934]: 48.

This metaphor highlights the functionalist emphasis on the language user, i.e. precisely on one of the aspects that are hidden by Saussure's interpretation of the CHESS metaphor and largely out of scope in Saussurian structuralism. Two points are worth noting as regards the issue of the evolution of metaphors in discourse. First of all, Bühler deliberately picks up and develops a metaphor with a long and substantial tradition going back to a passage in Plato's *Cratylus*. Secondly, Bühler's tool model of the sign has been famously extended to a more global communication model by his Prague-School fellow linguist Jakobson. Jakobson keeps the basic sender – receiver logic of the organon model and adds further functions of language beyond those included by Bühler.

My next illustration also comes from a Prague-School linguist, namely Tesnière, and it exemplifies the frequent mutual recourse between different scientific disciplines in their choice of metaphors. In order to convey the logic underlying his dependency grammar, Tesnière draws an explicit analogy to the groundbreaking theory in chemistry of his days,[8] namely the model of the atom proposed by Rutherford, Bohr and others, and this analogy also inspires the key notion of Tesnière's framework, namely that of 'valency':

> The verb may hence be likened to an atom with hooks that is equipped to attract – depending on the number of hooks it possesses – a specific number of actants and exerting control over them. The number of hooks possessed by a verb and, consequently, the number of actants it is capable of governing, constitutes what we call the verb's valency. (my transl.)[9]

The second key metaphor proposed by Tesnière is that of the sentence as a DRAMA:

> The verbal knot […] may be likened to a miniature drama. Like a drama, it is necessarily comprised of an action and more often than not actors and circumstances. Transposed from the realm of the drama to that of structural syntax, the action, the actors and the circumstances become the verb, the actants and the circumstants, respectively. (my transl.)[10]

[8] Parallel cases of explicit metaphoric recourse to other sciences abound; e.g., the notion of 'linguistic relativity' proposed by SAPIR – WHORF, which is inspired by Einstein's seminal theory, and the biological model of language (see the discussion later in the present paper).

[9] "On peut ainsi comparer le verbe à une sorte d'atome crochu susceptible d'exercer son attraction sur un nombre plus ou moins élevé d'actants, selon qu'il comporte un nombre plus ou moins élevé de crochets pour les maintenir dans sa dépendance. Le nombre de crochets que présente un verbe et par conséquent le nombre d'actants qu'il est susceptible de régir, constitue ce que nous appellerons la valence du verbe." TESNIÈRE 1966 [1959]: 238.

[10] "Le nœud verbal […] exprime tout un petit drame. Comme un drame en effet, il comporte obligatoirement un procès, et le plus souvent des acteurs et des circonstances. Transposés du plan de

In Tesnière's model, the DRAMA metaphor communicates with the VALENCY metaphor in that it specifies the distinction between obligatory *actants* and non-obligatory *circumstants*. Furthermore, it presents the verb with its valency properties as the prime sentence-building and perspective-setting element and hence rejects the standard analysis of the sentence in terms of a subject-predicate structure and the prominence given to the subject over all other sentence elements.

The brief survey given in the present section may close with Chomsky.[11] One of his favourite metaphors used in order to convey the basic assumptions of generative grammar is that of language as an ORGAN:[12]

> "We may usefully think of the language faculty, the number faculty, and others, as 'mental organs,' analogous to the heart or the visual system or the system of motor coordination and planning."[13]

> "Each of [the] 'organs of the body' has its properties. They fall together, presumably, at the level of cellular biology, but no 'organ theory' deals with properties of organs in general. The various faculties and cognitive systems of the mind may be much the same. If so, there will be no field of 'cognitive science' dealing with the general properties of cognitive systems. Specifically, the study of language will neither provide a useful model for other parts of the study of the mind, nor draw from them significantly.[14]

With this metaphor, he frames many of his discussions of key claims made by the generative enterprise, e.g. the assumption that the mind is a system of interrelated but autonomous modules and that language, too, has a modular design, the claim that specific structural principles of language (Universal Grammar) are innate and the related view of "language learning" as PHYSICAL GROWTH.

The brief survey given in the present section was meant to prepare the ground for the following more detailed discussion of some aspects of metaphor use in scientific discourse.

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la réalité dramatique sur celui de la syntaxe structurale, le procès, les acteurs et les circonstances deviennent respectivement le verbe, les actants et les circonstants." TESNIÈRE 1966 [1959]: 102.

[11] Also see MONSHAUSEN *this volume*.

[12] The metaphorisation of language as an ORGAN OF THE MIND is, of course, not original: Humboldt, one of Chomsky's major references, characterised language as the "forming organ of thought" ("das bildende Organ des Gedanken") and Herder called it the "organ of reason" ("Organ des Verstandes").

[13] CHOMSKY 1980: 39.

[14] CHOMSKY 1994: 34.

4. SOME PATTERNS OF METAPHOR USE IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE: THE CASE OF ORGANICISM IN 19TH CENTURY LINGUISTICS

In the present section, I will point to some recurrent patterns in the use and development of metaphors in scientific discourse. This issue is currently receiving a growing attention as a research topic among cognitive linguists; cf., e.g., Musolff's work on the BODY POLITIC metaphor[15] and Zinken, Hellsten and Nerlich with their notion of 'discourse metaphors'.[16] This research strand joins with the more global call for a greater attention to the notion of 'context' in cognitive linguistics.[17] What I wish to highlight in the present section is, first of all, the impact of *zeitgeist* on the choice and specific application of metaphors, an issue that falls into the realm of what Kövecses refers to as "global context". The case in point I will look at is the widely-used metaphorisation of languages as ORGANISMS or SPECIES in 19th century linguistics.

While the analogy between languages and organisms has a long tradition in Western thinking, it is well-known to have enjoyed a particularly high popularity among 19th century linguists.[18] Their use of this metaphorisation is, however, far from homogeneous; instead, several distinct interpretations of the LANGUAGE AS ORGANISM metaphor may be identified.[19]

One of these applications is the term *organisch* (organic) in the specific typological/ morphological context, and it is linked to the first generation of historical-comparative linguists, most prominently Friedrich Schlegel.[20] Schlegel uses *organisch* to refer to inflection-based languages (more specifically internal inflection), which he characterises as "having developed in an organic way" ("organisch entstanden") and as "forming an organic tissue" ("ein organisches Gewebe bilden[d]").[21] Affixation-based languages, in turn, are labelled *mechanisch* (mechanical). Their morphological roots, as Schlegel puts it,

[15] E.g. MUSOLFF 2009, and *this volume*.
[16] Cf. ZINKEN – HELLSTEN – NERLICH 2008.
[17] See, e.g., KÖVECSES 2009, and *this volume*, and the collective volume MUSOLFF – ZINKEN 2009 in general.
[18] A wealth of studies exists on the LANGUAGES AS ORGANISM/SPECIES metaphor in 19th century linguistics. Surveys include MORPURGO-DAVIES 1992: Ch. 4; TSIAPERA 1990 and KUCHARCZIK 1998.
[19] Cf. KUCHARCZIK 1998.
[20] See KUCHARCZIK 1998: 87–91 for discussion.
[21] F. SCHLEGEL 1808: 51.

> are not a fertile germ, but merely like a heap of atoms, which can be easily scattered or swept together by any casual wind; the bond actually being nothing but a merely mechanical one brought about through external addition. (my transl.) [22]

His brother, August Schlegel, adds the following organicist characterisation of the third type of languages, namely the isolating ones: "one may say that all their words are roots, but sterile roots which produce neither plants nor trees" (my transl.).[23]

The typological *organisch-mechanisch* distinction, however, had a relatively short life. With the advent of the *Agglutinationstheorie*, i.e. the insight that inflectional morphemes are in fact, to use the modern terminology, the product of the grammaticalisation of originally free (lexical) or agglutinated items, this distinction and the rhetoric of "sterile" and "fertile roots" turned out to be untenable and fell out of use. As Kucharczik rightly remarks, the term *organisch* was free again for new applications.[24] Consider, e.g., the use of *organisch* by Grimm in the sense of "regular", i.e. in accordance with the "natural rule of language" and its "internal consistency",[25] and, in turn, of *unorganisch* to refer to irregular developments and patterns. Humboldt, in turn, used the related term *language organism* (*Sprachorganismus*) in the sense of 'language structure'.[26]

To authors like the Schlegel brothers, Grimm and Humboldt, LANGUAGE AS AN ORGANISM was, its central status notwithstanding, still a *metaphoric* way of referring to linguistic phenomena. A fairly radical version of organicism, however, was proposed by one of the most prominent second-generation comparative linguists, namely Schleicher. In his programme of the language science as a natural science, languages were *literally* regarded as natural organisms:

[22] "In Sprachen hingegen, die statt der Flexion nur Affixa haben, sind die Wurzeln nicht eigentlich das; kein fruchtbarer Same, sondern nur wie ein Haufen Atome, die jeder Wind des Zufalls leicht aus einander treiben oder zusammenführen kann; der Zusammenhang eigentlich kein andrer, als ein bloß mechanischer durch äußere Anfügung." F. Schlegel 1808: 5.

[23] "On pourroit dire que tous les mots y sont des racines, mais des racine stériles qui ne produisent ni plantes ni arbres" A. Schlegel 1818: 14.

[24] Kucharczik 1998: 91.

[25] "der natürlichen regel der sprache und ihrer innern consequenz gemäss"; this quote comes from a letter by Grimm to Joost Halbertsma (Sept. 1833, repr. in Sijmons 1885: 268).

[26] Note that this application of the term "organism" has a long discourse tradition and can also be found, e.g., in Saussure's *Cours*, where "organisme (grammatical)" is used as a synonym of "linguistic system".

> The languages, made out of sound as their material and supreme among all natural organisms, do not only show their nature as natural organisms in that they are ordered in terms of genera, species, sub-species, etc. but also in that they grow according to specific laws. (my transl.)[27]

Schleicher's biological model of language communicated closely with the theory of evolution in biology, including Darwin's model, and is hence an excellent case in point to illustrate the mutual recourse between different sciences in the choice of key conceptualisations and analogies.[28] Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859. Its first German translation was available in 1860 and made known to Schleicher by Ernst Häckel. In 1863, Schleicher responded to Darwin's book with a paper entitled *Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft*. In 1869, an English translation of this paper appeared as *Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language*, which in turn was apparently among the sources that inspired Darwin to elaborate on the linguistic analogy in *Descent of Man* (1871), an analogy that was drawn by him in his *Origin of Species* already, albeit only in passing.[29] For my present concern, it is, however, more important to look at the discursive strategy taken by Schleicher in his *Darwin* paper. His strategy could hardly be more straightforward:

> "Lets us now take up the origin of species [i.e. Darwin's book; F.P.], and consider how far it is possible to confront the science of language with the views represented by Darwin."[30]

His endeavour is hence to make a linguistic argument in support of the theory of evolution. In turn, he takes Darwin's theory to provide confirmation of the biological model of language[31] and the programme of linguistics as a natural science:

[27] "Die Sprachen, diese aus lautlichem Stoffe gebildeten höchsten aller Naturorganismen, zeigen ihre Eigenschaft als Naturorganismen nicht nur darin, daß sie, wie diese, sämmtlich in Gattungen, Arten, Unterarten u.s.f. sich ordnen, sondern auch durch ihr nach bestimmten Gesetzen verlaufendes Wachsthum." Schleicher 1860: 33.

[28] Note, however, that Schleicher developed his biological model of language prior to his acquaintance with the specific version of the theory of evolution proposed by Darwin; see Koerner 1976, 1981 for discussion.

[29] See Frank 2008 for discussion, and Koerner 1981 on the link between Häckel and Schleicher.

[30] Schleicher 1869: 31.

[31] However, one should not overstate the case. Even in his *Darwin* paper, Schleicher sets limits to his analogy; cf.: "Das Reich der Sprachen ist von dem der Pflanzen und Thiere zu verschieden, als dass die Gesamtheit der Darwinschen Ausführungen mit ihren Einzelheiten für dasselbe Geltung haben könnte" Schleicher 1873 [1863]: 33 [The realm of languages is too widely different from that of the plants and the animals to make the totality of Darwin's account with all its particulars truly applicable to this realm; my transl.].

> "Languages are organisms of nature; they have never been directed by the will of man; they rose, and developed themselves according to definite laws; they grew old, and died out. They, too, are subject to that series of phenomena which we embrace under the name of "life." The science of language is consequently a natural science; its method is generally altogether the same as that of any other natural science."[32]

Schleicher's biological model of language met heavy criticism by his contemporaries. One may take, as an example thereof, the response to his *Darwin* paper written by Whitney some years after Schleicher's (1821–1868) death. Whitney's response also illustrates a general mechanism of criticism in scientific discourse: It is a recurrent pattern that such criticism is framed as an attack on the other's key metaphors. Following this pattern, Whitney's discursive strategy is to "test" the LANGUAGE AS AN ORGANISM metaphor:

> "Schleicher has put forth the theory of the independent and organic life of language in an extreme form, and has drawn from it extreme consequences, as if in order that we may be provoked to give it a thorough examination, and see whether it is a valuable guiding truth, or only a delusive figure of speech."[33]

This "test" leads him to the rejection of Schleicher's biological model of language. In the next step, Whitney frames his alternative perspectives with alternative metaphorisations:

> "Languages, then, far from being natural organisms, are the gradually elaborated products of the application by human beings of means and ends, of the devising of signs by which conceptions may be communicated and the operations of thought carried out. They are a constituent part of the hardly won substance of human civilization. […] If we are to give language a name which shall bring out its essential character most distinctly and sharply, and even in defiance of those who make of it an organism, we shall call it an INSTITUTION, one of the institutions that make up human culture."[34]

Schleicher's biological model was also rejected by the third generation of comparative linguists in Germany. Although the Neogrammarians continued and intensified his programme of studying language and language change as "law-governed",

[32] Schleicher 1869: 20–21.
[33] Whitney 1873: 300–301.
[34] Whitney 1873: 315–316; his capitalisation.

they had no inclination towards the view of languages as natural organisms. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the ORGANISM metaphor lost its original popularity and discursive prominence.

In addition to the specific versions of organicism sketched so far, the LANGUAGES AS ORGANISMS conceptualisation had a broad presence in 19th century linguistic discourse in a more global, "culturalist" sense. To many of the authors across this century it was altogether natural to relate structural characteristics of a given language to the character (the *Volksgeist*) of the nation it is spoken by. Through this metonymic association, languages, in this discourse, appear as CREATURES WITH HUMAN CHARACTER TRAITS.[35] The philosophical background to this view includes, most prominently, Condillac with his notion of the 'génie' of a language, and Leibniz, and the immediate reference point is certainly Herder. A quote from Herder may serve as an illustration of this view:

> The most elegant approach to the history and the manifold characteristics of the human mind and heart would thus be the philosophical comparison of the languages, for in each of them is inscribed a people's mind and character. (my transl.)[36]

The pervasive use of the ORGANISM metaphor in 19th century linguistics sketched above invites an interpretation in terms of Kövecses' recent notion of 'context'.[37] For these authors, given their specific foci, the recourse to models developed in biology was an altogether natural choice. First of all, in the immensely influential Linnean-type of taxonomy in biology, the early comparative linguists found a blueprint for their endeavour to classify their own object of inquiry, i.e. languages.[38] When the dynamic interpretation of such classifications became an issue, i.e. when the

[35] Across Humboldt's writings, for instance, we find attributes like *sensual*, *intellectual*, *energetic*, *lethargic*, etc. ascribed to languages or particular language structures. In the same vein, it was still altogether "natural" to an early 20th century key author like Jespersen, in his *Growth and Structure of the English Language* 1905, to famously relate structural properties of the English language to the "character" of the English people, e.g. with attributes like *masculine* or *grown-up*.

[36] "Der schönste Versuch über die Geschichte und mannigfaltige Charakteristik des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens wäre also eine philosophische Vergleichung der Sprachen; denn in jede derselben ist der Verstand eines Volkes und sein Charakter eingeprägt." HERDER 1991 [1784–1791]: 185.

[37] E.g. KÖVECSES 2009, 2011, and *this volume*.

[38] A parallel case in point is the LINGUISTIC UNITS ARE ORGANISMS metaphor reflected, most prominently, in the established terminology in morphology (*root*, *stem*). The very term *morphology*, too, is the product of the mapping process in question: Coined by Goethe in 1776 in the explicit context of the natural sciences and widely known through his 1817 study *Zur Morphologie*, it was transferred to the linguistic context by Friedrich Maximilian Müller and became popular there through Schleicher's 1859 paper *Zur Morphologie der Sprache*, whose title is clearly reminiscent of Goethe's study (cf. SCHMITTER 2004: 120).

focus shifted from mere classification to accounts of the historical development of languages, it was again a natural choice for linguists like Schleicher to extend their recourse to biology by including the theory of biological evolution into their model of language and elaborate the LANGUAGES AS SPECIES view accordingly. Here, one also needs to bear in mind that considerations on biological evolution were, of course, a hotly debated issue and public concern at that time, already prior to Darwin's seminal books. In other words, the recourse to the biological source domain (rather than others) reflects what Kövecses calls the "pressure of coherence" and, in particular, the influence and "pressure" of the "global context" on the choice of metaphors. Likewise, the general discourse on the "character" of languages (and nations, correspondingly) clearly reflects *zeitgeist* phenomena and ideological stances: Some languages were regarded as being nobler than others, intellectually superior, etc. The philosophical and anthropological view of an inextricable link between the "spirit of a people" and "the spirit of its language" received most immediate political implications in the process of nation-building, one of the key issues on the agenda of the 19th century.

5. THE REVIVAL OF THE BIOLOGICAL MODEL OF LANGUAGE IN 20TH CENTURY SOCIOLINGUISTICS: THE CASE OF THE DEBATE ON GLOBAL ENGLISH[39]

The loss of discursive prominence of culturalist interpretations and of the biological metaphors towards the end of the 19th century need to be seen in the light of a changing *zeitgeist* and of the advent and increasing dominance of new approaches in linguistics, with their own specific sets of key metaphors. However, biological metaphors did not completely disappear from linguistic discourse. It is especially in the context of linguistic diversity that they continued to be used. And it is precisely in this context that they returned to popularity in sociolinguistics towards the end of the 20th century. A key figure in this revival is certainly Haugen with his notion of the 'ecology of language'. The following passage is particularly relevant to my discussion, since Haugen develops his view from explicit considerations on metaphors in the language science and their heuristic function:

[39] My discussion leans on the earlier and more comprehensive account given in Polzenhagen – Dirven 2008.

> "Today the biological model is not popular among linguists. It was clearly a metaphor only, which brought out certain analogues between languages and biological organisms, but could not be pushed too far. Any conclusions drawn about language from this model were patently false: a language does not breathe; it has no life of its own from those who use it; and it has none of the tangible qualities of such organism. […] Even if we reject the biological, the instrumental, or the structural metaphors, we recognize the heuristic value of such fictions. Languages do have life, purpose, and form, each of which can be studied and analyzed as soon as we strip them of their metaphorical or mystical content."[40]

Haugen's 'ecology of language' view had a significant impact in the field of sociolinguistics in general, and it was also made part of a revival of the biological model in the specific discourse on global English. In my subsequent discussion, I will focus on the applications of this model by proponents of a view that may be called, to borrow a term from Schmied, "alienationist".[41] Under this view, English is regarded as "alien" and "destructive" to local "ecologies" at the various dimensions, i.e. to linguistic, cultural and even natural "ecologies".

As noted above, biological metaphors have come to be a common choice in the context of linguistic diversity. Many linguist of various persuasions have used them this way, and, evidently, this usage does not *per se* point to an author's adherence to a fully-fledged biological model of language. One may cite, as a representative example, Aitchison, who certainly has no inclinations towards organicism:

> "Yet there is one extra worry to add in language loss. Ninety per cent of the world's languages may be in danger. […] The splendiferous bouquet of current languages will be withered down to a small posy with only a few different flowers."[42]

It is instructive to contrast Aitchison's BOUQUET metaphor with the metaphorisations used in the alienationist discourse on global languages. Consider the following statement by Skutnabb-Kangas:

> "While new trees can be planted and habitats restored, it is much more difficult to restore languages once they have been **murdered**. Languages are today disappearing at a faster pace than ever before in human history. What happens is **linguistic genocide** on a massive scale, with formal education and media as

[40] HAUGEN 1972: 326–327.
[41] SCHMIED 1991: 104.
[42] AITCHISON 1997: 95.

> the main concrete culprits but with the world's political, economic and military structures as the more basic causal factors. **Big languages turn into killer languages, monsters that gobble up others,** when they are learnt *at the cost* of the small ones."[43]

This passage clearly differs from the spirit of the BOUQUET metaphor, first of all, in its explicit, ideologically motivated choice of negatively loaded and radical terms.[44] Furthermore, in the logic of these metaphors, languages are AGENTS capable of willful actions (more specifically, CARDINAL CRIMES); i.e. these metaphors ascribe properties to their target domain LANGUAGES which languages do precisely *not* have, which makes them, also from a heuristic point of view, dubious and inappropriate.[45]

In the above statement, the killer-language rhetoric basically frames the alleged effects of global languages like English on local "linguistic ecologies". However, in much of this discourse, a far broader notion of 'ecology' is advocated. The claim goes that language, culture and the biological world coevolve as elements of a common overarching ecology, that they are interrelated, interdependent and even determining each other.[46] This claim is expressed, for instance, by Maffi, in her survey of the development of the ecolinguistic movement:

> "However, in these initial pronouncements, no significant attempt was made to go beyond such parallels and ask whether *there might be more than a metaphorical relationship* between these phenomena. It is only recently that this question has been explicitly asked and the idea proposed that, along with cultural diversity, linguistic diversity should also be seen as inextricably linked to biodiversity."[47]

Here, the relationship assumed between languages and the biological world is not any more at the level of metaphor but *factual*. The biological model is no longer employed as a heuristic tool; instead, it is taken literally.

[43] Skutnabb-Kangas 2003: 33; italics in the original, boldface mine.
[44] Skutnabb-Kangas 2000: xxxii herself notes the "inevitable shock effect" of her metaphors. What is shocking indeed about terms like "linguistic genocide" is, in the light of the atrocity of real genocide, that such an analogy is drawn at all and propagated in the title of a book that is meant to argue for a sensitive stance towards the cultural experience of others.
[45] See Skutnabb-Kangas 2000: xxxii–xxxiii for her own view in defence of her terms, and Lucko 2003 and Polzenhagen – Dirven 2008: 270–273 for discussion.
[46] Studies along these line thus typically present tables that compare and correlate the number of biological species and the number of languages and cultures in some region, arguing that the various dimensions of diversity overlap (see, e.g., Skutnabb-Kangas 2000: Ch. 2).
[47] Maffi 1998: 12–13; italics mine.

By some authors, the relationship between the various dimensions of the assumed overarching "ecosystem" is explicitly characterised as a *causal* link. Languages, specifically, are regarded as *agents* in this ecology. A prominent example of this view is a paper by Mühlhäusler with the telling title "English as an exotic language".[48] There, he makes one of the senses of *exotic*, namely '(of plants and animals) foreign and not acclimatized' the input of his considerations on the degree of "adaptation" of English to his specific context of investigation (Pitcairn Island) and on the effects the English language has, according to him, on this setting. He concludes that English has remained "ill-adapted" to its "new environment" in many places. Discussing the alleged destructive effect of English, Mühlhäusler even finds it plausible to put the blame for ecological disasters on this language, making English a *causal factor* for such disasters:

> "The fact that an increasing number of well-adapted small local languages are being replaced by English is in all likelihood one of the reasons for global environmental deterioration."[49]

The group of authors that support such far-reaching claims derived from reasoning along the lines of the biological model is certainly small, although rather vocal in the debate. Parallel to the case of organicism in the 19th century, there is no fully homogeneous picture of metaphor use even within otherwise more or less delineated strands like ecolinguistics and the "linguistic-human-rights" movement. Furthermore, the ecological view of language is far from being the monopoly of alienationists in the debate. Authors like Mufwene, for instance, whose approach is explicitly modelled along the lines of an ecological view, arrive at very different interpretations against this background and regard language shift as a dynamic adaptation to changing socio-cultural ecologies.[50]

It is again straightforward to relate the "revival" of the biological model of language to Kövecses' notion of 'context'. Broadly speaking, it certainly reflects the general ecological *zeitgeist* that emerged in the 1970s at the wider societal level in Western countries, and growing concerns about the effects of globalisation. From the former, the discourse sketched above takes its preservationist/conservationist stance and its view of diversity as an asset and an imperative. As regards the issue of globalisation, the alienationists take side with an anti-Western, anti-globalisation ideology. This ideology leads some of these authors to an overt "West-bashing",

[48] Mühlhäusler 2003.
[49] Mühlhäusler 2003: 78.
[50] Mufwene 2002.

as Edwards aptly calls it,[51] which is taken to the linguistic front as overt "English-bashing". It is worth mentioning that, in this endeavour, they make use of the classic romantic-relativist conceptualisation of LANGUAGE AS BEARER OF WORLD-VIEW (cf. section 4 for some notes on the 19th version of "culturalist" discourse), too, and depict English variously as inextricably bound to and embodying Western world-view, Western values and Western imperialism, as ecologically unsound, as the conceptual Trojan Horse of the West, etc.[52]

With respect to another level of "context", namely current foci within the very discipline of linguistics, one also needs to bear in mind that the return of the biological model in the specific discourse on global English is not an isolated phenomenon. The more global subject of "language evolution", for instance, has come to be a thriving topic in linguistics in general, from the various theoretical perspectives. It is also worth noting that the communication between linguistics and biology is not one-directional; biologists, too, turn to linguistic models as a source of analogy for their own target domain.[53]

6. CONCLUSIONS

The perspective taken in the present paper bears an obvious reference to the Kuhnian notion of 'paradigms in science'[54] and related ones proposed and discussed in critical accounts of Kuhn's model. There is no space to go into detail here on these notions, but I still wish to make them the background of four concluding remarks: (i) While in the so-called "hard sciences" it may be the case that in paradigm shifts the new one completely replaces the old one (Kuhn's notion of 'revolution', with the prototypical example of the Copernican turn), the situation is markedly different in the social sciences (including linguistics). There, although a particular paradigm may be dominant at a given time, it is a natural and even mature state that several paradigms coexist, and less dominant ones my again return to prominence over time. This observation has already been made by early commentators on Kuhn's account; cf. Hymes' alternative notion of 'cynosures'.[55] (ii) The dominance of a model as well as its specific makeup often reflect a particular *zeitgeist*, and parallel observations can be made as regards the impact of specific overt ideologies. Koerner elaborates on the notion of 'climate of opinion'

[51] Edwards 2002: 8.
[52] On these and further ideological stances see the criticism in Edwards 2002; Lucko 2003 and Polzenhagen – Dirven 2008.
[53] See Dirven – Polzenhagen – Wolf 2007 for a brief survey.
[54] Kuhn 1962.
[55] Hymes 1974.

to capture this point and contrasts it with Kuhn's 'paradigms'.[56] There is an obvious consonance between the notions of 'climate of opinion' in this sense and 'global context' in the sense of Kövecses. (iii) There is a thriving communication and mutual recourse between the various sciences ("hard" and "soft") which manifests in their choice of metaphors. It is a recurrent pattern that models developed in a specific discipline are used in other sciences as a source domain for analogies. (iv) As already noted by Kuhn,[57] particular paradigms come with a set of specific key metaphors and paradigm shifts hence involve shifts in metaphors. However, one may also notice, in a given discipline, a stock of salient metaphors that are recurrently drawn upon and reinterpreted, and here, a specific metaphor is not bound exclusively to one particular model. Scientific communities are hence 'thought collectives' in the sense of Fleck[58] and, to apply a notion of Weinrich to this context, 'image-field communities' (*Bildfeldgemeinschaften*)[59] with respect to their metaphor use. This concord notwithstanding, there is, however, considerable variation in the elaboration of specific metaphors across individual authors even within the same strand in a discipline.

The account that can be given in a paper of the present length is necessarily scarcely more than a sketch. Indeed, it would be worthwhile and promising to work out a history of the language science based on the comparison of the key metaphors of the various theories proposed over the centuries, on their origins and implications and on their development in linguistic discourse.

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[56] Koerner 1976.
[57] Cf. Kuhn 1993.
[58] Fleck 1979 [1935].
[59] Weinrich 1976: 287.

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LISA MONSHAUSEN*

METAPHORS IN LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE

COMPARING CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN SEARLE AND CHOMSKY

1. INTRODUCTION

Scientific thinking, like any other product of the human mind, is impossible without the use of metaphors. Metaphors are omnipresent in scientific discourse, and the discourse of linguistics is no exception. In order to find evidence for this, it suffices to take a look at conceptual metaphor theory itself. The conceptual metaphor METAPHOR IS TRANSPORT is already realised in the term "metaphor", which historically means 'transfer'. The change of location that is related to the concept of transport becomes evident in the notion of "domain". The "source domain" corresponds to the place of departure and the "target domain" to the destination of the transfer. The term "mapping" is another manifestation of the TRANSPORT metaphor as it originates in cartography and thus evokes a spatial relation.[1]

This example indicates that a great number of metaphors lurk in linguistic terminology. My examination, however, is not confined to an investigation of technical terms. It looks at the writings of individual authors in order to examine which linguistic forms are used to express the target domain LANGUAGE.[2] I selected texts by two major representatives in linguistics, each of which exposes a different model of language. The study can thus be seen as a journey through theories of linguistics in the 20th century including visits to two of the top sights. The first case study deals with Searle's pragmatic approach to language on the basis of his

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[1] See Kertész 2004 and 2001 for a more detailed investigation of technical terms in linguistics.

[2] This onomasiological cognitive-linguistic approach was also applied by Olaf Jäkel 2003, who analysed different conceptualisations of the target domain SCIENCE on the basis of texts written by major Western philosophers including Aristotle, Descartes or Kant. Lakoff – Johnson 1999 also concerned themselves with the role of metaphors in science (with a focus on the field of philosophy), however investigating metaphorical thinking rather than the actual textual manifestations of metaphor.

In: *Cognition and culture.* Eds: Sonja Kleinke – Zoltán Kövecses – Andreas Musolff – Veronika Szelid
Budapest, 2012, Eötvös University Press /Tálentum 6./ 133–142.

seminal work *Speech acts – an essay in the philosophy of language*.[3] In the second case study, I will consider metaphorical conceptualisations of LANGUAGE in *Reflections on language* by Noam Chomsky.[4]

A central question in my examination is to what extent the different metaphorical conceptualisations are consistent with each other and with the theory that is advocated in the text. My analysis focuses on the role of the metaphor within the textual environment that it is embedded in, and therefore also reveals the author's motivation for the use of a particular metaphor and its function in the text.[5]

2. THE TARGET DOMAIN LANGUAGE

Before engaging in the actual metaphor analysis of the two texts, I would like to make a few remarks on the characteristics of the target domain LANGUAGE. The topic of language appears in a variety of discourses and has occupied people's minds for centuries. Consequently, the everyday English word 'language' has many different meanings – as do its equivalents in other languages. There is not one clear-cut definition of this highly abstract concept. In my metaphor analysis I examine which parts of the target domain LANGUAGE are highlighted and which parts are hidden by each identified metaphor. Regarding the content of the two texts selected for analysis, I established five sub-domains of LANGUAGE:

1. LANGUAGE USE/COMMUNICATION: the actual use of a language in particular situations, e.g. writing, speaking, reading, listening
2. AGENTS IN THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS: speaker, hearer, writer, reader
3. LANGUAGE FACULTY: the ability to produce and understand language
4. LINGUISTIC ELEMENTS: words, sentences etc.
5. GRAMMAR: the internal rules of the language system

Since each author focuses on the discussion of one particular aspect of language, it is likely that only a few of the aforementioned elements can be addressed by a single metaphor.

Language is certainly not only discussed among linguists. Philosophers and poets have also devoted themselves to thinking and writing about language and it is also a subject common in everyday conversation. Thus, the topic of language

[3] SEARLE 1969.

[4] CHOMSKY 1975.

[5] For a detailed description of the major functions of metaphors in scientific theorising, i.e. explanatory, argumentative and theory constitutive, see Boyd 1973.

touches two realms of knowledge: specialised, academic knowledge and widely shared non-expert knowledge. I will use the terms "expert theory" and "folk theory" to distinguish them.[6] Based on the assumption that folk and expert theories cannot always be clearly separated but mutually influence one another, my metaphor analysis includes expressions that pertain to scientific discourse but also meta-linguistic expressions that are conventional in everyday linguistic discourse. This will provide insight into the complexities that exist in the relationship between folk and expert theories. A crucial question that arises in this context is whether it is at all possible to abandon folk theories of language when formulating expert theories.[7]

One example of a folk model of meta-language is the CONDUIT metaphor, which was investigated in the late 1970s by Michael Reddy.[8] He analysed everyday discourse on the topic of language. The examples he provides demonstrate that much of our meta-language is structured by the CONDUIT metaphor. The major framework of the CONDUIT metaphor entails three main correspondences.[9] The first two correspondences, IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS and LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, imply that speakers and writers insert their thoughts or feelings in the words as in the example "It is very difficult to *put* this concept *into* words." Listeners and readers extract in turn the thoughts and feelings from the words, as in "I have to struggle to *get* any meaning at all *out of* the sentence." The third main correspondence is COMMUNICATION IS SENDING, which means that language functions like a conduit, transferring mental content physically from one person to another, as in the example "Try to *get* your *thoughts across* better."

3. CASE STUDY 1: SEARLE

Reddy investigated the prevalence of the CONDUIT metaphor in everyday language and claimed that it is nearly impossible to talk about language without using CONDUIT metaphors.[10] The intriguing question now would be whether the CONDUIT metaphor also occurs in scientific discourse. In an attempt to test whether it is possible for scholars to free themselves from such folk theories, I scanned Searle's text specifically for metaphorical expressions that fit into the framework of the CONDUIT metaphor. Indeed, I did find a set of textual manifesta-

[6] See Lakoff 1987: 118.

[7] In a similar way, Kövecses 2003 investigated the concept of emotion and the folk and expert theories related to it.

[8] Reddy 1993.

[9] See Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 10.

[10] See Reddy 1979: 177.

tions of the CONDUIT metaphor in Searle's text. The following examples illustrate the pervasiveness of reifications of LANGUAGE in the form of CONTAINER metaphors, which constitute the basis of the CONDUIT metaphor.

(1) The only descriptive content ***carried*** by the expression […].[11]

(2) The syntactical representation of the semantic facts will not always ***lie on the surface of*** the sentence.[12]

(3) Where there is in a given language or in any language an ***upper bound*** on the expressible […].[13]

(4) So what I shall do in my analysis of illocutionary acts is ***unpack*** what constitutes understanding a literal utterance […].[14]

If words can "carry" meanings, they need to have an inside and an outside and meaning must be imagined as tangible, containable, and movable. Example 2 also illustrates this aspect. Stating that there is "an upper bound on the expressible" suggests that words can be filled with meaning; that they are containers. Example 4 is concerned with how the receiver extracts the ideas from the utterance that contains them. These examples demonstrate that the CONDUIT metaphor involves ontological metaphors.

The domain LANGUAGE is structured further by structural metaphors. The following examples suggest the conceptualisation that COMMUNICATION IS SENDING or PHYSICAL TRANSFER.

(5) We have seen that in a fully consummated reference the speaker identifies an object for the hearer by ***conveying*** to the hearer a fact about the object […].[15]

(6) The speaker's ability to ***supply*** an expression […].[16]

(7) The speaker ***presents*** the hearer with an actual instance of the universal […].[17]

[11] SEARLE 1969: 92.
[12] SEARLE 1969: 30.
[13] SEARLE 1969: 20.
[14] SEARLE 1969: 47.
[15] SEARLE 1969: 115.
[16] SEARLE 1969: 86.
[17] SEARLE 1969: 116.

(8) It is the identifying description which provides the ***vehicle*** for saying what is meant in the reference.[18]

The verbs "convey", "supply" and "present" have basic physical meanings relating to the transmission of concrete objects. The notion of physical transfer is also evoked by the noun "vehicle" in example 8.

The metaphorical expressions discussed so far are deeply ingrained in everyday language. Their metaphoricity would largely be taken for granted by the author and, for the most part, go unnoticed by the reader. However, Searle's text also comprises more explicit metaphors, namely LANGUAGE USE IS A GAME, which is illustrated by the following quote:

> We are in a position of someone who has learned to play chess without ever having the rules formulated and who wants such a formulation. We learned how ***to play the game of illocutionary acts***, but in general it was done without an explicit formulation of the rules.[19]

Searle uses further explicit analogies between languages and games to underpin his theory that languages, just like games, are goal-directed and based on rules and conventions. Interestingly, there is a set of everyday linguistic expressions that fit into the framework of the LANGUAGE USE IS A GAME metaphor.

(9) My ***strategy*** is to ***play along with*** the terminology […].[20]

(10) The ***role*** that the word ***plays*** in an utterance of the sentence […].[21]

(11) Nor does the ***maneuver*** with the notion of exactness offer any help […].[22]

The expression "to play along with the terminology" suggests that SPEAKERS ARE PLAYERS IN A GAME. This correspondence stresses that communication requires a productive and a receptive part – just like there are typically several antagonists in a game. In example 10, the linguistic unit itself is the player in the language game. The word "maneuver" implies that communication is target-oriented; speakers use a specific tactic when communicating in order to achieve certain conversational goals. Accordingly, utterances in a conversation are moves

[18] Searle 1969: 88.
[19] Searle 1969: 55.
[20] Searle 1969: 176.
[21] Searle 1969: 74.
[22] Searle 1969: 9.

or even manoeuvres in a game. The general goal in the language game is to have one's intentions understood by the addressee and understanding the addresser's intentions respectively.

The two conceptual metaphors yielded by the analysis of Searle's text seem very unlike each other at first as they draw on two different source domains. However, playing games and sending and unpacking objects can be subsumed under the same general source domain: HUMAN ACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES. In both cases, a source-path-goal image schema is involved, which highlights that communication requires a giver (the speaker or the writer), a recipient (the listener or the reader) and the transfer of linguistic content. Despite having a similar focus, each of the two metaphors highlights a different aspect of communication. While the GAME metaphor foregrounds the goal-directedness and the dependency on rules and conventions, the CONDUIT metaphor stresses the process of transferring mental content. The two conceptual metaphors provide a refined image of one aspect of the domain LANGUAGE, namely its communicative function. In the same way that Searle's speech act theory is only one perspective on the concept language, the metaphors used to describe his linguistic theory are only capable of providing an insight into a limited set of aspects concerning language. The aspect of how human beings acquire their ability to use language and the aspect of grammar, i.e. the internal rules of the language system, cannot be accounted for by these two conceptual metaphors.

4. CASE STUDY 2: CHOMSKY

The following case study will elucidate this question on the basis of Noam Chomsky's book *Reflections on Language*. Unlike Searle, Chomsky regards language primarily as a mental phenomenon and thus deals with language systems independent of communicative situations or functions. Chomsky introduces an analogy between language and organs in order to underpin his hypothesis that "language faculty" is programmed into our genes rather than acquired through interactions with our environment.

> (12) The idea of regarding the ***growth of language*** as analogous to the development of a bodily organ is thus quite natural and plausible.[23]

In example 12, Chomsky speaks of a human's knowledge of language as "growing" like an organ rather than being learned, which evokes the image of language

[23] CHOMSKY 1975: 11.

faculty being a physical human organ. Example 13 implies that the language organ produces a grammar which in turn produces grammatically correct sentences (which constitute language):

> (13) The theory of language is simply that part of human psychology that is concerned with ***one particular »mental organ«, human language. Stimulated*** by appropriate and continuing experience, the ***language faculty creates*** a grammar that ***generates*** sentences with formal and semantic properties.[24]

Apart from metaphorical expressions relating to the source domain PHYSICAL ORGAN, Chomsky explicitly describes some of the common characteristics between language faculty and bodily organs, such as heart, liver or eye. For instance, he mentions that both physical organs and the language faculty have a basic structure and function that is common to all human beings. There can only be limited variations between different languages:

> A physical organ, say the heart, may vary from one person to the next in size or strength, but its basic structure and its function within human physiology are common to the species. Analogously, two individuals in the same speech community may acquire grammars that differ somewhat in scale and subtlety.[25]

In Chomsky's opinion, language faculty needs to be studied in the same way as bodily organs. On the basis of the assumed similarity of their object of inquiry, the methods of linguistics should henceforth be equivalent to the methods of natural sciences. The conceptual metaphor LANGUAGE FACULTY IS AN ORGAN thus forms an integral part of Chomsky's line of argument, which shows how metaphors can be used as a device of argumentation.

The ORGAN metaphor contrasts the idea of language as an artificial phenomenon. The metaphor analysis, however, yielded a set of expressions that are manifestations of the very metaphorical concept LANGUAGE IS A MACHINE.

> (14) Language is a rich and complex ***construction.***[26]

> (15) the ***workings*** of human language[27]

[24] Chomsky 1975: 36.
[25] Chomsky 1975: 38.
[26] Chomsky 1975: 10.
[27] Chomsky 1975: 52.

(16) The grammar is ***put to use***, interacting with other ***mechanisms of mind***, in speaking and understanding language.[28]

The metaphor LANGUAGE IS A MACHINE highlights that language is a system with separate elements, each of which has a function within the system. Example 16 implies that grammar is a machine that may be part of a larger machine; it is some kind of mechanism which controls movements in the system. Finally, in the following quote, Chomsky explicitly analogises INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CHILD AND ADULT as THE STARTING OF A MACHINE and LANGUAGE ACQUISITION as THE OPERATION OF A MACHINE.

> To consider an analogy that is perhaps not too remote, consider what happens when I turn on the ignition in my automobile. A change of state takes place. We might investigate the characteristics of the new state by examining fumes from the exhaust, the vibration level, the motion of the car when I press the accelerator, and so on. Similarly, certain interactions between me and my child result in his learning (hence knowing) English.[29]

The metaphorical concepts in Chomsky's text address the aspect of language faculty, first language acquisition and the nature of grammar. However, all elements that relate to the actual use of language are not and cannot be captured by these metaphors. The conceptualisation of LANGUAGE in Chomsky's text is not consistent – something cannot be both a part of the human body and a machine that exists independent of the human body. Nor is it consistent to conceptualise linguistic elements as products of an organ *and* as objects manufactured by a machine. The dichotomy between natural and artificial phenomena is present within one and the same text. One way to account for this incongruence is the unstated conceptualisation of organs as machines. In this sense, the growing of an organ could be seen as the operation of a machine.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The examples discussed above illustrate both the partial nature of metaphorical mapping and the structuring power of metaphors.[30] Each conceptual metaphor taken individually is not capable of capturing the concept LANGUAGE in its

[28] CHOMSKY 1975: 28.
[29] CHOMSKY 1975: 161.
[30] See LAKOFF – JOHNSON 1980 and KÖVECSES 2010.

entirety. Rather, several conceptual metaphors are needed to structure the domain and in doing so they jointly create language concepts. Hence, each metaphor hides and highlights specific aspects of the target domain. In focussing attention on something, they give prominence to certain aspects of it and, as a result, downplay others. The same holds true for scientific theories. The two case studies showed that Searle and Chomsky both bring certain aspects of language into prominence while hiding others. Generally speaking, each of the two authors highlights the very aspects that the other hides. Chomsky regards language primarily as a mental phenomenon and thus deals with language systems independent of communicative situations or functions. Searle, however, is mainly interested in linguistic performance, whereas the question of language faculty retreats into the background. The fact that Searle and Chomsky present two different perspectives on language is reflected in the metaphors that occur in each text. Via metaphors each author approaches a given concept from a particular point of view.

Metaphors clearly dominate scientific discourse in the respect that they help shape the course of scientific debates and conceptualisations of topics. The metaphor analysis revealed several important aspects of the complex phenomenon LANGUAGE. This issue demonstrates that metaphors are indeed useful tools for the description and explanation of abstract target domains. The explanatory function of metaphors can also be applied to the theory that is tied to the respective metaphor. Thus, metaphors can serve as a valuable method to elucidate interfaces as well as differences between linguistic theories.

However, different theories do not always also employ different metaphors. The same metaphor can be embedded in a different theoretical context and thereby gain a new meaning. "Chameleon-like, it could change colors, depending on the nature of its contextualisation."[31] A case in point is the LANGUAGE IS AN ORGANISM metaphor, which increasingly gained importance in 19th century romanticism with prominent advocates such as Grimm, Humboldt or Schleicher. Employing the LANGUAGE FACULTY IS A PHYSICAL ORGAN metaphor, Chomsky uses a version of the ORGANISM metaphor, but tailors it to his own purposes.[32]

Many of the metaphoric expressions I mentioned have become deeply entrenched in the vocabulary of linguistics and those who commonly use them might not even be aware of their metaphoricity. Drawing scientists' attention to the "metaphors they live by" but also to meta-linguistic expressions in everyday discourse could help create an inspiring potential for the construction of new scientific perspectives on language.

[31] Frank 2008: 222.

[32] The LANGUAGE IS AN ORGANISM metaphor also gained new impetus in the course of the debate on global English. For a detailed discussion see Polzenhagen – Dirven 2008.

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PART 5
POLITICAL THOUGHT

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CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE METAPHOR OF THE "BODY POLITIC"

(1) I am a mere *toenail in the body politic* (Conservative British politician, Boris Johnson, quoted in *The Independent on Sunday,* 20 November 2005; italicization of metaphorical expressions here and in further examples by AM).

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1. INTRODUCTION

The phrase *body politic* belongs to a whole field of metaphors in English that refer to political entities in terms of bodily organs and functions, such as *head of state, head of government, long arm of the law, organ (of a party), sclerosis* or *tumor (of the body politic)* and others.[1] The phrase appears to have originated in the early 16th century as a loan translation from *corpus politicum,* which was used to describe the political role of the king (as opposed to his natural/physical identity, the "body natural") and by extension, the monarchical state in England.[2] As the example quoted above shows, it is still employed today in British media discourse. A research corpus of almost 200 texts from British media in the period 1991-2001, which total 59,003 words, shows that more than 40 distinct body-related concepts can be identified as still being used as source domain input for political topics.[3] In this contribution, we focus on differences in the understanding of this metaphor in three national European political cultures, i.e. British, French and German. The aim is to find out more about how conceptual metaphors can transfer across languages and text genres and undergo culture-specific entrenchment.

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[1] For dictionary entries on *body politic* and further political *body/organ imagery* see Deignan 1995: 2; Room 1999: 149, 713; Trumble – Stevenson 2002, vol. 1: 258.

[2] See Hale 1971: 43–50, Dhorn-van-Rossum – Böckenförde 1978: 548, Kantorowicz 1997: 7–23.

[3] See Appendix.

2. LINGUISTIC COUSINS OF THE ENGLISH BODY POLITIC: CORPS POLITIQUE AND CORPS SOCIAL, STAATSKÖRPER – VOLKSKÖRPER, NATIONALER KÖRPER

Linguistic expressions of the metaphorical concept of the state as a (human) body are in principle "translatable" across all languages in the sense that they can be paraphrased if necessary but the respective lexical units do not stand in a 1:1 relationship. French and German, for instance, each have several terms or phrases instead of one idiomatically fixed construction such as *body politic*. In present-day French political discourse we find two lexical variants of the nation-body metaphor, i.e. *corps politique* and *corps social*:

(2) Mitterrand à Sarkozy: une irrésistible érosion de la fonction présidentielle et du *corps politique* (*Le Monde,* 5 March 2011) ['From Mitterrand to Sarkozy – an unstoppable decline of the presidential office and the *body politic* (= 'political system')'; headline of an article on the alleged loss of significance of republican institutions in France, translation of this and following examples by AM, unless otherwise indicated]

(3) La classe politique, droite libérale et gauche socialiste confondues, a malmené depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans *le vieux corps social français.* (*Le Figaro*, 9 November 2010) ['The political classes, both the (neo-)liberal right and the socialist left, have mismanaged the *ageing body politic of French society*']

The meanings of *corps politique* and *corps social* are evidently closely related: in the cited texts the social and political systems are thought of as interactive categories; however, they are not identical. Both (2) and (3) have politics as their topic, and the political agents/institutions in France as the target referent of the state-as-body metaphor, but example (4) also hints at a kind of responsibility of the *corps politique* for the larger *corps social* (i.e., the whole of society).

In German, on the other hand, there are not two but at least three terminological and semantic variants:

(4) So wie es den *Körper des Staates* à la longue zu bessern galt, galt es über den individuellen Körper zu triumphieren. (*Die Zeit,* 1 September 2009) ['Just as it was necessary to improve the *body of the state/body politic* in the long term, the individual body needed reforming.']

(5) [Theaterkritiker] sprechen vom „Bühnenkörper" und vom „*nationalen Körper*" – *Gesellschaft ist der große Leib, über den sich das Theater beugt.* (*Die Zeit,* 19 May 2005) ['Theatre critics speak of the "stage body" and the "*national body*" – society's *great body* is being scrutinised by theatre']

(6) Kein Atom im *Volkskörper* [headline] Die Anti-AKW-Bewegung in Österreich streitet derzeit heftig. Denn einige Gruppen und die Landesregierung pflegen einen unkritischen Umgang mit rechtsextremen Umweltschützern. (*Jungle World,* Austrian magazine, 25 August 2011) ['No nuclear pollution of the *people's body*! The anti-nuclear movement in Austria is divided on account of some of its members befriending right-wing extremists; the headline indicates the latter's stance']

Körper des Staates (state body), nationaler Körper (national body) and *Volkskörper (people's body)* are, of course, etymologically, morphologically and semantically closely related but by no means exchangeable. The first phrase, *Körper des Staates,* which dates back to the 17th century, seems to be the most "neutral", ideologically unmarked expression that targets any kind of political (state) entity, as does its morphological variant, *Staatskörper*.[4] The second variant, „*nationaler Körper*", appears to be rare (just one occurrence in a German sample of 154 texts) and its meaning comes close to that of French *corps social. Volkskörper*, on the other hand, is a highly marked form: 90% of its occurrences in the German sample refer to extreme right-wing discourses, i.e. either topical ones as in (6) or, historically, to Nazi-jargon, in which the term was of central importance for the 'justification' of genocidal anti-Semitic ideology and policy (by depicting Jews as *parasites* on the German *people's body*).[5] In several cases, the mention of the term *Volkskörper* is used to suggest that those who use the term currently in an affirmative sense are at least comparable, if not politically and ethically equivalent, to the Nazis.[6] *Volkskörper* is thus not at all a semantic equivalent to *body politic* or *corps politique*, and its uncommented translation into these English and French terms would be misleading. Rather, the corpus evidence suggests that its meaning in current-day

[4] Musolff 2010a: 122–128. *Staatskörper* seems to be used more frequently than the phrase *Körper des Staates;* the magazine *Der Spiegel* (11/2007), described ancient Germanic tribes as 'tumors on the *state body* of the Roman Empire' ("Geschwüre im Staatskörper von Rom").

[5] Musolff 2010a: 23–68.

[6] See for instance, K. Rutschky who characterized present-day German debates about demographic decline as echoing Nazi-propaganda, betraying an 'injured soul in the sick *people's body*' ("Im kranken *Volkskörper* steckt eine verletzte Seele", *Die Welt,* 11 April 2006) or the "Green" politician, D. Cohn-Bendit who criticized the conservative politician J. Schönbohm for holding up the ideal of an 'homogeneous *people's body*', as 'kindling the fire of interethnic conflict' ("Wer die Homogenität eines deutschen *Volkskörpers* ins Feld führt, der gießt Öl ins Feuer der Ghettos", *Die Zeit,* 18 June 1998).

German incorporates an historical index that links it to the public memory of Nazi language use.[7]

It could be argued that *Volkskörper* is a special case that relates to a unique historical event that is still to some extent in living memory, and that it is therefore untypical for the historical development of metaphors. What one might call the "discourse history" of consciously known meaning changes may be assumed to persist for two-three generations at most, so that the "Nazi stigma" of some vocabulary would be expected to disappear over the coming decades (with differences across specific discourse communities, e.g. it could be expected to persist longer in German-speaking communities and perhaps in Israel than elsewhere). However, that still leaves the other differences in usage to explain. How should we motivate, for instance, the terminological bifurcation of *corps social* and *corps politique* in French and the close semantic relationship between the two? A further example of French discourse usage can perhaps help us here: in 2005, the newspaper *Libération* published an article by the writer Philippe Boisnard that highlighted the metaphor in its title: "*Le corps politique, un malade à la recherche de sa thérapie*" ('The *body politic: a sick man in search of a therapy*'). The following text, "Il est urgent que l'État français comprenne la société qui s'est transformée et autonomisée" ('It is of the greatest urgency that the French state understands the society which has transformed and become more autonomous') indicates the target-topic, i.e. a perceived lack of reform in the political system that would match changes in modern French society. Later on, Boisnard indicates the origins of this conceptual link:

> (7) Il est commun […] de penser la dimension politique à l'image d'un corps, il n'y aurait qu'à relire Rousseau, dans *Du contrat social,* […] Cette métaphore […] suppose que ce corps soit dirigé par une seule unité intentionnelle […] et que tous les membres de la société ne soient plus considérés que comme organes de celui-ci (*Libération,* 8 May 2005) ['It is usual to think of the political sphere in terms of the image of a body; you only have to re-read Rousseau's *Social Contract.* This metaphor (pre-)supposes that the whole body is directed by one unity of intention and that all members of society are to be considered its organs.']

It is impossible to provide a detailed discussion of Rousseau's philosophy of state and society here but one quotation from his famous work of 1762 may be quoted that seems to support Boisnard's interpretation:

[7] For the enduring impact of such memory on public discourse in Germany and Austria see EITZ – STÖTZEL 2007.

(8) Comme la nature donne à chaque homme un pouvoir absolu sur tous ses membres, *le pacte social donne au corps politique un pouvoir absolu sur tous les siens,* et c'est ce même pouvoir qui, dirigé par la volonté générale, porte […] le nom de souveraineté. (*Du Contrat social,* Book 2, Chapter 3, ['Just as nature gives each man absolute power over all his limbs, the social pact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members; and […] it is the same power, directed by the general will, that bears the name of sovereignty'][8]

If we follow Boisnard's interpretation, the relationship between 'political' and 'social bodies' that seems to underlie in the French examples (2) and (3) cited earlier may be viewed as being inherited historically from the theoretical framework of the great enlightenment thinker. Such an explication does not entail that every politician or journalist who uses *corps politique* or *corps social* today must be aware of the origin of these terms in Rousseau's philosophy. However, it is still plausible to assume that thanks to Rousseau's prominent role in French education and public discourse these terms and their conceptual relationship have become commonplace and may be seen as an extension of a discourse tradition that started in the Enlightenment.

3. BRITISH TRADITIONS

So what about *body politic* in English? In the first place, it can be observed that its morphological structure is clearly marked: the positioning of the 'adjectival' part *after* the 'noun' part is not typical for present-day English but dates back to early modern English.[9] Of course, to use *body politic* terminology, speakers of English need as little to know its historical origins as French speakers would know Rousseau's philosophy by heart; nevertheless they do need to have learnt the construction as an idiomatic unit; otherwise they would only be talking of the "political body". This latter phrase is semantically perfectly transparent and is being used in current discourses chiefly to designate specific political institutions and 'corporations' but is not to exchangeable with *body politic*, which designates the whole of the politico-social entity known as the state. Furthermore, as example (1) above and the following examples show, the marked phrase is available for ironical wordplay targeting individual politicians:

[8] Rousseau 1964: 194; for the English translation see Rousseau 1994: 67. For further contextualisation of the *Contrat social* texts see Derathé 2000: passim, and Musolff 2010a: 117–119.
[9] Hughes 1988: 186.

(9) Sorry, Gordon [= Gordon Brown, former British Prime Minister], but *your body politic* doesn't match Putin's (*The Observer,* 1 November 2009)

(10) Just last week [*The Spectator,*] landed yet another bruising punch on [Tony] *Blair's solar plexus, a part of the body politic* that Iain Duncan Smith [= then the British Conservative party leader] has notably failed to reach. (*The Independent,* 7 July 2002)

In these cases as in example (1), the speaker plays on the double entendre of *body* as a political and physical entity: Gordon Browns physical and political appearance is compared negatively to Vladimir Putin's, Blair's *solar plexus* is a part-for-whole metonymy, built on the metaphor that describes him as being on the receiving end of 'hard-hitting' political attacks by the right wing magazine *The Spectator*, and in (1) the former editor of that magazine describes himself seemingly self-deprecatingly as a *toenail* on the *body politic.* This grotesque image may have been taken from Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* where the character of the senator Menenius, after having told the old "Fable of the Belly", insults the leader of a social rebellion as the "big toe" of the state, because "being one o' the lowest, basest, poorest, Of this most wise rebellion", he still goes "foremost".[10] Again, understanding B. Johnson's present-day usage does not depend on knowing Shakespeare's play, but the exceptional standing of Shakespearean texts in British education, and their continuing use as a source for idioms and proverbs can be assumed to have helped the survival of the archaic *body politic* in general and to make it available for colourful wordplay.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The examples presented here provide only a small empirical basis for a full contrastive analysis of English, French and German traditions in the usage of the metaphor of the nation state as a body. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn as regards the plausibility of assuming continuous discourse traditions that underlie the emergence of distinct pathways of political imagery in national cultures. The apparent patterns in the lexical variation for an identical metaphorical concept across three languages could be related to prominent historical model formulations that go back several decades or centuries. The main explanatory hypothesis for this link is that the textual, lexical and morphological data under discussion reflect traditions of usage in the respective national discourse cultures. It is not claimed that present-day users are necessarily aware of these traditions;

[10] SHAKESPEARE, *Coriolanus*, I, 1: 162–164.

explicit "memorizing" and discussion of the historical links with reference to specific authors may only be typical for certain discourse registers, such as reflective comment articles on political discourse in the 'quality press'. Still, the evidence suggests that the phenomenon of metaphor variation across discourse communities, which on the one hand highlights semantic-pragmatic "pressures of coherence",[11] also helps to exemplify pressures of differentiation in emergent semantic change.

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APPENDIX:

Lexical realizations of the metaphor 'a state is a body' in British and US media 1991-2011 (sources: MUSOLFF 2010a,b,c)

GENERAL CATEGORIES	CONCEPTS	LEXICAL ITEMS
ORGANISM	BODY	body, body politic
	ORGANISM	organism
– LIFE-DEATH	BIRTH	born
	LIFE	revive
	DEATH	deceased, bury, last rites
ANATOMY	ARTERIES	arteries
	HEAD	head
	HEART	heart
	LIVER	livers
	GALL-BLADDER	gall-bladders
	MUSCLES	muscles
	SOLAR PLEXUS	solar plexus
	TOENAIL	toenail
– GOOD STATE OF HEALTH	HEALTHY	on the mend, off the sick list
– BAD STATE OF HEALTH	BLOOD CLOT	blood clot
	CANCER	cancer, cancerous, metastasize, canker
	COMA	coma
	CYST	cyst
	DISEASE	disease, illness
	INFECTION	infection

GENERAL CATEGORIES	CONCEPTS	LEXICAL ITEMS
– BAD STATE OF HEALTH (CONTD.)	PAIN	ache, pain
	PANDEMIC	pandemic
	PARALYSIS	paralysis
	ROTTEN	rotten heart of Europe
	SCLEROSIS	eurosclerosis
	SICK	diseased, sick, sick man of Europe
	SYMPTOM	symptom
	TUMOUR	tumour
– AGENT OF DISEASE	CONTAGION	contagion
	PARASITE	parasite, leech
	POISON	poison, toxic
	VIRUS	(flu) virus, superbug, MRSA
	TENTACLES	tentacles
	ZIT	zit
– INJURY	DISEMBOWEL	disembowel
	DISMEMBER	dismember
– THERAPY	LIFE-SUPPORT MACHINE	life-support machine
	MEDICATION	medication, medicine
	OPERATION	ops, bypass
BODY AESTHETIC	PIMPLE	pimple
	PUSTULE	pustule
	WART	wart

ORSOLYA FARKAS*

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE STATE IN HUNGARIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In his *Moral Politics*, George Lakoff (2006) outlines the conceptual metaphors behind general American political reasoning, concluding that both liberal and conservative politicians use two variations (the Strict Father and the Nurturant Parent model) of the same Nation-As-Family metaphor when talking or reasoning about issues of political interest.

Alan Cienki (2005) tried to use corpora research to map out specifics of the conceptual metaphor system described by Lakoff. His results raised more questions than they solved. He came to the conclusion that the concept of state is at a higher level of abstraction than what we experience on the basic level, so general metaphors rarely if ever appear in speech. However, they do appear in the process and structure of reasoning, and one has to search a given corpora for not only metaphorical expressions, but metaphorical entailments as well.

According to Zoltán Kövecses (2009), the system of political reasoning outlined by Lakoff is generally found in Hungary as well, but a unique „Hungarian Twist" can be observed, meaning that the initiatives of conservative parties on one hand and social-liberal parties on the other have been characterized by exactly the opposite model than what they should have been according to pure logic or to the American system.

2. THE CORPORA

I have examined an 11-year span (1999–2010) of unique year-summary speeches given by prime ministers to identify differences resulting from change over time as well as differences between the two major political sides: conservative and social-liberal. On the conservative side, I analyzed twelve speeches given by Viktor Orbán in the period 1999–2010. Orban served as prime minister between 1998 and 2002 and then continued the tradition of giving these speeches as the main

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leader of the conservatives. On the social-liberal side, I analyzed two speeches given by Péter Medgyessy as prime minister (2003–2004), four speeches by Ferenc Gyurcsány when he was prime minister in 2005–2006 and again in 2008–2009 and one speech given after his term was over, in 2010. Two speeches by Gordon Bajnai, one given just before his appointment in 2009, and one as prime minister in 2010, and segments from speeches given by János Kóka, minister of Economy (2008–2010) round out the corpora of the social-liberal side.

These corpora amounted to 470,000 characters on the conservative side, and 260,000 characters on the social-liberal side, making it a total of about 710 thousand characters.

3. THE RESEARCH METHOD

Upon close examination of all speeches in the corpora, I underlined all instances where reference was made to the Hungarian state itself, including its territory (the country); its form (republic); its residents (the people, the community, the nation) or the government, its workings or other characteristics of the state. I also underlined instances where the Nation-As-Family conceptual metaphor or its mappings (the country is the home of the family, the government is the parents, the citizens are the children) appear either on the text-level, with explicit details, or in the reasoning process. I looked at the source domains that play a role in the conceptualization of state, not excluding the possibility of finding a non-metaphorical prototype. I also looked at the words referring to the target domain in general or in part (country, nation, Hungarians, etc). Furthermore, I examined the immediate context where the word 'state' appeared in the text, and noted what other words are attached to it most frequently. Throughout the process, I paid special attention to morality traits that could be present in connection to the different family models or moral prototypes. In the conclusion, I outlined some tendencies that could be observed, and tried to make sense of them with regards to the process and specifics of how the state gets conceptualized.

4. RESEARCH FINDINGS

The most striking difference was the presence of multiple well-defined conceptual metaphors in Orbán-speeches (conservative side), in opposition to rather vague metaphors in the rest (social-liberal side).

4.1. Source domain

I found three major source domains: vehicle, building, and people.

4.1.1. Vehicle

Conservative speeches in most cases specified the kind of vehicle used, stressed the need of getting somewhere, and examined the characteristics of the given vehicle: whether or not it is in good condition, etc. Examples include:[1]

ship (*sodródó hajó* – 'a drifting ship'; *Magyarország hajója […] ne legyen kiszolgáltatva a változó széljárásoknak* – 'the ship of Hungary will not be left to the mercy of changing winds')

racket (*hogyan indul útjára egy rakéta* – 'as a rocket leaving ground')

car (*defektes gépkocsink már a felniken fut* – 'our car is running with a burst tire')

bus (*csakhogy itt most nem magánautóról van szó, hanem egy buszról, amelynek tízmillió utasa van* – 'we are not talking about a private car, but a bus with ten million passangers')

train (*előfordulhat, hogy a világgazdaság […] szerelvényéhez nem tudjuk odakapcsolni Magyarország vasúti kocsiját* – 'it might happen that we cannot attach our wagon to the train of the world economy')

I did not find specific instances of the vehicle as source domain in speeches by social-liberal politicians, although the concept of getting somewhere was present: *a nemzetnek együtt kell Európába érkeznie* – 'the nation has to arrive in Europe together'; *váltsunk irányt és váltsunk sebességet* – 'let's change direction and change gear!'

4.1.2. Building

This source domain appears both in general and with specifications on the conservative side:

In general (*ha nem tudjuk felépíteni ezt az államot* – 'if we cannot build this state')

a house (*zsugorítja ennek a háznak az értékét, hogy szolid családi házból utcavégi, ártéri odúvá minősítették* – 'the house lost value, as the once modest family home is requalified as a last-on-the-row, floodplain cottage')

Like the vehicle domain, references to this source domain lack specifics on the social-liberal side, even to the point that the concept of building becomes as vague as making or creating. Another emerging aspect here is that this act often shifts from the present to the future:

[1] The examples are followed by my translation.

csináljunk egy nagyszerű országot – 'let's make a wonderful country!'
lehet teremteni egy új, egy jobb Magyarországot – 'a new, better Hungary can be created'

4.1.3. People

This source domain includes both unique groups of people or certain individuals on the conservative side, specifying major characteristics as well:
family (*a szülők kis vonással jelzik az ajtófélfán, mennyit nőtt, gyarapodott gyermeküк* – 'the parents mark the door post to see how much their children have grown')
team (*az erős ország azonban olyan, mint egy erős csapat* – 'the strong country is like a strong team')
athlete (*Magyarország is benevezett egy versenybe* – 'Hungary also signed up for a contest')
steward (*valójában sohasem az állam, hanem mindig a kormány a rossz gazda*) – 'in reality it is never the state, but the government as a bad steward')

I found only two instances of this source on the social-liberal side:
steward (*előrelátó gazdájaként az országnak* – 'a far-sighted steward of the country')
family (*úgy van ez, mint otthon: ha a jövedelmünkből többet költünk, mint amennyi van, a hónap végén a szomszédba szaladunk, vagy szalajtjuk a gyereket kölcsönkérni* – 'it is just like at home: if we spend more of our income than what we have, we go to our neighbour or send the kid over for a loan at the end of the month').

4.2. Morality

On the textual level, the Nation As Family conceptual metaphor did not appear often enough to draw a clear picture of whether either side of the political spectrum could be characterized by one family model or another. Still, models of morality do emerge, and can be depicted by examining the character traits of the target-domain (the state, the nation, or the government as its head), directly personalized or appearing through the above mentioned sources.

4.2.1. Orbán

In conservative speeches, the state is independent (*ezt a hajót közös akaratunk szerint magunk kormányozhassuk* – 'this ship is to be steered by our common consent'), strong, responsible (*erős, felelős és cselekvő kormányzás* – 'strong, responsible and active government')

and does the following:

Holds rights to oversee and controll (*erősíteni kell az államok irányítási és ellenőrzési jogait* – 'we have to strengthen the controlling and overseeing rights of the states')
Provides protection (*meg tudja védeni az embereket* – 'can protect the people')
Sets moral boundaries (*mégiscsak szükség van valamilyen erkölcsi abroncsra* – 'some kind of a moral rim is still needed')
Preserves agency but helps nevertheless (*az állam melléjük áll … bizonyos szabadságokat bátran meghagyhat az embereknek, akik eldönthetik* – 'the state stands by them […] leaving some freedoms with the people, who can decide')
Provides opportunities (*lehetőségeket adni a tetterős embereknek* – 'giving opportunities to people ready to act')
Serves (*hatalmaskodás helyett szolgálatot* – 'service instead of dominance')

This is more like the Strict Father model, but traits of the Nurturant Parent appear in it as well. Nevertheless, independence seems to be very important.

The character traits in social-liberal speeches often vary by time and by speaker, making it hard to identify specific trends or themes.

4.2.2. Medgyessy

The state –
Gives protection and provides (*minden polgárát megvédi* – 'protects all of its citizens'; *felelősek vagyunk azokért, akik a maguk erejéből nem tudtak feljebb kapaszkodni* – 'we are responsible for those who cannot climb up on their own').
Counts on the help of a larger unit (*Európa segít* – 'Europe helps').
Serves, helps out, lends support (*sokat tettünk azokért, akiknek eddig túl kevés jutott* – 'we have done much for those who do not have much'; *azokat kell segíteni, akik valóban rászorultak* – 'we need to help those truly in need; *állami támogatás* – 'support from the state')

The Nurturant Parent model dominates through both years of his administration, but this parent is not necessarily the state; it could be Europe or the European Union as well.

4.2.3. Gyurcsány

The state –
Does not necessarily provide (n*em igaz, hogy a gondoskodó állam helyettesíti a teljesítményt, hogy a gazdaságban a versenynél fontosabb a kormányzati támogatás* – 'it is not true that a providing state can replace achievement, that state support is more important than competition in economy')

Counts on members of the community (*a köztársaság ereje és cselekvőképessége a polgárok hozzájárulásán múlik* – 'the strength and capacity of the republic depends on the contribution of its citizens')
Serves, protects, helps (*a köztársaság ereje és cselekvőképessége a polgárok hozzájárulásán múlik* – 'that the state will be better and more just in serving us'; *az államnak határozottabban kell védeni a gyengét* –. 'the state has to protect the weak with more determination'; *sokan csak az államtól várhatnak és kaphatnak segítséget* – 'there are many who can hope for and receive help only from the state'),
But cannot help all the time (*az állam később fenntarthatatlan mértékűnek bizonyult szociális szerepvállalása* – 'the social undertaking of the state that proved to be unsustainable'),

The 2005 speech uses the Nurturant Parent model critically, and shifts the responsibility of providing to the family, the community as a whole. Character traits of the Strict Father model are expected from members of the community, the children in this metaphor. Speeches between 2006 and 2009 at times bring back a spotlight on the responsibility of the state as a provider, shifting to criticizing the same again in 2010.

4.2.4. Bajnai

There is little metaphorical content in these speeches, the state is mentioned mainly in connection to its size, debt, expenditures and frugality. There is one characteristic metaphor that emerges as new, however:

THE STATE IS A COMPANY

(*én a köztársaság „alkalmazottjaként" szeretnék ma szólni* – 'I would like to address you as an „employer" of the republic')

4.2.5. Kóka

The Strict Father model can be clearly observed in his speeches:

krónikusan óriásira duzzadt állam eltartásának terhei – 'the cost of providing for a state that has become chronically large';
a válságból csak úgy tudunk kilábalni, ha […] végre az öngondoskodást, a felelősségvállalást, a verseny kultúráját támogatjuk – 'we can get out of this crisis only if we support self-reliance, responsibility, and the spirit of competition'.

4.3. Near synonyms of the target used by the speakers

The word *Hungary* is more often used by the social-liberal side, while the conservative side prefers the use of the word *Hungarians* (much more often than the other side). The social-liberal side often uses the word *Republic*, while it did not appear at all in the conservative speeches, where the world *homeland* is used instead. The word *community* appears more often on the social-liberal side, but it is most likely due to context, as these parts of the speeches talk about responsibilities of the people (mentioned in connection with morality in Gyurcsany). The conservative side, on the other hand, used the word *people*, which is much less frequent in social-liberal speeches.

The most striking difference between the two sides is that while the conservative side talks from a personalized perspective, and frequently uses a possessive adjective (e.g. *our*), the social-liberal side distances itself from the target, and uses the definitive article (*the*).

4.4. Words attached to the target

The social-liberal side often uses the following words in connection with the target: *modern, strong, European, new, successful, democratic, just*, and *better*.

The conservative side does not attach attributes to the target this way; there is only one that appears here and there: *strong*.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Orbán (conservative) uses many well-developed metaphors, specifying the characteristics of the concept in question. Social-liberal talks contain fewer metaphors overall and these are less developed. Unlike Orbán, social-liberal speakers employ general source domains and do not specify characteristics.

The two sides use different synonyms in reference to the target domain and its elements, and while the social-liberal side uses various attribute signals, the conservative side emphasizes our relation, an attachment to it.

The NATION/STATE IS A FAMILY conceptual metaphor and its mappings rarely appear on the level of the text (more in the right-wing, less in the left-wing talks), but its metaphorical entailments abound. Thesecan be discovered through examining the background morality and the metaphor is clearly present in the reasoning.

Conservative talks tend to rely on the Strict Father model, although traits of the Nurturant Parent model can be discovered as well. Social-liberal talks switch

back and forth between dominant qualities of either model. The prototype is not clear and it changes over time and between speakers.

The presence of „The Hungarian Twist" can be observed, but is not a simple, rather a multiple twist.

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PART 6
RELIGION

RITA BRDAR-SZABÓ*

HOW NIGHT GETS TRANSFORMED INTO A CROSS

POETIC IMAGERY IN EDITH STEIN'S SCIENCE OF THE CROSS

In: *Cognition and culture.*
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1. INTRODUCTION

The topic of the present paper is a unique intertextual constellation. On the one hand, the poetic imagery in the mystic poem *En una noche oscura* by Saint John of the Cross[1] gets interpreted by the author himself as spiritual guidance for determined believers on their way to God. To be more precise, two bulky monographs are devoted to the interpretation of the first two stanzas, namely *The Dark Night of the Soul*[2] and *Ascent of Mount Carmel*.[3] The life and work of Saint John of the Cross, a canonized expert on Christian mystics, gets however in turn interpreted by his late "spiritual daughter", Edith Stein, in *The Science of the Cross*.[4] This constellation is unique because of the twofold interpretative perspective based on the encounter of different cultures, languages, and historical periods.

Let us have a look at the first two stanzas of the poem in Spanish[5] and English:

En una noche oscura,
con ansias, en amores inflamada,
¡oh dichosa ventura!,
salí sin ser notada
estando ya mi casa sosegada.

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[1] CWJC.
[2] CWJC.
[3] CWJC.
[4] JCOC.
[5] CWJC.

A oscuras y segura,
por la secreta escala, disfrazada
¡oh dichosa ventura!,
a oscuras y en celada,
estando ya mi casa sosegada.

1. One dark night,
fired with love's urgent longings
– ah, the sheer grace! –
I went out unseen,
my house being now all stilled.

2. In darkness, and secure,
by the secret ladder, disguised,
– ah, the sheer grace! –
in darkness and concealment,
my house being now all stilled.

The central concept in Saint John's work is the night, which became a widely used technical term in Christian religious discourse. The main purpose of writing the above mentioned interpretative books is providing support and spiritual guidance for those whose inner life is in a transitional stage between meditation and contemplation. Saint John's life and work appear in Edith Stein's interpretation as the science of the cross. The main problem addressed in the present paper is: how does the concept of night get transformed into the concept of cross. In trying to answer this question I will apply cognitive linguistic methodology in the semantic analysis of the German compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* (in English: 'science of the cross'): I will use elements of metaphor, metonymy and blending theory.

My paper is structured as follows: In next section I provide some basic background information about the person of St. John of the Cross and of Edith Stein. In section 3 I summarize the structure of the book "The Science of the Cross," with the aim of helping contextualize the compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft*. Section 4 is devoted to the cognitive semantic analysis of this compound and its interconnectedness with the image of night. The last section contains some concluding remarks.

2. ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS AND EDITH STEIN: LIFE AND WORK IN A NUTSHELL

St. John is the cofounder of the reformed Discalced Carmelite order. The Doctor of the Church, often also called the Mystical Doctor, he was an extraordinarily talented spiritual director and incidentally a genius as a poet as well, in fact one of the best Spanish poets. Edith Stein – Husserl's assistant, a philosopher, a convertite, a Discalced Carmelite nun, a martyr, a saint, the co-patroness of Europe – this is her life in a nutshell. She was working on "The Science of the Cross," a study for the 4th centenary of the birth of St. John of the Cross. The last chapter of the book was completed with her own blood, as she suffered a martyr's death in 1942 at Auschwitz-Birkenau. She offered God her life and death for Jewish and German people and for the peace in Germany.

According to Steven Payn, OCD:[6] "[…] there seems to have been a mysterious and providential link between Edith Stein (1891-1942) and the man she called 'holy Father St. John of the Cross' (1542-1581), […] Even their dates strangely mirror each other; Edith Stein was born during the third centenary of John's death, and died during the fourth centenary of his birth. And although she was presumably unaware of modern speculation about John's possible 'converso' ancestry, her comments on John often suggest a sense of kinship, even identification, with him." As Kieran Kavanaugh[7] stressed, "by taking the title 'of the Cross,'" […] Edith Stein turned into sister Teresia Benedicta of the Cross and she "considered she was sharing with him a special vocation to live the mystery of the cross." The remembrance card "to commemorate her profession carried a quotation from St. John of the Cross's *Ascent of Mount Carmel*:[8] 'To arrive at being all, desire to be nothing', […] and on her card for her profession of perpetual vows, she put "words from stanza 28 of the *Spiritual Canticle*:[9] 'One thing alone I do, and that is love.'"

[6] Payn 1998.
[7] CWJC: XX.
[8] CWJC.
[9] CWJC.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF "THE SCIENCE OF THE CROSS"

The monograph is divided in 3 main parts, the last one was left untitled and unfinished. This central text corpus is preceded by a "Foreword" and "Introduction." The aim of the project is spelled out in the "Forword." The compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* is not yet introduced, its content is however alluded to. The "Introduction" explains "the meaning of the science of the cross and the essentials of its origin" (p. 5ff.). This is the first time that the word *Kreuzeswissenschaft* is mentioned in the discourse, disregarding the title of the book itself. It is stressed that the science of cross "[…] is not to be understood in the usual meaning of science; we are not dealing merely with a theory, that is, with the body of – really or presumably – true propositions. Neither are we dealing with a structure built of ideas laid out in reasoned steps." (p. 9) It is furthermore shown that there are some parallels with the "science of the saints" which changes into the science of the cross as soon the cross moves in the center. The main points of the whole book are summarized in this chapter. Edith Stein attempts to find out how and in which form the message gets from the cross to St. John of the Cross, how it is received by him and how it gets integrated into his personality. Edith Stein argues for the thesis that "[…] we have every reason to suppose that this applies to John: childlike, artistic and holy realism were combined in him and supplied for the message of the cross the most favorable soil in which it could grow into the science of the cross." (p. 13)

The first main part of the volume is devoted to the message of the cross. It provides a meticulous account of where, when and in which way St. John of the Cross might have been influenced by it. The following types of encounter with the cross are dealt with chapter by chapter: early encounters with the cross, the role of Sacred Scripture, the holy mass, visions of the cross, the content of the message of the cross.

The second part titled "Kreuzeslehre" – which means the doctrine of the cross – investigates the question of how the works of St. John have been shaped and influenced by the message of the cross. It is here that his most important poems are presented and interpreted and their explanations provided by the poet himself. On the basis of the analysis of the books *The Dark Night of the Soul*[10] and *Ascent of Mount Carmel*[11] Edith Stein describes the process of the purgation of senses and desires in all things. These two important monographs explain the first and the

[10] CWJC.
[11] CWJC.

second stanzas of the poem *En una noche oscura*.[12] The main purpose of writing these books is providing support and spiritual guidance for those whose inner life is in a transitional stage between meditation and contemplation. Entering this night actively is called carrying the cross, entering the passive night of the senses, on the other hand, is interpreted as crucification. The discussion of related chapters of these two books focuses then on the night of the spirit, while the emptying of the three faculties of the soul – understanding, memory and will – in the active night is described as way of the cross (leading to Golgotha) and as the death on the cross. The experience of abandonment by God in the passive night of the spirit is on the other hand interpreted as a way leading to the union with God, presented as death as resurrection. It is shown then that "[n]ach der dunklen Nacht […] die lebendige Liebesflamme auf[strahlt]." (Cf. page 155) [after the dark night shines up the living flame of love. Transl.: R. B.-Sz.] On the basis of the analysis of the books *Living Flame of Love*[13] and *Spiritual Canticle*[14] the glory of resurrection is alluded to. Edith Stein stresses that the union of the soul with God can be fulfilled only on the cross in the night of dark contemplation which is the right motivation for St. John of the Cross to try so hard to put into words the unspeakable, the inexpressible experience of the union with God, because "Liebe zu den Seelen […] die Lippen geöffnet [hat]: er will ihnen Mut machen zum harten Kreuzweg, dem steilen und schmalen Weg, der auf so lichter, seliger Höhe endet." (Cf. page 182). [= Love to the souls [has] opened his lips: he wants to encourage them to step on the hard way of the cross, on the steep and narrow path which ends on a light blessed peak. Transl.: R. B.-Sz.] Finally, the bride symbol of the *Spiritual Canticle*[15] and the cross are brought into close connection "da hier das sehnsüchtige Verlangen nach dem verborgenen Gott *das* Leiden ist, das den ganzen mystischen Weg beherrscht." (Cf. page 213). [because here the desireful longing for the hidden God the suffering is which dominates the whole mystic way. Transl.: R. B.-Sz.]

The untitled third main part summarizes the essential points of the science of the cross in the truest sense of the word, e.a. as a unity of life and work of St. John of the Cross captured under the symbol of the cross, as interior transformation into the crucified Christ. Some of the so called minor works, letters and poesias of St. John of the Cross are discussed here and compared with the testimony of reliable witnesses about important and symbol-laiden moments of his life.

[12] CWJC.
[13] CWJC.
[14] CWJC.
[15] CWJC.

In the next section of my paper I give an account of the meaning construction processes connected to the compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* as well as of the cognitive processes[16] involved.

4. A COGNITIVE SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMPOUND *KREUZESWISSENSCHAFT*

The nominal compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* seems to be transparent at first sight as one gets the impression that it can be broken down into the immediate constituentes *Kreuz(es)* and *Wissenschaft*. The appearances can however be deceptive as the general meaning of this compound cannot be computed simply on the basis of the meanings of its components: *Wissenschaft* (=science) hasn't got here its usual meanings, as entrenched in English and German:

"1. knowledge about the structure and behaviour of the natural and physical world, based on facts that you can prove, for example by experiments; 2. the study of science; 3. a particular branch of science; 4. a system for organizing the knowledge about a particular subject, especially one concerned with aspects of human behaviour or society."[17]

"1. (ein begründetes, geordnetes, für gesichert erachtetes) Wissen hervorbringende forschende Tätigkeit in einem bestimmten Bereich; exakte Wissenschaften (Wissenschaften, deren Ergebnisse auf mathematischen Beweisen, genauen Messungen beruhen); Wissenschaftlichkeit; im Bereich der Wissenschaft; 2. jmds. Wissen in einer bestimmten Angelegenheit."[18]

This fact is also stressed by Edith Stein: "When we speak of a science of the cross, this is not to be understood in the usual meaning of science; we are not dealing merely with a theory, that is, with the body of – really or presumably – true propositions. Neither are we dealing with a structure built of ideas laid out in reasoned steps." (Cf. page 9.)

As one can see in Illustration 1, the general meaning of this compound cannot be found out by simple addition of the meanings of its parts but should be worked out with the help of the blending analysis.

[16] Cf. research on the semantics of compounding conducted by FAUCONNIER – TURNER 1996 and 2002, COULSON 2001 and BENCZES 2006.
[17] OALD
[18] DUW


Generic space
System of ideas
Agent
Object
Central elements
Aim
Method
Application
Input space 1
Input space 2
Agent – Christians as believers (lay/priest/monk or nun/theologian/spiritual director);
Object – faith in Jesus Christ and acceptance of the secrets of faith;
Central elements – baptism, acquisition of the Christian knowledge system and its integration into the life of believers;
Aim – realization of Christian way of life (based on charity);
Method – following of Christ (imitation Christi), prayer, deeds or works of charity, study of theology (optionally);
Application – faith is to be converted into deeds ("faith without deeds is dead" James 2: 26)
Agent – scientist/researcher;
Object – research topic;
Central elements – socialising in one area of science, acquisition and systematization of knowledge, model building;
Aim – development of cognitive faculties, building of models of the world
Method – falsifying and verifying of hypotheses;
Application – optional
Kreuzes-
Christendom
science
Agent – St. John of the Cross as believer, monk, priest, poet, spiritual director and theologian;
Object – his poetic and mystagogic works and his life as well;
Central elements – integration of the message of the cross into his life and work;
Aim – checking and proof of unity in life and work;
Method – comparative investigation of the whole content of all his works and the details of his life on the basis of reliable sources and the testimony of contemporary witnesses;
Application – proof of the realization of the doctrine of the cross in life and work of St. John of the Cross
Blended space *Kreuzeswissenschaft*

The two inputs of conceptual integration are however not *Kreuz(es)* [=cross] and *Wissenschaft* [=science], respectively, but *Christentum/ Christliche Religion* [Christianity/ Christian religion] and *Wissenschaft* [=science]. *Kreuz*, as the central symbol of Christianity, stands metonymically for Christianity, for the Christian religion itself. The target of this metonymic extension enters the process as Input1, while *Wissenschaft* takes part as Input2. The generic space "System of Ideas" contains various roles such as Agent, Object, Central Elements, Aim, Method, Applying. These various roles can be related in Input1 and Input2 to appropriate schematic frames. In Input1 the following correspondences should be pointed out:

Agent – Christians as believer (lay/priest/monk or nun/theologian/spiritual director); Object – faith in Jesus Christ and acceptance of the secrets of faith;

Central elements – baptism, acquisition of the Christian knowledge system and its integration into the life of believers;

Aim – realization of Christian way of life (based on charity);

Method – following of Christ (imitation Christi), prayer, deeds or works of charity, study of theology (optionally);

Application – faith is to be converted into deeds ("faith without deeds is dead" James 2: 26)

In Input2 the following correspondences are to be mentioned:

Agent – scientist/researcher;

Object – research topic;

Central elements – socialising in one area of science, acquisition and systematization of knowledge, model building;

Aim – development of cognitive faculties, building of models of the world

Method – falsifying and verifying of hypotheses;

Application – optional.

The integrated space created by selective projection, elaboration and overlap of Input1, Input2 and elements of discourse, contains the following correspondences between different roles:

Agent – St. John of the Cross as believer, monk, priest, poet, spiritual director and theologian;

Object – his poetic and mystagogic works and his life as well;

Central elements – integration of the message of the cross into his life and work;

Aim – checking and proof of unity in life and work;

Method – comparative investigation of the whole content of all his works and the details of his life on the basis of reliable sources and the testimony of contemporary witnesses;

Application – proof of the realization of the doctrine of the cross in life and work of St. John of the Cross

The general meaning of the compound which is created by conceptual integration focuses therefore on the unity in St. John's life and work. This blending analysis presupposes the cross as the central religious symbol of Christianity. The cross as part of the frame "Christianity, Christian religion" can evoke the whole frame. Ever since Lakoff and Johnson[19] we have known that "[t]he conceptual systems of cultures and religions are metaphorical in nature […]" but we also know that there are also metonymically motivated cultural and religious symbols which mediate between our every day experiences and appropriate coherent metaphor systems. Let me cite Lakoff and Johnson again: "Symbolic metonymies that are grounded in our physical experience provide an essential means of comprehending religious and cultural concepts."[20] The cross is an excellent example of a metonymically motivated cultural and religious symbol. The whole issue can be regarded as an extraordinary complex and multilayered phenomenon which cannot be dealt with in all its cultural, historical and religious aspects. I can mention only some aspects of the metonymic motivation of the cross.

According to the OALD there are 7 meanings of the lexeme cross: Meaning 1 utilizes the image schema of a cross, 2 refers to the ancient instrument of punishment, 3. refers as a proper name to the Christian symbol and means "the cross that Jesus Christ died on", 4. is based on the SHAPE OF an OBJECT for an OBJECT metonymy. (The cross can in addition to the above cases also appear in the visual code as image schema or as symbol with different degrees of schematicity. Poetic imagery could be compared with representation by drawing the image)

The remaining 3 meanings are also based on different types of metonymies but they do not relate to the meanings of the cross in Christian context. Finally, the idiomatic construction "have a (heavy) cross to bear" is based on metonymy – as far as as a part of a frame, scenario or narration can stand for the whole frame, scenario or narration – and metaphor – as far as the cross in the meaning 'a difficult problem' puts suffering from the domain of crucifixion into other domains. Cross in the 2nd and 3rd meaning can stand metonymically for the whole frame, scenario or narration of crucifixion in Biblical context. The cross appears in these cases as frame-based, scenario-based or narration-based metonymy. There are however some overlaps between frame and scenario on the one hand and between scenario and narration on the other hand. Overlaps between frame and scenario can show up (1) when the stereotyped temporal order of event sequences can vary within certain boundaries and is not absolutely fixed and (2) when two or more in their temporal order fixed scenarios are conceptualized as parts of a predominant

[19] Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 40.
[20] Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 40.

general frame. Overlaps between scenario and narration can occur in those cases when a scenario in a culture community is handed down as part of a narration.

Up to this point, the analysis has concentrated on *Kreuz* and *Kreuzeswissenschaft*. A purely structural study could stop at this point. However, as already mentioned, the concept of *night* plays a definitive role in the works of St. John of the Cross. Edith Stein herself devotes a couple of chapters to the clarification of the relationship between *cross* and *night*. This problem can be dealt with here only from the perspective of the semantics of *Kreuzeswissenschaft.* The poetic image of night, the dark night of the senses and the dark night of the spirit appear very often as discourse unfolds. It is certain that the deeper sense of these expressions also shapes the general meaning of *Kreuzeswissenschaft*. Consequently, the metonymically used *Kreuz(es)* is preceded by another linguistic image, a metaphor: the cosmic night stands here for the mystic night of the soul.

The cosmic night is structured into three parts. This structure of the cosmic night is then mapped onto the image of the mystic night:

> "The submersion of the world of the senses is like the oncoming of night, when a mere twilight remains of the day's brightness. Faith, on the contrary, is midnight darkness because here not only are the senses inactive but the knowledge from natural understanding is eliminated. The dawn of the new day of eternity, however, breaks into her night when the soul finds God." (Cf. page 31.)

The parallels between the stages of the mystic night on the one hand and crucifixion, death on the cross and resurrection on the other hand are therefore obvious.

The dark night of the senses presupposes "the mortification of joy in the desire for all things." (Cf. page 38.) Edith Stein parallels the active entrance into this night with following of the cross, the passive night is interpreted on the other side as crucifixion. The night of the spirit is darker then the night of senses and it presupposes in first order the night of faith as the path leading to union with God. The emptying of the three faculties of the soul – understanding, memory and will – in the active night is described as way of the cross (leading to Golgotha) and as death on the cross. The experience of the abandonment by God in the passive night of the spirit is on the other hand interpreted as way leading to union with God, presented as death as resurrection. There is also more than one night metaphor here, there are at least as many as the number of stages of the mystic night. Consequently, the metonymic cross is preceded by a complex network of metaphors. We are faced here with an unusual situation: The first Input to conceptual integration is here the target of metonymic meaning transfer which is in turn the target of metaphoric meaning transfers.

This is however by far not the whole story. The semantics of the compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* is namely much more complex then it could be shown in a brief paper in which we can get only a glimpse of its complexity. The image of the night is for St. John of the Cross not only, or not primarily, something negative, bad or painful. To name only a few examples: Night is for him also the time of deep contemplative prayer outdoors, it is the time of permanent search and separation, but also of love union as well, as it is namely also the night of Shir Hashirim, the Song of the Songs, which was so precious to St. John that he asked for it just before dying. As St. John knew the Bible by heart and very often cited it, there is another intertextual layer here that should be taken seriously: the parallel imagery of the Holy Scripture. Let me mention two examples:

Genesis 1:2:

> Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters.

This lines of the Creation (Old Testament) are echoed in the Gospel in Matthew 27:50:

> From the sixth hour until the ninth hour darkness came over all the land. About the ninth hour Jesus cried out in a loud voice "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?" – which means "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"[21]

As Creation is paralleled by salvation on the Cross, so could the dark night of the spirit of St. John of the Cross be seen as paralleling these quotations from Scripture, as St. John's imagery tries to describe the spiritual way of the individual believer to the union with God.

Another example is Philippians 2:6:

> Who, being in very nature God,
> did not consider equality with
> God something to be grasped,
> but made himself nothing,
> taking the very nature of a
> servant,
> being made in human likeness.

[21] This is a well known quotation of Psalm 22:1: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?

And being found in appearance as a
man,
he humbled himself
and became obedient to
death–even death on a cross!

The above lines evoke St. Paul's theology of the cross. "Made himself nothing" is rendered in some other translations as "emptied himself". It must be stressed that Christ emptied himself as a man, his humility and obedience are the Gospels' narrow path of redemption. St. John's "nada", which means "nothing", and which image is visually represented in his sketch of the *Ascent of Mount Carmel*[22] with the narrow path in the middle and with nothing on the top of the mountain, is interlocked both with the imagery of taking up one's cross and of the night. An interim conclusion might be that *Kreuzeswissenschaft* seems to be only the tip of an iceberg in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner[23] and that the iceberg is apparently made of complex networks of conceptual integration. The main function of blending seems to be in this case also the compression which adapts complexity to a human scale, as Fauconnier and Turner[24] put it.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Now, I move on to my two concluding remarks. The first of them is methodological in nature, the second one is connected to the relationship of cross and night.

The analysis of the semantics of the compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* has brought to light an unresolved problem: How can the interaction of blending, metaphor and metonymy be modelled and visualized properly? The precise status of these three cognitive processes seems to be unclear at the moment: How far can we move on with unification? How autonomous are these three cognitive processes? The central question seems to be what is the relationship between mental spaces, frames, scenarios, discourse structure and online construction of meaning. Langacker's dictum[25] that "everything has to fit" should be also kept in mind. The semantic complexity of the compound *Kreuzeswissenschaft* seems to be a challenge for the theory of conceptual integration. It is an area where Fauconnier's statements fully apply to: "I don't think we have anything close to a 'conceptual integration theory'.

[22] CWJC.
[23] FAUCONNIER – TURNER 2002: 17.
[24] FAUCONNIER – TURNER 2002: 346.
[25] LANGACKER 1999: 54.

[…][…] there is still a lot of data to be discovered and understood, leading to deeper and perhaps thoroughly novel theoretical insights."[26]

Now I am coming to my second remark. My analysis of the relationship of night and cross up to this point was based on written works of St. John of the Cross. The picture however would not be complete without looking at his work in visual art, a unique masterpiece called St. John's crucifixion drawing. This is also another approach to the question about how night gets transformed into a cross. St. John's Christ crucified is seen from an entirely new perspective: the image of Christ is in a vertical position. This angel of vision is unique in Christian art history. According to experts of visual art[27] St. John of the Cross did not limit himself to the contemporary rules of visual art, nothing counts for him except his inner experience, the fruit of his contemplation. His crucifixion drawing opens up a door for us to his image of the cross. In his writings he mostly speaks about the night and with a few exceptions he remains silent about the cross. His crucifixion drawing reveals however with unique expressive power a hidden message: As his Christ is seen from above, Salvador Dalí thinks that St. John sees him from heaven. This seems to support Edith Stein's analysis of St. John's life and work as science of the cross and her opinion that St. John has reached the state of union with God. There is another compositional element in the drawing which also supports Edith Stein's analysis: this is the light coming from above and behind the cross which signalizes the presence of the Father. If we draw parallels with the phases of the night this is the cross of somebody who has already suffered his way across the darkest phase of the night and in spite of his suffering has a glimpse of the light of resurrection. This is another way to look at the question how night gets transformed into a cross.

Illustration 2: *Crucification drawing by St. John of the Cross*

[26] Coulson 2011: 426.
[27] IWJC and Schweig 2000.

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Veronika Szelid*

"Set me as a seal upon thine heart"

A cognitive linguistic analysis of the Song of Songs

1. Introduction

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There is a book in the Old Testament that is surrounded by great mysteries. It is because no one can be sure about how and why it has been chosen to be included in the Bible. There is no explicit word in it about either God or the Church (or Israel, for that matter): the Song of Songs contains about thirty songs about the love of the bride and the groom. They are together, then separate, long for each other and find each other again. About twelve songs are recited by the bride, eight by the groom and six present their dialogues commented on by the "daughters of Jerusalem".

If the text is about human love, why do we still think and feel that it is coherent with other scripts of the Bible? Why could Rabbi Akiba (2nd century AD) even say that the entire Scripture was holy but the Song of Songs was the "Holy of Holies"?[1]

There are two main types of interpretations. One is the so-called *natural* interpretation that holds to the literal meaning of the text irrespective of the cultural background: it is about nothing more than requited, faithful human love; the other is the traditional *allegorical* one that assigns a divine meaning to the Songs: they speak about the covenant between God (represented by the groom) and Israel (portrayed by the bride).[2]

The reason for writing this paper is not to provide an answer to the above-mentioned and centuries-old problem, but to see whether and how cognitive metaphor theory is able to contribute to the explanation of why it might not be far-fetched to give a divine interpretation to the book. We know from previous research that hiding essential information on morality in love expressions is not

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[1] Mishnah Yadayim 3: 5: „The whole world is not as worthy as the day when the Song of Songs was given to Israel; for all the Writings are holy but the Song of Songs are holy of holies."

[2] See Rózsa 1996: 395–396, Pope 1977.

unique to the Song of Songs.[3] In what follows, I intend to substantiate this view by analyzing some of the the metaphorical systems of the book. My analysis will be done from a Christian perspective.

In the Song of Songs, abstract concepts are most often understood by the metaphorical source domains of plants, animals and precious objects. Most of the metaphors describe the bride and fewer of them speak about the groom.[4] The existence of the Great chain of being metaphor[5] explains why we can easily understand how these source domains represent people and how their features emphasize certain abstract human features.

2. METAPHORS OF THE BRIDE AND THE GROOM

The bride and the groom are plants

The text abounds in metaphors with the source domain of plants. In the Songs the bride is most often presented as an odorous and pleasant plant, a flower, a fruit or sometimes a tree. These metaphors represent and illustrate certain features of the beloved lady.

"A *bundle of myrrh* is my well-beloved unto me." (Song 1, 13)
"Thy plants are an orchard of *pomegranates, with pleasant fruits*." (Song 4, 13)
"thy stature is like to *a palm tree*…" (Song 7, 7)

A plant with ointment characterizes her sexual ripeness and fertility, a pleasant fruit her desirable nature, a white flower her purity, a high and straight tree her healthy and open character. Not only her figure as a whole appears in the form of a plant but also her separate body parts:

[3] In Szelid 2007 we see that this phenomenon is typical in folksongs. As an example to this let us see the following extract: "Ennek vétek a gyümölcsfa, lefeküdjék árnyékába, Körte béesik szájába, S az sem ura, hogy elrágja." ('He does not deserve a fruit tree: he would just lie in its shadow, and would even be too lazy to chew the pear falling into his mouth.') This scene that seemingly speaks about nothing more than a lazy man implies a love affair, through the Sex is eating metaphor. The supporting evidence is everyday expressions such as *'I love you so much, I could eat you.*"; "*You are so sweet.*" on the one hand; and similar lines taken from songs of the same region on the other, where eating fruit and sexual attraction are in parallel. For example: „*Megérett a cseresznye, le lehet etetni, megérett a barna kislány meg lehet csókolni.*" ('The cherry is ripe and can be eaten when picked, the little girl is grown up and can be kissed.')

[4] For the analysis of the Song of Songs I used the English translation in the King James Version of the Holy Bible (Cambridge edition).

[5] See Lakoff – Turner 1989.

"Thy *belly* is like *a heap of wheat*" (Song 7, 2)
"and the smell of thy nose like *apples*" (Song 7, 8)
"thy *breasts* shall be as *clusters of the vine…*" (Song 7, 8)
"*thy temples are like a piece of a pomegranate within thy locks*" (Song 4, 3)

These last lines suggest that the various plants need to be together to represent the person as a whole. This is also emphasized by the lines that describe the bride as a garden, a vineyard or an orchard: a place that is fenced off and collects many plants together. It is part of the so-called agricultural metaphor.[6] The land represents the woman's body and all of the activitiy on it stands for the male force. Here belong for example, sowing, planting, watering, reaping, blowing of the wind that spreads the pollen and odour of the flowers. This is very common in the literature and folk tradition of peoples of nature. Some parts of the Song of Songs speak quite explicitly about it:

"A *garden* inclosed is my sister, my spouse." (Song 4, 12)

Some others contain this meaning in a more implicit way:

"My *vineyard*, which is mine, is before me." (Song 8, 12)
"Awake, O north wind; and come, thou south; blow upon my *garden*, that the spices thereof may flow out." (Song 4, 16)

The groom and his body parts are presented by very similar types of plants, but much less frequently:

"As the *apple tree* among the trees of the wood, so is my beloved among the sons" (Song 2, 3)
"his lips like *lilies*" (Song 5, 13)
"his countenance is as Lebanon, excellent *as the cedars*" (Song 5, 15)

The bride and the groom are animals

Compared to the source domain of plants, the domain of animals appears much less often in the Songs to describe the features of the lovers. Most often it is their body parts (eyes, teeth, breasts) that appear in the form of an animal.

[6] See e. g.: Martínez 2006, Szelid 2007.

"Behold, thou art fair, my love; thou hast *dove's eyes…*" (Song 1, 15)
"*Thy two breasts are like two young roes that are twins*" (Song 4, 5)
"Thy *teeth are as a flock of sheep* which go up from the washing, whereof every one beareth twins, and there is not one barren among them." (Song 6, 6)
"His eyes are as the *eyes of doves* by the rivers of waters, washed with milk, and fitly set." (Song 5, 12)

The groom is sometimes represented as a dove hidden in secret places or an animal upon the mountains: both of them are positioned high, a bit distant but at the same time present everywhere, the way the first of the following quotations shows:

"O my *dove* that art in the clefts of the rock, in the secret places of the stairs, let me see thy countenance, let me hear thy voice; for sweet is thy voice, and thy countenance is lovely." (Song 2, 14)
"Make haste, my beloved, and be thou like to a roe or to a *young hart upon the mountains of spices*." (Song 8, 14)

At times the bride is compared to a group of animals like *a company of horses, a flock of goats, or a flock of sheep.* This might carry the same message as the above-mentioned metaphor of garden and vineyard: both of them represent a unity of different items.

"*I have compared thee, O my love, to a company of horses in Pharaoh's chariots…*" (Song 1, 9)

The bride and the groom are precious objects

The text abounds with precious and semi-precious stones and expensive jewels, accentuating the noble features of the two lovers. The fact that the groom of the Songs was most probably a king (traditionally he is identified with King Solomon) owning all the wealth of the world does not interfere with the metaphorical interpretation of the text. Like in the case of plants and animals, the different body parts are elaborated on by these sources in a very detailed way. It seems to be important, similarly to the previous cases, that they form a whole body together.

"Thy *lips* are like a *thread of scarlet*, and thy speech is comely…" (Song 4, 3)
"How beautiful are thy *feet* with shoes, O prince's daughter! *the joints of thy thighs are like jewels*, the work of the hands of a cunning workman." (Song 7, 1)

"His *head is as the most fine gold*, his locks are bushy, and black as a raven." (Song 5, 11)
"*his belly is as bright ivory overlaid with sapphires*." (Song 5, 14)

3. METAPHORS OF HUMAN AND DIVINE LOVE

Love is a feature of the plants

As referred to previously, the different features of the flowers, fruits and other plants are there to reflect upon the desirable, pure and noble character of the lovers. Most importantly of all, this appears in the way they love each other. This love is described by the odour, colour, taste and structure of the plants.

Let us first focus on the odour of the plants that saturates the whole book. The spreading odours and pouring of ointments can be understood as a reference to to both sexual desire and the unity of the lovers.[7]

Love is the spreading odour / ointment of the plants
"his lips like *lilies, dropping sweet smelling myrrh*" (Song 5, 13)
Love is a liquid in a container, Sex is pouring ointment
"*thy name is as ointment poured forth…*" (Song 1, 3)
"*stay me with flagons*, comfort me with apples: for I am sick of love…" (Song 2, 5)

The odorous plant, i.e. the lover is like a vessel containing odour or ointment that represent love spreading from the lover towards the beloved one.

The same images, on a more sublime level, can also be interpreted as people's love towards God and God's love towards people. A metonymical explanation to this is the role of ointments in Christian tradition (baptism, confirmation, ordination) and liturgy: Accessories for the event or more broadly, Parts for the whole. These images of the Songs thus stand for some kind of initiation and they do so also with the help of the underlying metaphor: The initiation of divine/human love is the pouring of ointments/spreading of odours.

"*Spikenard and saffron, calamus and cinnamon*, with all *trees of frankincense, myrrh and aloes*, with all the chief spices…" (Song 4, 14)

A parallel image in the Songs is a container holding water: this, instead of the above-mentioned desirability focuses on the purity and essential nature of love.

[7] See e.g. the image of water in Szelid 2007.

"A *fountain* of gardens…" (Song 4, 15)
"*a well* of living waters…" (Song 4, 15)
"a *fountain* sealed" (Song 4, 12)

The fact that the container can be empty as well, is again a telling sign of the divine nature of the Songs. These lines show us that sexual desire is only important here on earth, and divine love functions in a different, ethereal way. The following line might as well be a prefiguration of the Virgin Mary who conceived from God.

"Thy navel is like a *round goblet*, which wanteth not liquor." (Song 7, 2)

Another feature of the plants is their taste. The drinkability and edibility of these plants reflect the uniting desire of the lovers.

Sexual attraction is pleasant taste
"Thy plants are an orchard […] *with pleasant fruits*." (Song 4, 13)
Desire for love is hunger / thirst
Stay me with flagons, comfort me with apples: for I am sick of love. (Song 2, 5)
Making love is eating / drinking
"I sat down under his (the apple tree's) shadow with great delight, and *his fruit was sweet to my taste*." (Song 2, 3)

These metaphors can be extended to the divine level, as well. Grapes and most especially wine are traditionally taken as a reference to the last supper of Jesus and the disciples. It is not surprising that love appears to be sweeter than wine, for wine on the concrete level is something temporal but what it represents, the blood of Jesus and through this His Word and love, is eternal.

"Thy love is *better than wine*…" (Song 1, 2)

The colours of the plants are also metaphorical. The rose that is the symbol of romantic love and has most typically red colour can stand for the blood of Jesus that was shed for us on the cross. This is an unusual mental process as it first goes from a concrete domain (rose) to the abstract (romantic love) then back to another concrete domain (blood) that represents the abstract-level divine love. This cognitive operation is similar to a bouncing ball.

In this context it is no wonder that the bride sees her beloved as red and white, where the rose's redness goes together with the whiteness of the lily, based on the underlying metonymy Whiteness for purity. This is thus the prefiguration of Jesus whose figure is the unification of heaven (white) and earth (red).

"I am the *rose* of Sharon, the *lily* of the valleys." (Song 2, 1)
"My beloved is *white* and *ruddy*, the chiefest among ten thousand." (Song 5, 10)

In some parts the figure of the Virgin Mary can also be discovered:

"Thy belly is like *an heap of wheat* set about with lilies." (Song 7, 2)

The *heap of wheat* expresses fertility through the metaphor A FEATURE OF THE BRIDE IS A FEATURE OF THE PLANT: besides the fact that wheat in itself is a symbol of fertility, a heap of it looks like the round belly of a pregnant woman. At the same time, lilies' whiteness metonymically stands for purity and virginity. The only woman we know of giving birth to a child and at the same time remaining pure in both the literal and the metaphorical sense of the word is the Virgin Mary. However, we need to keep in mind that the second level of interpretation, namely that fertility and purity also refer to the ideal human love, applies here as well, where purity of course is merely understood metaphorically: the purity of the heart.

We have seen above that different plants often appear together in a garden, vineyard and orchard to stand for the beloved lady. On a more abstract level of interpretation these images representing the fertile wife can stand for the whole Church: THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH IS THE UNITY OF PLANTS IN A GARDEN / VINEYARD / ORCHARD. In this context the fertility of both a garden full of plants on the first level and a wife on the second is understood as the fertility of the members of the Church through whom the words of God are expected to flourish.

"Let us get up early to the *vineyards*; let us see if the vine flourish, whether the tender grape appear, and the pomegranates bud forth: there will I give thee my loves…" (Song 7, 12)

In this context, GOD IS A GARDENER:

"Thou that dwellest in the *gardens*, the companions hearken to thy voice: cause me to hear it." (Song 8, 13)

At other places, a similar unity of the Church is expressed by the body metaphor. Here different body parts are symbolized by plants. This is in harmony whith what St. Paul writes in his letter to the Corinthians.[8]

[8] See 1 Cor 12–20.

> "Now *the body is not a single part, but many.* If a foot should say, «Because I am not a hand I do not belong to the body», it does not for this reason belong any less to the body. […] But as it is, God placed the parts, each one of them, in the body as he intended. If they were all one part, where would the body be? But as it is, *there are many parts, yet one body*."

Another metaphor referring to the garden and other similar places is: Sexual unity is entering the garden, vineyard, house.

> "My beloved *put in his hand by the hole of the door*, and my bowels were moved for him." (Song 5, 4)
> "I had *brought him into my mother's house*, and into the chamber that conceived me." (Song 3, 4)

In these lines the one who enters the place is the groom and the place itself stands for the bride. However, at certain points the roles change, which might provide another evidence for the presence of divine love: genders lose their importance.

> "The *king hath brought me into his chambers. He brought me to the banqueting house,* and his banner over me was love…" (Song 1, 4)

The same meaning is carried by the lines in which the lovers call each other brother and sister.

> "O that thou wert as *my brother*, that sucked the breasts of my mother!" (Song 8, 1)

Love is a feature of animals

Features of animals can also be understood as source domains for love. For example:

> Strength of love is a group of animals
> *company of horses* (Song 1, 9)
> *flock of goats* (Song 6, 5)
> *flock of sheep* (Song 6, 6)
> Sexual unity is feeding animals
> "*O thou whom my soul loveth, where thou feedest, where thou makest thy fock to rest at noon.*" (Song 1, 7)

The extensions of the animal domain to divine love is manifested in different ways. As it was mentioned above, the groom sometimes appears in the form of a dove that is the symbol of the Holy Spirit in the Christian tradition. The dove of the text hides in „all clefts of the rock, in the secret places of the stairs", putting it briefly, he is everywhere, like the divine Spirit.

Even images alluding to sexual desire like feeding animals gain a divine interpretaion in the context of the book, where the flock is fed among the lilies, the symbols of purity, that is to say that some kind of spiritual hunger has been satisfied here.

The fact that the bride is compared to a group of animals as mentioned above, makes her stand for the Church: it contains many members who should live in unity.

Love is a feature of objects

The precious objects the lovers compare each other to can both be interpreted metaphorically and metonymically.

The metonymies are instantiations of the Part for whole general metonymy. On the one hand, the Accessory stands for the wedding ceremony, and on the other hand, Precious objects stand for the riches of the church (the precious stones, jewels and gold refer to the chalices in the church), more deeply, for God's kingdom.

Metaphorically, Love is a precious object, The preciousness of the soul is the value of the jewels, Love's / God's steadiness is the steadiness of marble feet, Love's / God's purity is the brightness of ivory.

"*His legs are as pillars of marble*, set upon sockets of fine gold." (Song 5, 15)
"*His belly is as bright ivory* overlaid with sapphires." (Song 5, 14)

Love is a journey

The lovers of the Song of Songs look for each other throughout the whole book.

"I *sought* him whom my soul loveth." (Song 3, 1)
"Whither *is thy beloved turned aside*? That *we may seek him with thee.*" (Song 6, 1)

They would like to travel together, and this desired journey stands for marriage.

"Come, my beloved, *let us go forth into the field*; let us lodge in the villages." (Song 7, 11)

At the time when the Songs were born it was rare for a woman to have her own will realized, let alone going after her beloved before marriage.[9] Most often it was the man's parents who selected a wife for their son.[10] The fact that it is not only the groom but also the bride who looks for her partner in the Songs must have been very striking in the era and gives place to a divine interpretation again: the bride stands for the Church that looks for God, the Redemptor, and He saves her from all evil.

The fact that also the bride is an active partner in the realization of the marriage is supported by the reciprocity of the Possession metaphor.

"*My beloved is mine, and I am his:* he feedeth among the lilies." (Song 2, 16)
"*I am my beloved's, and my beloved is mine:* he feedeth among the lilies" (Song 6, 3)

The Journey metaphor can be extended in the following way: The progression of humans' love to God is a journey. Throughout this journey one should walk on the narrow way, not on the broad one (this image is again a precursor of an extract in the New Testament).[11]

"I will rise now, and go about the city in the streets, and *in the broad ways* […] *I sought him but I found him not.*" (Song 3, 1)

Love is a force

The most essential metaphor of romantic love is the Force metaphor that is based on the fight between the rational and the emotional selves.[12] In typical cases it is the emotional one that wins the battle. In the Song of Songs we come across some of its manifestations, too.

Love is a physical force
"*Draw* me, we will run after Thee." (Song 2, 4)
Love is a rapture
"Thou hast ravished my heart, my sister, my spouse, with one of thine eyes, with one chain of thy neck." (Song 4, 9)

[9] See e. g.: Judg 14, 2.
[10] See e. g.: Gen 24, 4.
[11] See Mt 7, 13–15.
[12] Kövecses 2000.

Love is a fire

"Set me as a seal upon thine heart, as a seal upon thine arm: for love is strong as death; jealousy is cruel as the grave: the coals thereof are *coals of fire*, which hath a most vehement flame." (Song 8, 6)

In the Biblical context we can interpret this force as the representation of divine love, too, and the above-mentioned Fire metaphor provides a good example to this. It states that the opposite of death is not life but love, and it is understood via the Love is heat metaphor.[13] This conclusion has two interpretations.

The first one refers to love in our lives on earth. In this understanding love is the synonym of life, through the Part for whole metonymy, in that love as the most essential part of life stands for life as a whole. This leaves place for the metaphors God is love and God is life.

The second interpretation focuses on the afterlife. Here we can identify the Cause for effect metonymy, namely Love for eternal life. If we love each other here on earth we can get into the Kingdom of God where there is a possibility for us to experience the perfectness of love.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The main question of this paper has been what some of the methods of Cognitive Linguistics can add to explain the possibility of being able to understand the Song of Songs as the love relationship between God and the Church when there is no explicit reference to either of these. Whether or not the songs of the discussed book of the Old Testament were meant to be allegorical when being written or were just mere wedding songs, in the Biblical discourse its reception is context-dependent, and it is like that in a twofold way.

First, there is a metaphorical explanation. The encompassing Biblical text and the Jewish-Christian tradition in which this book is set contains the concrete physical setting of plants, animals and objects of the royal court in Israel. All these are used to understand the nature of love with the help of two underlying metaphors: Human love is a feature of natural objects, Divine love is human love.

Second, there is a metonymical interpretation, represented by The salient part for whole metonymy. The purity of ideal mutual love that is explicitly present in the text and that is a central teaching of Christianity stands for the whole religious teaching: the love relationship between God and the people.

[13] See also Barsi 2003.

SOURCE

Holy Bible, King James Version, Cambridge Edition. Source: http://kingjbible.com/songs/1.htm, downloaded on 28th January, 2012.

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PART 7
UNDERSTANDING PICTURES

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METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN BILLBOARDS

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor and metonymy are fundamental processes of communication. Contrary to traditional approaches, the cognitive paradigm considers them to be conceptual, not linguistic, tools which govern thinking and understanding.[1] Metaphor and metonymy are indispensable processes of cognition, as they facilitate comprehension. Metaphor, for instance, helps to understand the abstract concept of life, by connecting it with the more concrete, thus, more easily apprehensible, experience of a journey (*She has gone through a lot in life.*). Metonymy, on the other hand, can assist in grasping an – invisible – emotion (like love or attraction), through its – more tangible – bodily effect (*He felt hot when he saw the dancer.*). The difference between these two cognitive tools lies in the nature of the connection they establish. Metaphor links concepts based on their correlation in experience, while metonymy operates with entities that are contiguous.[2] People tend to perceive similarities in the features of life and journeys (they both have difficulties/obstacles, choices/crossroads, goals/destinations, etc.), which provides basis for their metaphoric connection. In the case of metonymies, however, the relatedness of the two concepts, the emotional *cause* and the physical *effect* of the emotional state, is already guaranteed, which is why they can metonymically activate each other.

Metaphor and metonymy are not limited to verbal language, though. As Cognitive Linguistics claims, they originate from thought; thus, they are conceptual in nature. This also means that they are probably present in other kinds of communication as well.[3] The scope of the present study is to explore how the abovementioned conceptual mechanisms appear in the visual realm, more specifically, in advertising. I will attempt to demonstrate that, just like verbal language, visuality is also bound to metaphoric and metonymic effects. The analysis will

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[1] Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 37.

[2] Kövecses 2002: 143–144.

[3] Forceville – Urios-Aparasi 2009: 3–4.

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start with a general introduction of these two conceptual mechanisms, then it will turn to their more specific application in visual contexts, and finally it will focus on their particular role in the operation of billboards.

2. METAPHOR

The Metaphor Theory of Cognitive Linguistics comes from Lakoff & Johnson.[4] According to their definition, metaphor is a conceptual, not linguistic, phenomenon, whose function is to facilitate the understanding of a more abstract and thus less easily available concept in terms of another more concrete and thus more readily graspable concept. The connection between the two entities, which belong to different domains, is guaranteed by systematic correspondences, *mappings,* between the source and the target domain. The classic example of life and journey illustrates how metaphor works.

(1) *She has* ***gone through*** *a lot in life.*
(2) *My life is at a* ***crossroads*** *now.*

As shown in examples (1)–(2), we tend to talk about life in terms of journeys. The basis of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor is the correlation of bodily experiences between one's journeys and one's life (that is, between the source domain of JOURNEY and the target domain of LIFE). The experience of being in motion and on a journey, which are inseparable parts of our lives, can be perceived to have a similar structure with the experience of living. The two domains share numerous fundamental correspondences.

JOURNEY	LIFE
traveler	person
co-travelers	partners
obstacles	difficulties
crossroads	choices
destinations	goals
etc.	etc.[5]

[4] LAKOFF – JOHNSON 1980.
[5] Naturally there are a lot of features in which the two domains do not correspond with each other. Why they still can be connected together is explained with their similar meaning focus (KÖVECSES, in press).

Since the majority of our metaphors are based on embodiment, they are more or less universal.[6] To connect the sensation of happiness-sadness to verticality (in a way that happiness is correlated with activeness and upness, while sadness with passiveness and downness) is also a universal and basic metaphor (see examples (3)–(4)). Their experiential basis is easy to see: when we are happy, we tend to be more active, which necessitates most frequently the *upright* body position. Whereas sadness pulls us *down*, in a passive-defensive mood, which is usually coupled with a bowed posture.

(3) *The good news cheered me* ***up****.*
(4) *He has been* ***down*** *ever since they parted.*

Visuality is not without metaphors either. Forceville's studies pointed out that while pictorial metaphors do have their peculiarities, their basic properties are the same as their verbal counterparts.[7] Let us examine the above mentioned metaphor, now applied in a (verbo-) visual context (see fig.1). Even without the text, one has no difficulties identifying when Jon feels up and when he (or Garfield) feels down. The posture, the mouth, and the eyes illustrate and visualize the connection between emotional states and verticality.

FIGURE 1: *happy is up, sad is down*

Anger, another abstract emotion, has even more expressive visual representations. Continuing with the genre of cartoons, there is a noticeable tendency to place the angry person before a red background, which implicitly or explicitly connects the emotional state either with fire or natural force. In verbal contexts the conceptual metaphors of ANGER IS FIRE, ANGER IS HEAT, and ANGER IS A NATURAL

[6] KÖVECSES 2002: 163.
[7] FORCEVILLE 1996, 2006, 2009.

FORCE (examples (5)–(7), respectively) are among the most frequent and universally occurring types.[8]

(5) *He was breathing **fire**.*
(6) *She was **boiling** with anger.*
(7) *It was a **stormy** discussion.*

FIGURE 2: *Anger is fire in Superman (DC Comics)*

FIGURE 3: *Anger is a natural force in Batman (DC Comics)*

[8] KÖVECSES et al. (ms).

Figure 2 serves as a transparent illustration of anger in a visual context. An edgy facial expression, fiery eyes, clenched fists, and the dominance of the red color are unmistakable signs of an agitated emotional state. On *figure 3* lightening is an additional indicator of anger, next to the signals of the face and the colors.

The above examined examples have shown that metaphor is a key tool of communication, be it verbal or visual (or else). Metonymy is another ubiquitous process that governs both our verbal and visual communication.

3. METONYMY

There exist several different approaches to metonymy in the Cognitive Linguistic literature. The most prominent ones include idealized cognitive models,[9] conceptual mappings,[10] or domain highlighting.[11] Despite the different viewpoints, cognitivists seem to agree on the basic function of metonymy: it serves to provide access to a less easily available entity (like an emotion) through another, related entity (like the physical effects of the emotion). Metonymy, therefore, is a reference point construction whose role is to activate a related entity.[12]

As it is built on contiguity, every metonymy incorporates some form of the part-whole relation. In the following examples, it is the part that activates the whole: the face/head, as the central part of the human body, stands for the person.

PART FOR WHOLE

(8) *We need some new **faces** in the team.*

(9) *Two **heads** are better than one.*

Another frequent metonymic relation is when the whole entity is used to evoke only a part of it. It is (most probably) only the point of the pencil and the ink of the pen that is meant in the sentences below.

WHOLE FOR PART

(10) *My **pencil** has broken.*

(11) *Could you give me a **red pen**?*

[9] LAKOFF 1987: 78.
[10] KÖVECSES – RADDEN 1999: 39.
[11] CROFT 2002: 162.
[12] LANGACKER 1999: 199.

It is a further category of metonymies when one part of the entity serves to activate another, related part of the same entity. In example (12) *Dickinson* as the author stands for her work, which in turn stands for the physical, tangible book containing that piece of art. In the same manner, *Bachmann* activates her party first, then the team responsible for the party's presidential campaign.

PART FOR PART
(12) *They bought a* ***Dickinson*** *for 10 dollars.*
(13) ***Bachmann****'s campaign didn't prove to be effective.*

Metonymy can be divided into subtypes not only according to how the target entity (Bachmann's party's marketing team) and the vehicle entity (Bachmann) are related but also according to the degree of conventionalization. Paradis distinguishes three types based on how obvious or automatic the application of the conceptual metonymy is.[13]

(14) *The* ***blue*** *won the tournament.*
(15) *The* ***school*** *reached an agreement on the name of the new auditorium.*
(16) *The* ***school*** *has been renovated since July.*
(17) *Fill up my* ***glass****, please.*
(18) *The* ***glass*** *got chipped.*

In example (14) *the blue* stands for the team in blue outfit, which is a conspicuous case of metonymic language use (CHARACTERISTIC DRESS FOR PERSON/TEAM). Sentences (15)–(16) attract much less notice, appearing to be literal, while they are not. *School*, which is a body of people, on the one hand, and a building, on the other, activates its organizational aspect in the first example, shadowing all the rest, while in the second case it is its architectural part that is put in light, and everything else is left in the background. Cruse calls this phenomenon *facetization*, labelling the different aspects different *facets*.[14] The metonymic nature of examples (17)–(18) remains hidden even more for a lay-observer. The context automatically activates, not the whole concept of the *glass*, but its container aspect in the first case, and its edge in the second, while backgrounding all other features of the category. This phenomenon, which has been called *zone activation* since Langacker,[15] permeates language, as it is almost impossible for every single feature of a concept (like the container capacity, the content, the material, the edge, the bottom, etc. of the glass)

[13] PARADIS 2002: 6.
[14] CRUSE 1995: 38.
[15] LANGACKER 1987: 385–386.

Figure 4: *Portrait – part for whole*
Jan Vermeer van Delft: Girl with a pearl earring (1665)

Figure 5: *Self-portrait – part for whole*
Frida Kahlo: Self-portrait for Dorado (1941)

to equally take part in the specific communication situation, not having a feature, a zone, which is activated more.

Metonymy is an essential part of visuality as well. It is enough to consider the basic principle behind (self-)portraits, a fundamental genre of painting. Such illustrations usually portray only the head and the upper part of the body, but they are meant and are able to evoke the whole person *(figures 4-5),* which is an evident metonymic effect.

Zone activation is a pervasive phenomenon not only of verbal language but also of visual communication. Not all information conveyed by a picture is equally relevant; some parts are more central to the message. The main function of the other elements is to create the frame for the interpretation of the activated zone. Two related pieces by Leonardo Da Vinci illustrate this phenomenon *(fig. 6–7).* The first one, *Saint Anne cartoon*, is considered to be the basis for the second, more famous, painting, portraying Jesus, Mary, and Saint Anne. Even though both pieces of art illustrate a number of figures, it is clear that the central character, due to its larger

form, its central position, and its power relations, is Saint Anne.[16] The figures of Mary and Jesus serve to direct access to and facilitate the interpretation of the third character as the godly grandmother, Saint Anne. The metonymic nature of this process is conspicuous: the *whole* frame (of the HOLY FAMILY) is there to activate only a *part* of it (the grandmother, Anne). Zone activation, it will be revealed, is an indispensable tool of the visual communication of advertising as well.

FIGURE 6: *Active zone*
Leonardo Da Vinci: Saint Anne cartoon
(1499-1501)

FIGURE 7: *Active zone*
Leonardo Da Vinci: The Virgin and the child with Saint Anne (1508-1510)

[16] Even the title supports such a claim. In the first case, it is explicitly Saint Anne that is named, thus, highlighted, while in the second case, it is the "with" structure that gives her a special significance over the other figures.

4. METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN ADVERTISING

As a special subtype of visuality, advertising is also rich in metaphoric-metonymic processes. The significance of the two conceptual tools is in fact fundamental; on the most basic level, billboards are operated by a metaphor and a metonymy. *Metaphorization* is what establishes the connection between the ad and the consumer, which is the very precondition of the communicative situation (more precisely, of manipulation). *Metonymy* is what takes the next step: its part-whole effect mechanism builds up the frame of the message, that is, it places the product in a pleasant context, triggering a positive emotional attitude toward the article. In the next sections, I will provide a detailed analysis of these two processes revealing what lies behind the billboard-effect.

4.1. Metaphor

The first question to ask is what constitutes the essence of an advertisement. Marketing theory defines it as a communication form whose only goal is to influence behavior.[17] How can it still be effective if its purpose is widely known to those it aims to affect? The answer is provided by Grice's interaction theory.[18] Each type of advertisement (from print ads through billboards to audio-video clips) creates a communication situation. According to Grice, communication is governed by cooperation, that is, by the mutual interest of the parties to take part in the communication situation.[19] In the case of advertising, it is obvious why one of the parties, the advertiser, is interested in the cooperation, as his/her goal is to sell, that is, to convince the consumer to buy. Why the other party, the person (becoming a consumer), is motivated to participate is a more subtle question. According to another influential theory of pragmatics, proposed by Sperber & Wilson, the answer lies in the notion of relevance.[20] If the message is relevant for the listener, he/she will want to participate.

In order to make their messages relevant, advertisers exploit some of our basic human characteristics, namely, our needs and desires, on the one hand, and our instinct for imitation, on the other. It is the human form that is the most effective trigger in both cases. In fact, it is telling that the large majority of billboards

[17] Bauer et al. 2007: 49.
[18] Grice 1975.
[19] Participation can also be passive-receptive, that is, listening to the message is already "taking part."
[20] Sperber – Wilson 1986.

portray some human figure, no matter what the product is. The age and gender distribution of the figures, however, is uneven. Marketing psychological evidence shows that people (both women and men) prefer to watch – young – women, for aesthetic reasons. Billboards, consequently, display women much more often, both for a female and a male target audience, though with different meaning foci. Since marketing postulates a sexually bipolar world, with women attracted to men and men attracted to women,[21] it is easy to distinguish the effect mechanism of ads targeting women with asexual female models, and ads targeting men with sexualized female models. What they share is the metaphoric basis.

In the first case, that is, when the gender of the target audience and the model is the same, the ad appears to be a mirror, reflecting our ideal self, that is, a figure that is similar to us, which we can identify with, but which already embodies our desire, not ourselves.[22] The mechanism behind THE AD/BILLBOARD IS A (DISTORTING) MIRROR,[23] the metaphor that makes this illusion possible, is the following: (1) it presents a better (nicer, neater, younger, happier, etc.) self; (2) with this contrast it increases dissatisfaction with the actual self and enhances a feeling of need; (3) finally, it offers satisfaction and a solution to this uncomfortable feeling through the product, by suggesting a cause-effect relation between the product and the desired self. This is what guarantees the individual relevance of advertisements; we feel they respond to our personal needs. What we buy is much more the sensation not the product. As Levitt puts it, the advertisement sells ideals and impressions, not objects.[24]

Figure 8 models the operation of the mirror-metaphor. As it illustrates an active, smiling woman, an ideal, while she is shopping, the billboard's message is that the satisfaction people are eagerly looking for can be reached by shopping, more precisely by buying an epilator. The visual promise of the ad is, consequently, that "if you buy an epilator, not only will you get shoes for free but you will also be this happy (and beautiful and young and desirable) as she is."[25] Since the visual representation of the message portrays the promise, including the emotional contentment, as if it was already realized, we perceive the billboard to be a mirror

[21] Despite a more complex reality. See the research results of The Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction (http://www.kinseyinstitute.org/research/)

[22] ERŐS 1981: 8, NAGY 2010: 92.

[23] It has to be added that the metaphor THE BILLBOARD IS A *DISTORTING* MIRROR is metonymic based: the self is identified with a part of the self, the ideal self (for more on the self, see LAKOFF – JOHNSON 1999).

[24] LEVITT 1983 in BAUER et al. 2007: 167.

[25] The verbal and more explicit message, for which the ad could be accountable for, is more modest, claiming that "if you buy an epilator, you *may* win a pair of shoes." If we compare the space the verbal and the visual message occupies, it is obvious which is more influential.

Figure 8: *The billboard is a (distorting) mirror*

Figure 9: *The product to sell is a person*

and the figure to be our reflected, desired, self. It is this illusion on which the manipulative effect of (asexual) billboards is built.

If the billboard targets the opposite gender, and sexuality comes into play, a different metaphor will be responsible for conveying the message. The drive that the ad aims to reinforce will no longer be that of imitation but of obtaining.

The above billboard (fig. 9) expressively illustrates how the sexualized female figure and the product get blurred, even becoming one (Try *me*. = Try *KFC's Krushers*.). The application of the metaphor The product to sell is a person[26] implies the objectification of the human model, which is most often female. This one-sided, objectifying social message of advertisements, suggesting that the woman can be obtained and purchased just like the product, has been critiqued by numerous fields, including critical discourse analysis, gender studies, and feminist theories.[27]

[26] Kövecses 2002: 59, Velasco-Sacristán – Fuertes-Olivera 2006: 1989.
[27] Velasco-Sacristán – Fuertes-Olivera 2005, Kilyeni 2009, Huszár 2010, Reklámok & Nemek 2007.

4.2. Metonymy

Metonymic processes are also detectable in the operation of billboards. Due to their limited size, billboards must make use of minimal input in order to produce maximal output; that is, they have to activate the whole frame (which triggers the positive attitude toward the product) with only parts of that frame.

The frame is an interpretational background, a reference point,[28] within which the meaning of the category is born. As Fillmore points out, every meaning is relative, that is, frame-dependent.[29] The BALL, interpreted within the FOOTBALL frame, the MAGICIAN frame, or the BABY frame, activates a fundamentally different reading and associates fundamentally different emotions.

Since the space the billboard can utilize is not unbounded, the entirety of the frame cannot be displayed, but it can be evoked. Obviously, without metonymic, part-whole processes this would never be possible. As my research concentrates on billboards that deal with women, I will demonstrate the general metonymic aspects of advertisements by examining the typical frames of the specific category of WOMAN. Most frequently, the frames of BEAUTY, FAMILY, and SEXUALITY are the ones that serve to give context to the female character (and the product connected to her). All three frames bestow specific activators, in order to evoke the (entire) frame, including the emotional connotations. For the BEAUTY frame, we have already seen an example *(figure 8).* The shopping bag and the multiple display of the product are the main activators of the SHOPPING frame, subframe of BEAUTY. The activation of such a frame brings the additional aspects of *hobby, money, appearance,* and *pleasing* into the picture as well, while also identifying the woman with the *consumer* who cares for her looks.

Another referential background of the woman is the FAMILY, in which she is the mother. The principal activators of this frame are a female and a male figure, of approximately the same age, accompanied by a child *(figure 10).* Since such a grouping of people constitutes the family stereotype, it automatically evokes the frame. The physical contact of the figures is an additional, potential activator of the FAMILY frame (which is motivated by the metaphor EMOTIONAL BONDING IS PHYSICAL CLOSENESS). Similarity, in skin color, hair, and facial expression, is another, metaphor-based, element that supports their belonging. As we can see, these are only potential parts of a frame, but, thanks to our metonymic automatisms, they manage to create the illusion of the frame and evoke a set of positive associations.

[28] LANGACKER 1999: 199.
[29] FILLMORE 1982: 112.

Figure 10: *Family*

The third typical frame connected to women is the frame of sexuality. Usually both the face and the body add to a sexual interpretation, not unlike in *figure 11*. As far as the face is concerned, the lips play the most dominant role: the red of the lipstick and the white of the teeth make the oral area especially salient. The hair is also significant; as evolutionary psychological evidence shows, long and shiny locks are the instinctive indicators of feminine fertility, health, and sensuality.[30] It is interesting to notice that billboards almost exclusively display long-haired models. As for the signals of the body, nakedness is an explicit activator of sexuality, just like feminine curves. The breasts, primary evolutionary symbols of femininity, are

Figure 11: *Sexuality*

[30] Bereczkei – Meskó 2006: 35.

positioned in the center of the billboard, but the curved posture accentuates the pelvic area as well. Even though all these are only parts, they are sufficient to evoke the whole frame of SEXUALITY, with all its associated emotions.

In addition to activating the adequate frame, metonymy has another function in the billboard-effect: connecting the positive associations of the frame to the product. This is accomplished by a causation metonymy. The pleasant emotional state, originating from the context, is portrayed as if it had been caused by the product. That is, in order to be an active and jovial woman, all one needs to do is to buy an epilator *(figure 8)*. In order to have a balanced and happy family, one needs to arrange one's banking affairs at FHB *(figure 10)*. Finally, in order to be desirable, one needs to purchase a bikini *(figure 11);* and looking at the other side of the same frame, obtaining a desirable woman equals drinking a shake *(figure 9)*. These mappings, which contribute to the efficiency of the ad, are enabled by metonymic processes.[31]

5. CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, metaphor and metonymy play a central role in the visual communication of billboards. As we have seen, metaphor is a process that connects two entities based on their correlation in experience. In the case of billboards, the role of the metaphor is to establish a relationship between the ad and the audience, creating a personal relevance. As a consequence, the ad functions either as a mirror or as a personifier, stimulating our instincts of imitation or obtaining. On the other hand, metonymy, which is a reference point construction, helps build a context for the product that is desirable enough to be motivating. In the case of the woman category, BEAUTY, FAMILY, and SEXUALITY seemed to be the most frequently occurring frames. Thanks to part-whole effects, it is enough to display only a limited number of activators (like lipstick, curves, and nakedness) in order for the frame (of SEXUALITY) to be evoked. The pleasant associations of the activated frame are then projected upon the product as if it was the cause (feeling sexy is the consequence of and achievable by wearing a bikini). While these are only a few of the metaphors and metonymies that can take part in the operation of billboards, they aptly illustrate the processes that form the bases of the billboards' effect mechanism.

[31] In the last case, a metaphor (SEXUAL DESIRE IS THIRST) is also in play.

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PART 8
PROVERBS

Sadia BelKhir*

VARIATION IN SOURCE AND TARGET DOMAIN MAPPINGS IN ENGLISH AND KABYLE DOG PROVERBS[1]

1. INTRODUCTION

The influence of culture upon human cognition is a fact that is widely recognized nowadays. Various instances that demonstrate this influence have been reported. Among these is the interesting case of metaphor which, in the cultural cognitive linguistic view, is considered as a cognitive, linguistic and cultural phenomenon subject to variation. The relationship that links metaphor, cognition and culture can clearly be seen when the specific cultural aspects of a given social group conceptually mould metaphor in particular ways. Through a contrastive analysis involving English and Kabyle[2] dog proverbs, the present article offers additional evidence suggesting the direct influence of culture on human cognition and, thus, on metaphor. The question that is raised is the following: Are the source and target domain mappings involved in metaphoric dog proverbs the same or different in English and Kabyle? My main objective is to explore the variation of mappings in the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS DOG BEHAVIOUR conceptual metaphor involved in these proverbs in order to show that remote cultural specificities result in far more differences than similarities between English and Kabyle. In addition, the main meaning foci denoted in the proverbs will be contrasted so as to find out the extent to which they bear positive and/or negative connotations. Then, the results of the contrastive analysis will be provided and discussed with regard to cultural representations of dogs' role in English and Kabyle.

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[2] Kabyle is a variety of the Tamazight language spoken in the Northern part of Algeria.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Interest in the study of metaphor in cognition in terms of cross domain mapping began with George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's publication *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). In their view, "*the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.*"[3] That is, metaphor is the result of a conceptual mapping between a concrete source domain and an abstract target domain. They furthermore claim that metaphors are not only linguistic aspects characterizing language but cognitive constructs that structure our thought and actions.[4] In a later publication; namely, *More Than Cool Reason: A field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, Lakoff G. together with Turner M. (1989) set out to study proverb interpretation. They introduce the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. They say: "*There exists a single generic-level metaphor, GENERIC IS SPECIFIC, which maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel specific-level schemas that all have the same generic level structure as the source-domain schema.*"[5] For instance, the proverb *barking dogs seldom bite* contains the specific-level concepts *barking, dogs, seldom, bite.* By means of the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, this proverb is interpreted at a generic level. That is, *barking dogs* represent any persons who argue strongly and *seldom bite* refers to the harmlessness of the action of arguing. In this way, the generic meaning of the proverb is obtained: people who argue strongly harm no one. Furthermore, Lakoff G. and Turner M. (1989) introduce the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR that they describe as a whole that allows proverb understanding through the comprehension of human features and behaviours via analogy with those of animals and objects and vice-versa.[6]

Kövecses Z. (2002) shares the ideas held by Lakoff G. and Turner Mark (1989), as he says: "*Much of human behavior seems to be metaphorically understood in terms of ANIMAL behaviour.*"[7] This concerns the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR conceptual metaphor in which the source domain of animals is mapped onto the target domain of humans. He moreover raises the question of how linguistic expressions related to animals obtain their meaning. In answer to this question, he argues that "*humans attributed human characteristics to animals and then reapplied these characteristics to humans. That is, animals were personified first, and then the "human-based animal characteristics" were used to understand human behaviour.*"[8] He furthermore introduces the notion of *main meaning focus*

[3] Lakoff – Johnson 1980: 5.
[4] ibid: 3.
[5] Lakoff –Turner 1989: 162.
[6] ibid: 172.
[7] Kövecses 2002: 124.
[8] Ibid: 125.

which he defines as a *major theme.*[9] He considers that the main meaning focus of THE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR is *objectionability* or *undesirability* which leads to the reformulation of the conceptual metaphor into OBJECTIONABLE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR. He remarks that metaphors related to animals "*capture the negative characteristics of human beings.*"[10] However, he notes that not all metaphors follow this pattern. In his work *Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation*, Kövecses Z. (2005) draws attention to the limitations of earlier studies of metaphor in accounting for the tight link between metaphor and culture, thus, giving priority to universal metaphors over those that are not. He in fact contends that "w*hen we look at metaphors in the world's languages, we have the distinct impression that there is a large number of nonuniversal metaphors as well, and that they may be just as numerous as the universal ones, if not more…*"[11] He accordingly undertakes research to demonstrate the way in which conceptual metaphor and its components are subject to variation under the influence of culturally-specific features. As far as, metaphorical mappings are concerned, he claims: "*Mappings characterizing particular conceptual metaphors can change through time and can vary from culture to culture, and from subculture to subculture.*"[12]

Relying on these findings, I will investigate the variation of mappings in the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS DOG BEHAVIOUR conceptual metaphor found in some English and Kabyle dog proverbs. I will try to demonstrate that there exist different sets of mappings for the same conceptual metaphor. These differences are the result of different ways of conceptualisation within two different cultures: a Western English culture and a North African Kabyle culture. The enterprise I intend to undertake necessitates a research method and materials. These will be described hereafter.

3. METHODOLOGY

To conduct my study, I will resort to contrastive analysis, a method that allows the comparison of aspects existing in different languages with the intention of finding similarities and differences. I will rely on a corpus composed of proverbs involving the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS DOG BEHAVIOUR metaphor. The English proverbs are extracted from *The Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs*

[9] Ibid: 110.
[10] Ibid: 125.
[11] Kövecses 2005: 3
[12] Ibid: 127.

(1970) and Rosalind Fergusson's *The Penguin Dictionary of Proverbs* (2000). The Kabyle proverbs are taken from Youcef Nacib's *Proverbes et Dictons Kabyles* (2009). The corpus is included in the appendix.

4. CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF DOGS IN ENGLISH AND KABYLE CULTURES

A description of the characteristics of the dog and its role in the English and Kabyle cultures is useful for an understanding of the cultural representations associated with this domestic animal. This will illuminate some of the reasons underlying possible variations in the metaphorical mappings.

As far as the English culture is concerned, the Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture (2005) defines the word "dog" and describes the role of the domestic animal as "*1.a common four-legged animal, especially of the many varieties kept by humans as companions or for hunting, working, guarding, etc.*"[13] In its metaphoric use, the word "dog" has a negative connotation as it refers to "*a despicable man or youth.*"[14] The word is also used in slang to denote "*an ugly, boring, or crude person.*"[15] Dalziel H. (1883), in his book *British Dogs: their Varieties, History, characteristics, Breeding, Management, and Exhibition*, describes the dog as an animal endowed with "*wonderful scenting powers, […] great speed, […] strength and endurance, […] indomitable courage, […] power of arranging, and facility in carrying out a preconcerted attack on his prey.*"[16] In his view, these features lead man to have the desire to own this useful and lovable animal. In addition, he mentions the existence of many varieties of dogs in Britain and provides classifications of British dogs according to their role. For example, greyhounds are used in field sports and are described as good hunters of the hare. Competitions are organised for greyhounds where the foremost dog who kills the hare is the winner. Shepherds' and drovers' dogs are varieties useful to man and Dalmatians are good watchers and defenders of life, etc.[17] Nowadays, the British consider dogs as popular pets. They "*often give them a lot of attention and consider them to be part of the family.*"[18] Moreover, a British competition known as "Cruft's dog show" is organised for dogs

[13] Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture 2005: 403.
[14] The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1987: 578.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Dalziel 1883: 4.
[17] Cf. Ibid: 9–10.
[18] Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture 2005: 403.

in Birmingham every year. The aim of the competition is to find out the best dog in the country, i.e., the "Cruft's Supreme Champion."[19]

In the Kabyle culture, a dog bearing the name "*Kabyle dog* or *the Atlas sheepdog*" is mainly used for guarding flocks and people's homes and belongings because of its ferocity and protective instinct.[20] This dog is also useful for hunters, as it "*exhibits strong scenting ability, making him a reliable hunting companion.*"[21] It has to be remarked that the Kabyle dog is kept outside the home, not only because it is used for guarding but also because it is considered to be a dirty animal. However, Kabyle people perceive the dog as an enduring and patient animal as maintained in the following saying: "aqjun yefka-yas Ṛebbi ṣṣber, yeskad kan swallen"[22] (Allah has given patience to the dog, He is content with asking for something with his eyes). From a socio-cultural point of view, the use of the word *aqjun* (dog), in any context in Kabyle, is felt as being rude and perceived as an insult.[23] So, when Kabyle speakers use the word *aqjun* (dog) in speech, they immediately apologize for doing so through the use of the word *ḥaca* (apologies).

5. ACCOUNT OF MAPPINGS IN ENGLISH AND KABYLE DOG PROVERBS

The description and classification of the mappings involved in the English and Kabyle dog proverbs under study is presented below. Table (1) is devoted to the English proverbs while table (2) presents the Kabyle ones. The source and target domains in each table correspond respectively to the DOG BEHAVIOUR and HUMAN BEHAVIOUR.

Table (1) reveals that BARKING is the dog behaviour that is mostly used in English dog proverbs. BITING and QUARRELLING are also used more than other dog behaviours such as HUNTING, TAIL WAGGING, GNAWING BONE, etc.

Table 2 shows that compared to dog behaviours like BITING, QUARRELLING, BEING FEROCIOUS, etc., BARKING is the mostly used dog behaviour in Kabyle dog proverbs.

[19] Ibid: 332.
[20] Encyclopédie Berbère Vol.xiii 1994: 1920–1924.
[21] http://dogbreeds.bulldoginformation.com/aidi-chien-atlas.html.
[22] Dallet 1982: 657.
[23] Dallet 1982: 657. Genevois 1963: 58.

DOG BEHAVIOUR	Proverbs	HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
BARKING	Barking dogs seldom bite. Dogs bark and the caravan goes on. Dogs that bark at a distance bite not at hand. The dog barks in vain at the moon. The dog that is idle barks at his fleas, but he that is hunting feels them not. Dogs bark as they are bred. An old dog barks not in vain. If the old dog barks, he gives counsel.	IDLE THREATENING IDLE THREATENING IDLE THREATENING IDLE THREATENING COMPLAINING ABOUT PETTY MATTERS BEHAVING BADLY GIVING ADVICE GIVING ADVICE
NOT EATING BITING NOT BITING	Dog does not eat dog. The dog bites the stone, not him that throws it. Dead dogs bite not.	BEING LOYAL WITH COMPANIONS SHIFTING THE BLAME BEING HARMLESS
QUARRELLING	Two dogs strive for a bone, and a third runs away with it. Quarrelsome dogs get dirty coats. Quarrelling dogs come halting home.	QUARRELLING QUARRELING QUARRELLING
HUNTING FOULEST WORRYING A HARE BEING FOREMOST	The dog that hunts foulest, hits at most faults. Many dogs may easily worry one hare. The foremost dog catches the hare.	BEHAVING BADLY FIGHTINGOVER/ WORRYING A PERSON BEING THE FIRST
TAIL WAGGING	Dogs wag their tails not so much in love to you as to your bread.	INSINCERE FLATTERY
FAWNING	Better to have a dog fawn on you than bite you.	GIVING APPARENT RESPECT
FETCHING CARRYING	The dog that fetches will carry.	BRINGING CARRYING GOSSIP
SLEEPING/LYING	Let sleeping dogs lie.	STOP MAKING TROUBLE
UNABLE TO LEARN	You can't teach an old dog new tricks.	UABLE TO COPE WITH NEW IDEAS
DISAGREEING	Two dogs and a bone never agree.	NOT BEING AT PEACE WITH OTHERS
FOLLOWING MASTER	If you would wish the dog to follow you, feed him.	BEING OBEDIENT
LEAVING A FOREIGN MASTER	He that keeps another man's dog, shall have nothing left him but the line.	BEING UNGRATEFUL

DOG BEHAVIOUR	Proverbs	HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
GNAWING A BONE	While the dog gnaws bone, companions would be none.	GUARDING WINNINGS AND PROFITS
DROWNING	when a dog is drowning, everyone offers him drink.	BEING UNABLE TO FIGHT BACK
RETURNING TO HIS VOMIT	The dog returns to his vomit.	RETURNING TO THE SCENE OF THE CRIME
LICKING ASHES	The dog that licks ashes trust not with meal.	BEING SATISFIED WITH INFERIOR THINGS
BEING GOOD	A good dog deserves a good bone.	BEING GOOD
BEING DUMB AND DANGEROUS	Dumb dogs are dangerous.	SILENT PEOPLE MAY BE DANGEROUS

Table (1): *Source and Target Domain Mappings in English Dog Proverbs*

DOG BEHAVIOUR	Proverbs	HUMAN BEHAVIOUR.
BARKING NOT BARKING	Aqjun isseglafen ur ite ţ ţara (A barking dog does not bite) Isseglaf wqjun 99 tikwal ɣef qarrus, tis miyya ibab-is. (The dog barks 99 times to protect himself, the hundredth's time to protect his master) Iqwjan-neɣ ur seglafen-ara fellas (Our dogs do not bark at him)	IDLE THREATENING BEING SELFISH FEELING SOMEONE FAMILIAR
BITING	Tekkseɣ iselfan i wegdi, ihebber dgi. (I remove fleas from the dog, he bites me)	BEING UNGRATEFUL
BEING GRAND	Mugger wugdi urtiwi ta3 rict. (The dog is so grand that the garret does not contain him)	BEING ARROGANT
EATING OR NOT EATING	Fkas iwegdi aclim, ad yeč č neɣ ad yeqqim (Give bran to the dog, he eats it or leaves it)	BEING EXACTING/ DEMANDING
QUARRELLING	Amennuɣ gizem yibbwas, amennuɣ bwgdi kullas. (The lion quarrels once, the dog quarrels every day)	PERMANENT QUARRELLING

DOG BEHAVIOUR	Proverbs	HUMAN BEHAVIOUR.
SUCCEEDING	Yerbah weqjun 3alqen-as taqlaṭ. (The dog succeeded, we put a collar to him)	SUCCEEDING
BEING FEROCIOUS	Addred aqjun, dmedd a3kwaz (When you mention the dog, take a stick)	BEING AGRESSIVE
BEING MAD	Aqjun ikelben d imawlan at iḥekmen (A mad dog must be controlled by his masters)	BEING INSOLENT
LIVING LONG LIFE	D la3mer bwqjun (It is a dog's life)	HAVING ENDURANCE AND PATIENCE

TABLE (2): *Source and Target Domain Mappings in Kabyle dog proverbs*

6. ACCOUNT OF THE MAIN MEANING FOCI IN ENGLISH AND KABYLE DOG PROVERBS

Kövecses Z. (2002) maintains that the main meaning focus of the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR metaphor is *objectionability* or *undesirability.* However, some metaphors' main meaning focus is desirability. In this case, positive features of humans are denoted. Hereafter, I classify the English and Kabyle proverbs according to the main meaning foci denoted in the metaphors; i.e. undesirability and desirability.

Undesirability	Barking dogs seldom bite. (BARKING) The dog that is idle barks at his fleas, but he that is hunting feels them not. (BARKING) Dogs bark as they are bred. (BARKING) Dogs bark and the caravan goes on. (BARKING) Dogs that bark at a distance bite not at hand. (BARKING) The dog barks in vain at the moon. (BARKING) The dog bites the stone, not him that throws it. (BITING) Two dogs strive for a bone, and a third runs away with it. (QUARRELLING) Quarrelsome dogs get dirty coats. (QUARRELLING) Quarrelling dogs come halting home. (QUARRELLING) The dog that hunts foulest, hits at most faults. (HUNTING FOULEST) Dogs wag their tails not so much in love to you as to your bread. (TAIL WAGGING) Better to have a dog fawn on you than bite you. (FAWNING)

	The dog that fetches will carry. (FETCHING-CARRYING) You can't teach an old dog new tricks. (UNABLE TO LEARN) Two dogs and a bone never agree. (DISAGREEING) Many dogs may easily worry one hare. (WORRYING A HARE) He that keeps another man's dog shall have nothing left him but the line. (LEAVING A FOREIGN MASTER) While the dog gnaws bone, companions would be none. (GNAWING BONE) When a dog is drowning, everyone offers him drink. (DROWNING) The dog returns to his vomit. (RETURNING TO VOMIT) The dog that licks ashes trust not with meal. (LICKING ASHES) Dumb dogs are dangerous. (BEING DUMB AND DANGEROUS)
Desirability	An old dog barks not in vain. (BARKING) If the old dog barks, he gives counsel. (BARKING) Dog does not eat dog. (NOT EATING) Dead dogs bite not. (NOT BITING) Let sleeping dogs lie. (SLEEPING/LYING) If you would wish the dog to follow you, feed him. (FOLLOWING MASTER) The foremost dog catches the hare. (BEING FOREMOST) A good dog deserves a good bone. (BEING GOOD)

Table 3: *Classification of the English Proverbs According to the Main Meaning Foci.*

As can be seen from table 3, the number of proverbs classified within the undesirability main meaning focus is superior to that of the proverbs classified within the desirability one. This implies that people use dog proverbs to denote negative behaviours more than they do to express positive ones.

Undesirability	Aqjun isseglafen ur ite ţ ţara (BARKING) Isseglaf wqjun 99 tikwal ɣef qarrus, tis miyya ibab-is. (BARKING) Tekkseɣ iselfan i wegdi, ihebber dgi. (BITING) Muqqer wugdi urtiwi ta3 rict. (BEING GRAND) Fkas iwegdi aclim, ad yeč č neɣ ad yeqqim. (EATING OR NOT EATING) Amennuɣ gizem yibbwas, amennuɣ bwgdi kullas. (QUARRELLING) Addred aqjun, dmedd a3kwaz (BEING FEROCIOUS) Aqjun ikelben d imawlan at iḥekmen (BEING MAD)
Desirability	Iqwjan-neɣ ur seglafen-ara fellas. (NOT BARKING) Yerbaḥ weqjun 3alqen-as taqlaṭ. (SUCCEEDING) D la3mer bwqjun (LIVING LONG LIFE)

Table (4): *Classification of the Kabyle Proverbs According to the Main Meaning Foci.*

Table (4) demonstrates that Kabyle proverbs involving the undesirability main meaning focus constitute a greater portion than those including the desirability one. This is indicative of Kabyle people's use of dog proverbs to refer to negative behaviours more than to positive ones.

7. CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

So far, I have described the mappings involved in the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS DOG BEHAVIOUR in English and Kabyle proverbs. In addition, I have classified the proverbs according to the main meaning foci they convey. These description and classification will allow me to contrast these aspects. Once this is done, I will attempt to discuss these findings with regard to the influence of cultural features.

Relying on the data that have been supplied in tables (1) and (2), I will begin by contrasting the dog behaviours involved in the mappings. Then, I will compare the human behaviours. These steps will reveal the extent to which the mappings being used in the proverbs of the two languages involve similar or different dog and human behaviours.

First, I have discovered that one proverb is common to English and Kabyle; namely, *barking dogs seldom bite* and *Aqjun isseglafen ur iteţţara*. In these proverbs, the source domain is BARKING and the target domain is IDLE THREATENING; so, the mapping is the same. As far as the other proverbs are concerned, I have noticed that some similar dog behaviours are used in the proverbs of the two languages. For example, BARKING is the mostly used dog behaviour in English and Kabyle proverbs. However, the mappings are different. Other shared dog behaviours include QUARRELLING and BITING.

A number of dog behaviours are used in English proverbs but not in Kabyle ones and vice versa. In fact, English proverbs involve such dog behaviours as HUNTING, TAIL WAGGING, FAWNING, FETCHING, CARRYING, SLEEPING, UNABLE TO LEARN, DISAGREEING, FOLLOWING HIS MASTER, LEAVING A FOREIGN MASTER, GNAWING BONE, DROWNING, RETURNING TO HIS VOMIT, LICKING ASHES, BEING GOOD, BEING DUMB AND DANGEROUS. These dog behaviours are not used in Kabyle proverbs. Similarly, Kabyle proverbs include such dog behaviours as BEING GRAND, EATING OR NOT EATING, SUCCEEDING, BEING FEROCIOUS, BEING MAD, LIVING LONG LIFE. These dog behaviours are not found in English proverbs.

As far as human behaviours are concerned, the ones that are used in the English proverbs and which are found to be used in Kabyle as well include IDLE THREATENING, QUARRELLING and BEING UNGRATEFUL. However, it should be recalled that the mappings are not similar. A set of human behaviours are particularly used in English but absent in Kabyle and vice-versa. For instance, I have found that the following human behaviours are not used in Kabyle dog proverbs: COMPLAINING ABOUT PETTY MATTERS, BEHAVING BADLY, GIVING ADVICE, BEING LOYAL WITH COMPANIONS, SHIFTING THE BLAME, BEING HARMLESS, INSINCERE FLATTERY, GIVING APPARENT RESPECT, BRINGING GOSSIP, CARRYING GOSSIP, STOP TROUBLE

MAKING, BEING UNABLE TO COPE WITH NEW IDEAS, NOT BEING AT PEACE WITH OTHERS, FIGHTING OVER /WORRYING A PERSON, BEING OBEDIENT, GUARDING WINNNINGS AND PROFITS, BEING UNABLE TO FIGHT BACK, BEING THE FIRST, RETURNING TO THE SCENE OF HIS CRIME, BEING SATISFIED WITH INFERIOR STUFF, BEING GOOD, SILENT PEOPLE MAY BE DANGEROUS. In addition, some human behaviours are only used in Kabyle. These include BEING SELFISH, FEELING SOMEONE FAMILIAR, BEING ARROGANT, BEING EXACTING/DEMANDING, SUCCEEDING, BEING AGRESSIVE, BEING INSOLENT and HAVING ENDURANCE AND PATIENCE.

The dog behaviours that are found to be common to English and Kabyle proverbs are BARKING, QUARRELLING and BITING. This similarity can be explained by the fact that barking, quarrelling and biting are kinds of behaviours that dogs in general have. That is, regardless of breed and geographical area, all dogs share these behaviours. This leads people to conceptualise human behaviour in terms of dogs' barking, quarrelling and biting irrespective of their socio-cultural environment.

My findings also reveal that a great number of dog behaviours are not common to English and Kabyle dog proverbs. This difference has a culture-specific explanation. An interesting example that can be provided to support this claim is the source domain of HUNTING characterising some English proverbs but not Kabyle ones. In the following proverbs: *The dog that hunts foulest, hits at most faults, Many dogs may easily worry one hare* and *The foremost dog catches the hare* involve the source domain of hunting. As was remarked earlier, it is part of the British culture for dogs, like greyhounds, to be used to hunt hares and participate in competitions in which the dog that is foremost and catches the hare is the winner. Such a cultural tradition belongs to the British but not to Kabyle people. As a result, the source domain of DOG BEHAVIOUR involves HUNTING FOULEST, WORRYING A HARE and BEING FOREMOST on which are mapped various human behaviours in English dog proverbs including BEHAVING BADLY, FIGHTING OVER/ WORRYING A PERSON and BEING THE FIRST while this does not occur in Kabyle. Another example shows the influence of culture and people's perceptions upon the mappings. Because Kabyle people perceive dogs as patient and enduring animals, they conceptualise HUMAN ENDURANCE in terms of DOG'S LONG LIFE in the proverb D la3mer bwqjun (it's a dog's life). This is completely different from the way the British conceptualise dog's life, as illustrated by the English idiomatic expression *To lead a dog's life,* meaning to lead a boring life. Therefore, there is no English proverb in which HUMAN ENDURANCE is mapped onto DOG'S LONG LIFE.

Another interesting finding relates to the main meaning foci denoted in the English and Kabyle proverbs. As was already mentioned, the word dog is perceived

as an insult by Kabyle speakers and is used to refer to a despicable man or youth by English people. Accordingly, both English and Kabyle speakers use dog proverbs to refer to negative features and behaviours more than they do to describe positive ones. The undesirability main meaning focus is highly denoted in the proverbs of the two languages in contrast with the desirability one. In fact, I have found 23 English proverbs involving the undesirability main meaning focus and 8 proverbs bearing the desirability one. In Kabyle, I have found 8 proverbs having the undesirability main meaning focus and only 3 involving the desirability one. Although the basic tendency to associate dogs with undesirability is similar, the ways of expressing it map differently. For instance, In the English proverb *"dogs bark as they are bred"* BARKING is mapped onto BEHAVING BADLY. Such a mapping does not exist in Kabyle proverbs. Moreover, in the Kabyle proverb Isseglaf wqjun 99 tikwal ɣef qarrus, tis miyya ibab-is (The dog barks 99 times to protect himself, the hundredth's time to protect his master), BARKING is mapped onto BEING SELFISH. Such a mapping is absent in English proverbs.

8. CONCLUSIONS

The study I have conducted represents a modest attempt to show the effect of cultural specificities upon the metaphorical mappings involved in the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR metaphor in some English and Kabyle dog proverbs. The main findings reached through the study revealed the existence of one proverb sharing a similar mapping while others involve different ones. In addition, only a few mappings sharing similar source and/or target aspects are found to be used in the two languages leading to the conclusion that there are more differences than similarities in the conceptual mappings involved in the HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR metaphor due to divergent cultural specificities.

While this study could only consider a small sample, its results suggest that it would be fruitful to investigate the variation of mappings in other animal-related proverbs and other languages. Such research will help to illuminate the degree to which cultural specificities influence conceptual mappings.

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APPENDIX I: ENGLISH DOG PROVERBS

A good dog deserves a good bone.
Better to have a dog fawn on you than bite you.
Dog does not eat dog.
The dog that fetches will carry.
The dog that is idle barks at his fleas, but he that is hunting feels them not.
The dog bites the stone, not him that throws it.
Barking dogs seldom bite.
Dogs bark as they are bred.
An old dog barks not in vain.
If the old dog barks, he gives counsel.
You can't teach an old dog new tricks.
Dogs bark and the caravan goes on.
Let sleeping dogs lie.
Dead dogs bite not.

Dumb dogs are dangerous.
Two dogs and a bone never agree.
Dogs that bark at a distance bite not at hand.
Dogs wag their tails not so much in love to you as to your bread.
Many dogs may easily worry one hare.
If you would wish the dog to follow you, feed him.
While the dog gnaws bone, companions would be none.
When a dog is drowning, everyone offers him drink.
The foremost dog catches the hare.
The dog barks in vain at the moon.
The dog returns to his vomit.
The dog that licks ashes trust not with meal.
The dog that hunts foulest, hits at most faults.
Two dogs strive for a bone, and a third runs away with it.
Quarrelsome dogs get dirty coats.
Quarreling dogs come halting home.
He that keeps another man's dog, shall have nothing left him but the line.

APPENDIX II: KABYLE DOG PROVERBS

Fkas iwegdi aclim, ad yeč č neɣ ad yeqqim
give-him to dog bran will he-eat or will he-let
Give to the dog bran, he eats it or let it.
Iqwjann neɣ ur seglafen ara fellas
dogs our not bark-they not on-him.
Our dogs do not bark at him.
Isseglaf wqjun 99 tikwal ɣef qarrus, tis miyya ibabis.
he-barks the-dog 99 times on head-his the hundredth to master-his
The dog barks 99 times for himself and the hundredth time for his master.
Aqjun isseglafen ur ite ţ ţara.
the-dog barking not bite not
A barking dog does not bite.
Tekkseɣ iselfan iwegdi, ihebberdgi.
I-remove fleas from the dog he-bites in-me
while I remove the dogs fleas, he bites me.
Muqqer wugdi urtiwi ta rict.
is-grand the dog not contain the-garret
The dog is so grand that the garret does not contain him.
Amennuɣ gizem yibbwas, amennuɣ bwgdi kullas.
the-quarrel of-the-lion one-day the-quarrel of-the-dog everyday
The lion quarrels once, the dog quarrels every day.
Yerbah weqjun 3alqenas taqlaṭ. he-succeeded the-dğg they-ţut-him a cğllar
The dog succeeded, they put a collar to him

Addred aqjun, dmedd a3kwaz
Mention dog take a-stick
When you mention the dog, take a stick
Aqjun ikelben d imawlan at ihekmen
Dog being-mad it-is masters will control-him
A mad dog must be controlled by his masters
D la3mer bwqjun
It-is life of-dog
It's a dog's life

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